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Abstract
In an emerging computing paradigm, computational capabilities, from processing power to
storage capacities, are offered to users over communication networks as a service. This new
paradigm holds enormous promise for increasing the utility of computationally weak de-
vices. A natural approach is for weak devices to delegate expensive tasks, such as storing
a large file or running a complex computation, to more powerful entities (say servers) con-
nected to the same network. While the delegation approach seems promising, it raises an
immediate concern: when and how can a weak device verify that a computational task was
completed correctly? This practically motivated question touches on foundational questions
in cryptography and complexity theory.
The focus of this thesis is verifying the correctness of delegated computations. We con-
struct efficient protocols (interactive proofs) for delegating computational tasks. In particu-
lar, we present:
e A protocol for delegating any computation, where the work needed to verify the cor-
rectness of the output is linear in the input length, polynomial in the computation's
depth, and only poly-logarithmic in the computation's size. The space needed for ver-
ification is only logarithmic in the computation size. Thus, for any computation of
polynomial size and poly-logarithmic depth (the rich complexity class N/C), the work
required to verify the correctness of the output is only quasi-linear in the input length.
The work required to prove the output's correctness is only polynomial in the origi-
nal computation's size. This protocol also has applications to constructing one-round
arguments for delegating computation, and efficient zero-knowledge proofs.
* A general transformation, reducing the parallel running time (or computation depth) of
the verifier in protocols for delegating computation (interactive proofs) to be constant.
Next, we explore the power of the delegation paradigm in settings where mutually dis-
trustful parties interact. In particular, we consider the settings of checking the correctness
of computer programs and of designing error-correcting codes. We show:
* A new methodology for checking the correctness of programs (program checking), in
which work is delegated from the program checker to the untrusted program being
checked. Using this methodology we obtain program checkers for an entire complexity
class (the class of N/C-computations that are WNC-hard), and for a slew of specific
functions such as matrix multiplication, inversion, determinant and rank, as well as
graph functions such as connectivity, perfect matching and bounded-degree graph iso-
morphism.
* A methodology for designing error-correcting codes with efficient decoding procedures,
in which work is delegated from the decoder to the encoder. We use this methodology
to obtain constant-depth (ACo) locally decodable and locally-list decodable codes. We
also show that the parameters of these codes are optimal (up to polynomial factors)
for constant-depth decoding.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In a wide array of modern computing setting, parties want to accomplish tasks (compu-
tational or otherwise) that they cannot or do not want to perform themselves. A natural
approach in such situations is for such a party, the delegator, to delegate the task to another
entity, a delegatee, which will perform it for them. One increasingly prevalent such setting
is that of cloud computing, where users (delegators) outsource their data and even their
computations to remote servers (delegatees). This effective approach faces serious obstacles.
In this thesis we focus on the challenge of guaranteeing reliability. The question we ask is
how can a delegator ensure that a delegatee performed computational tasks correctly, without
performing them itself?
This question is of interest both from a foundational and a practical perspective. We
study it not only as it pertains to today's emerging technology, but also in a host of com-
putational settings. We focus on settings where mutually distrustful or error-prone parties
interact and computational tasks may be outsourced from one party to another. Our inter-
est lies in exploring both how reliability can be guaranteed for delegated computations, and
when the approach of delegating computation can be useful for increasing the efficiency of
computational systems. The settings we study include (i) Interactive proofs, where a mali-
cious prover (delegatee) may be arbitrarily powerful, as well as interactive arguments, where
malicious provers are assumed to be computationally bounded, (ii) Checking the correctness
of programs. We view the (untrusted) program whose correctness is being checked as a
computational resource, and delegate work from the checker to the program being checked
(while ensuring reliability), and (iii) Efficient decoding of error correcting codes, where we
delegate work from the decoder to the encoder using the unreliable channel.
This thesis contains the following results:
* In Section 1.1 we study interactive proofs for delegating computation. In this setting
the verifier is the delegator who wants to be convinced of an output's correctness, and
the prover is the delegatee who wants to generate a proof of correctness. We ask which
polynomial-time computations have such interactive proofs where the prover's running
time is polynomial and the proof can be verified super-efficiently (in terms of running
time and space).
Our main contribution is a new interactive proof protocol for general uniform com-
putations. The running time of the (honest) prover in this protocol is polynomial in
the computation's circuit-size. The running time of the verifier is linear in the input
length, polynomial in the computation's circuit depth, and only poly-logarithmic in the
circuit's size. The space used by the verifier is logarithmic in the computation's size.
The communication is polynomial in the computation's depth and poly-logarithmic in
its size.
This new protocol has applications to many several questions in the theory of inter-
active proofs and arguments. We use it, together with a transformation of Kalai and
Raz [KR09], to construct efficient one-round computationally sound arguments for
general computations under standard cryptographic intractability assumptions. Pre-
viously such results were known only by the work of Micali [Mic94] in the random
oracle model. The new protocol also allows us to build new succinct zero-knowledge
proofs for KNP languages, where the communication complexity is linear in the witness
length and the complexity of verifying is dominated by the depth of the language's AP
relation (rather than its size). In addition, we obtain a complete characterization of
the power of interactive proofs with public-coin logarithmic-space verifiers.
In Section 1.2 we consider another notion of efficiently verifying that tasks were per-
formed correctly: constant depth (or constant parallel running time) verification. We
study the power of interactive proofs with constant-depth verifiers, considering general
(not necessarily polynomial-time) computations, but also focusing on polynomial-time
computations as a special case.
Our main contribution here is a general transformation from an arbitrary interactive
proof protocol, into one where the verifier runs in constant depth. Thus, we show that
interactive proofs with constant-depth verifiers are as powerful as general interactive
proofs. This transformation preserves (up to polynomial factors) the running time
of the (honest) prover, and in particular it allows us to obtain an interactive proof
with constant-depth verification and an efficient (honest) prover for any efficiently
computable language.
The settings of interactive proofs and arguments are perhaps the most immediate ones
for studying the question of delegating computation reliably. However, this question arises
naturally in many computational settings where mutually distrustful parties interact. We
re-examine two central scenarios in the theory of computing through the lens of delegating
computation: (i) the question of checking, testing and correcting programs, where we del-
egate computation form the checker (or tester or corrector) to the program being checked,
and (ii) the question of designing error correcting codes, where we delegate computation
from the decoder to the encoder. We show:
* Program Checking: Here the goal is to check the correctness of an untrusted program
on a specific input. There are two components to the system: a weak checker that tries
to verify correctness, and a "stronger" program, which allegedly computes a complex
function, This program might be faulty or malicious and compute some other arbitrary
function. We introduce the idea of delegating computation (in a reliable manner) from
the checker to the (potentially faulty) program being checked. The challenge is first
finding useful computations that can be computed by the program (which, even if it
is not faulty, only computes a fixed function), and then finding reliable methods for
delegating these computations (even if the program is malicious).
This approach yields new checkers (and testers and correctors, see below). In par-
ticular, we obtain program checkers for an entire complexity class (the class of nAC-
computations that are AC 1-hard), and for a slew of specific functions such as matrix
multiplication, inversion, determinant and rank, as well as graph functions such as
connectivity, perfect matching and bounded-degree graph isomorphism. Moreover,
this approach and the results obtained shed new light on long-standing questions in
the field of program checking. See Section 1.3 for details.
* Error-Correcting Codes: Here the goal is to encode a message so that even if many
of its bits are corrupted (by a noisy channel) a decoding procedure can still recover
the original message. We again examine the two components of this system: the
encoder and decoder, which communicate over the noisy channel. We introduce the
idea of delegating computation from the decoder to the encoder. The challenge is that
any helpful information that the encoder wishes to convey to the decoder might be
corrupted by the noisy channel, and so we need error-resilient methods for conveying
computationally helpful information.
Using this methodology we obtain new locally decodable and locally list-decodable
codes with constant-depth decoders (decoding known codes with similar parameters
required implementing more complex operations that provably cannot be implemented
in constant depth). We also show that these codes are optimal up to polynomial
factors. See Section 1.4 for further discussion.
We proceed with an overview of results for each of the above contributions.
1.1 Verifying Interactive Proofs for Efficient Compu-
tations
We study interactive proofs that can be used for delegating efficient (i.e. polynomial-time)
computations. The general setting is of several computational devices of differing compu-
tational abilities interacting with each other over a network. Some of these devices are
computationally weak due to various resource constraints. As a consequence there are tasks,
which potentially could enlarge a device's range of application, that are beyond its reach. A
natural solution is to delegate computations that are too expensive for one device, to other
devices which are more powerful or numerous and connected to the same network. This
approach comes up naturally in today's and tomorrow's computing reality as illustrated in
the following two examples.
1. Large Scale Distmbuted Computing. The idea of Volunteer Computing is for a server to
split large computations into small units, send these units to volunteers for processing, and
reassemble the result (via a much easier computation). The Berkeley Open Infrastructure
for Network Computing (BOINC) [And03, And04] is such a platform whose intent is to
make it possible for researchers in fields as diverse as physics, biology and mathematics to
tap into the enormous processing power of personal computers around the world. A famous
project using the BOINC platform is SETILhome [SET07, SET99], where large chunks of
radio transmission data are scanned for signs of extraterrestrial intelligence. Anyone can
participate by running a free program that downloads and analyzes radio telescope data.
Thus, getting many computers to pitch into the larger task of scanning space for the existence
of extraterrestrial intelligence, and getting people interested in science at the same time.
Another example of a similar flavor is the Great Internet Mersenne Prime Search [Mer07],
where volunteers search for Mersenne prime numbers and communicate their findings to a
central server.
2. Weak Perpheral Devices. More and more, small or cheap computational devices with
limited computational capabilities, such as cell-phones, printers, cameras, security access-
cards, music players, and sensors, are connected via networks to stronger remote computers
whose help they can use. Consider, for example, a sensor that is presented with an access-
card, sends it a random challenge, and receives a digital signature of the random challenge.
The computation required to verify the signature involves public-key operations which are
too expensive both in time and space for the sensor to run. Instead, it could interact with
a remote mainframe (delegatee), which can do the computation.
The fundamental problem that arises is: how can a delegator verify that the delegatees
performed the computatzon correctly, wzthout runnzng the computation ztself? For example,
in the volunteer computing setting, an adversarial volunteer may introduce errors into the
computation, by claiming that a chunk of radio transmissions contains no signs of extrater-
restrial intelligence. In the Mersenne Prime search example, an adversary may claim that
a given range of numbers does not contain a Mersenne prime. Or in the sensor example,
the communication channel between the main-frame and the sensor may be corrupted by an
adversary.
All would be well if the delegatee could provide the delegator with a proof that the
computation was performed correctly. The challenge is that for the whole idea to pay off, it
is essentzal that the time to verify such a proof of correctness be significantly smaller than
the time needed to run the entire computation.1 At the same time, the delegatee should
not invest more than a reasonable amount of time in this endeavor. Interactive proofs
with efficient provers (the delegatees) and super-efficient verifiers (the delegators) provide a
natural solution to the problem of delegating computation reliably.
Interactive Proofs for Delegating Computation. Efficient proof verification lies at
the heart of complexity theory. Classically, this was captured by the class VP, where a
deterministic polynomial time verification procedure which receives the proof (witness), a
certificate of polynomial length, and verifies its validity. For example, to prove that a graph
contains a Hamiltonian cycle, the proof is the cycle and the (deterministic, non-interactive,
1With regard to the Mersenne Prime example, we note that current methods for verifying the output
of polynomial time deterministic primality tests [AKS04] are not significantly faster than running the test
itself.
polynomial time) verification procedure verifies that it is indeed a Hamiltonian cycle in the
input graph. Interactive proof systems, introduced by [GMR89, Bab85], extend the classic
notion of proof verification by considering randomized and interactive (polynomial time)
verification procedures. The proof, rather than being written down non-interactively, is an
interactive protocol with a prover. Dishonest provers might employ an arbitrarily malicious
adaptive strategy, and soundness is still required to hold against such malicious dishonest
provers (i.e. the verifier should, with high probability over its coins, reject inputs that are
not in the language).
We want to use interactive proofs to prove the correctness of delegated computations.
Namely, the statement to be proved is that the delegated computation was executed correctly
(i.e. that the given output is the correct one); the delegator zs the verifier in the interactive
proof; the delegatee is the prover in the interactive proof, who convinces the delegatee that
he performed the computation correctly (and runs in polynomial time). In these interactive
proofs the (honest) prover should run in polynomial time (as we want efficient parties to be
able to use them), and the verification should be super-efficient; in particular, verification
should be much more efficient that running the computation (as the point is to farm out the
computation).
Previous work studied interactive proofs through the lenses of both cryptography and
complexity theory. These settings both differ from ours as discussed below.
Complexity-theoretic setting: Most work has focused on studying the expressive power
of interactive proofs under various resource restrictions (e.g. verification time, space, depth,
rounds or randomness). The complexity of proving has received less attention. Indeed, since
research focused on proofs for intractable languages, the honest prover is often 2 assumed
to be able to perform intractable computations in the interest of efficient verifiability. In
Arthur-Merlin games, the honest prover is accordingly named after Merlin, a computationally
unbounded magician.
2We note that there are important exceptions to the above, e.g. the work of Beigel, Bellare, Feigenbaum
and Goldwasser [BBFG91] on competitive proof systems.
Cryptographic setting: In the cryptographic study of interactive proofs, most works
consider protocols where all parties must run in polynomial time. The focus remains, how-
ever, on intractable (usually NP) languages, such as deciding quadratic-residuosity modulo
a composite number. To allow the honest prover to perform computations otherwise impos-
sible in polynomial time, he or she can use auxiliary secrets, e.g. the factorization of the
input modulos in the quadratic residuosity example. This model is reasonable in protocol
settings where the input is generated by the prover himself. The prover can generate the
input along with an auxiliary secret which enables him prove non-BPP properties. However,
in settings where the input is generated by an external source, an efficient prover does not
have access to auxiliary information about the input.
Our Setting: We embark on the study of interactive proofs for the real world, where
all parties (both the verifier and the prover) are efficient and the proofs are for efficiently
computable languages. Thus, we replace the unbounded (honest) prover with a bounded
prover who is limited to running probabilistic polynomial-time computations. We think of
the input to the interactive proof as dictated by an outside source, possibly even by the
verifier. Thus, the prover has no auxiliary information to help him in the proving task.
Clearly, if both the prover and the verifier are efficient, then the language is tractable (in
BPP). This may seem puzzling at first glance, since usually one allows the verifier to run
arbitrary polynomial-time computations, and thus it could compute on its own whether or
not the input is in the language! This obviously is not very interesting. Indeed, we want
verification to be considerably faster than computing.
The question we ask in this work is which polynomial-time computable languages have
interactive proofs with a super-efficient verifier and an efficient prover. We emphasize that
although we aim for the honest prover to be efficient, we still require the soundness of the
proof system to hold unconditionally. Namely, we make no assumptions on the computational
power of a dishonest prover.
Overview of Our Results: Our main technical theorem gives a public coin interactive
proof for general uniform computations:
Theorem 1.1.1. Let L be a language that can be computed by a family of O(log(S(n)))-space
uniform3 boolean circuits of size S(n) and depth d(n). L has an interactive proof where:
1. The prover runs in tzme poly(S(n)). The verifier runs in time n - poly(d(n), log S(n))
and space O(log(S(n))). Moreover, if the verifier is given oracle access to the low-degree
extension of its input, then its running time is only poly(d(n), log S(n)).
2. The protocol has perfect completeness and soundness 1/2. 4
3. The protocol is public-coin, with communication complexity d(n) -polylog(S(n)).
In particular, for languages computable by log-space uniform A/C (circuits of polylog(n)
depth), the prover is efficient, the verifier runs in time n - polylog(n) and space O(log(n)),
and the communication complexity is polylog(n). The protocol of Theorem 1.1.1 can be
used for reliably delegating computations.
We note also that the above protocol immediately yields a method for delegating a
collection of many computations with low amortized cost. This is an immediate consequence
of the protocol's complexity being proportional to the computation depth. Consider a set
of m computations whose correctness we wish to verify. Potentially these computations are
m different circuits evaluated on m different inputs and with m different outputs. Viewing
these m computations as a single larger circuit, the circuit depth is only increased by a
log m additive factor beyond the depth of the deepest computation in the set. Thus, the
cost of verifying m computations (once all m computations and their inputs and outputs
are specified) is only polylog(m) times higher than the cost of verifying the most expensive
computation in the set.
3A circuit family is s(n)n-space uniform if there exists a Turing Machine that on input In runs in space
O(s(n)) and outputs the circuit for inputs of length n. A circuit family is L-uniform if it is log-space uniform.
4Throughout this work we work with constant soundness for interactive proof systems. This is easily
amplified via parallel or sequential repetition.
Comparison to Prior Work on Interactive Proofs. We emphasize that Theorem
1.1.1 improves previous work on interactive proofs, including the works of Lund, Fortnow,
Karloff and Nissan [LFKN92], Shamir [Sha92], and Fortnow and Lund [FL93] in terms of the
honest prover's running time. In particular, Corollary 3.1.1 gives efficient honest provers,
whereas the honest provers in previous results run in super-polynomial time (even for log-
space languages). Both of the works [LFKN92, Sha92] address complete languages for #P
and for PSPACE, and thus naturally the honest prover needs to perform non-polynomial
time computation. Scale-down of the protocols to P or even to L retains the non-polynomial
time provers. In particular, for a time t(n) and space s(n) computation, prior work gives
interactive proofs where the (honest) provers running time is t(n)poly(s(n)). The work of
Fortnow and Lund [FL93], using algebraic methods extending [LFKN92, Sha92], on the
other hand, does explicitly address the question of interactive proofs for polynomial time
languages and in particular nVC. They show how to improve the space complexity of the
verifier, in particular achieving log-space and poly-time verifiers for C computations. Their
protocol, however, has a non-polynomial time prover as in [LFKN92, Sha92].
Our work puts severe restrictions on the sequential runtime (and space) of the verifier
(and, in Section 1.2, on its computation depth). This continues a sequence of works which
investigated the power of interactive proofs with weak verifiers (but often with unbounded
provers). Dwork and Stockmeyer [DS92a, DS92b] investigated the power of finite state
verifiers (with and without zero-knowledge). Condon and Ladner [CL88], Condon and Lipton
[CL89], and Condon [Con91] studied space (and time) bounded verifiers. Kilian [Kil88b]
considered zero-knowledge for space-bounded verifiers. Fortnow and Sipser (see results in
[For89]) and Fortnow and Lund [FL93] focused on public-coin restricted space verifiers.
Prior Work in Other Models. Variants of the question of checking the correctness of
computations have been studied previously in several settings outside of the interactive proof
model. These studies include the work of Babai, Fortnow, Levin, and Szegedy [BFLS91]
in the Holographic Proofs model (or alternatively the PCP model), and the works of Mi-
cali [Mic94] and Kilian [Kil95] on computationally sound argument systems. These works
raise similar goals to ours, but in their respective models, requiring super-efficient verifia-
bility, and efficient provability (polynomial time in the non-deterministic time complexity
of accepting the input). We elaborate on these seminal related works in Section 3.1.1. In
contrast, our work is in the standard interactive proof model [GMR89] where soundness is
achieved unconditionally, making no assumptions on the power of the dishonest prover (as
in [Mic94, Ki195]), nor making assumptions on the non-adaptivity of the dishonest prover
(as in [BFLS91]). Prior work has also considered delegating specific useful computations
(such as, say, modular exponentiation), especially in cryptographic settings. See for example
Hohenberger and Lysyanskaya [HL05] for a discussion of concerns that arise and prior work.
Further Applications: Beyond its direct applications to delegating computation, Theo-
rem 1.1.1 also allows us to make progress on several questions, as described below. As further
applications, we also obtain new Interactive PCPs [KR08] and Probabilistically Checkable
Arguments [KRO9]. See Chapter 3 for details.
1.1.1 1-round Arguments for Certifying Computations
The above protocol of Theorem 1.1.1 requires multiple rounds of communication (the number
of rounds is polynomial in the depth and poly-logarithmic in the size of the computation).
We find it very interesting to consider non-interactive protocols for delegating computation,
where the prover only needs to send a single message to the verifier. This message can
contain the output of the computation and a proof, and no interaction is necessary (beyond
perhaps some offline setup phase). More generally, we seek to reduce the round complexity of
protocols for delegating computation. The only known non-interactive (or 1-round) general
protocol for delegating computation is in Micali's work [Mic94] on CS proofs. These results,
however, hold only in the random oracle model, and it is not known how to translate such
results to protocols that are secure in the real world (see [CGH04, GK03]). We seek instead
to base protocols on standard cryptographic intractability assumptions.
We obtain a one-round protocol using the protocol of Theorem 1.1.1 together with a recent
transformation of Kalai and Raz [KR09] from public-coin interactive proofs to one-round
arguments. Furthermore, this protocol is "almost" non-interactive (see below). The protocol
has computational soundness against polynomial-time cheating provers. This computational
soundness is based on a standard cryptographic assumption, the existence of a PIR scheme
with polylog communication (see e.g. the work of Cachin, Micali and Stadler [CMS99]).
The 1-round protocol we obtain is a computationally sound argument system for general
(uniform) computations. The (honest) prover's work is polynomial in the computation size,
the verifier's work is linear in the input length and polynomial in the security parameter, the
computation depth and only polylogarithmic in the computation size. The communication
is polynomial in the computation's depth and the security parameter and polylogarithmic
in the computation size. Moreover, the verifier's message in this protocol is completely
independent of the input and the computation whose correctness is being proven. Thus, the
protocol is "almost" non-interactive in the sense that the verifier can compute this message
in advance and independently of the computation, and no further interaction is needed once
the computation becomes known.
See Theorem 3.1.2 of Section 3.1.2 for a precise statement. We note that, as in the main
result of Theorem 1.1.1, this protocol can be used to amortize the cost of delegating many
computations in a natural way.
1.1.2 Succinct Zero-Knowledge Proofs
Zero-knowledge interactive proofs are central in the study of cryptography and also in com-
plexity theory. In this setting we have an P relation R which takes as input an instance
x and a witness w. A prover (who knows both x and w) wants to convince a verifier (who
knows only x and does not know w) in zero-knowledge that R(x, w) = 1. The verifier should
learn nothing from this interaction beyond the validity of the prover's assertion.
We improve known results on zero-knowledge proofs significantly. We show that any
NP language whose relation R can be verified by depth d circuits has a zero-knowledge
proof where the communication complexity is linear in the witness length and polynomial
in the security parameter and the depth d. Previously zero-knowledge proofs with commu-
nication proportional to the witness length were known only for languages whose relation
R is computable in ACo (constant depth) [IKOS07, KR08]. For general NP languages out-
side this class, the best protocols have communication polynomial in the circuit size of R
[GMW91, Blu87]. Our protocol can be based on any one-way function. Moreover, for NP
languages whose relations can be verified in (L-) uniform depth d, the verifier in the new
protocol runs in time that is linear in the input size and polynomial in d and the security
parameter. Previous work on zero knowledge proofs for general classes of AnP languages did
not achieve verifier computation time that is lower than the size of R. See Theorems 3.1.5
and 3.1.6 in Section 3.1.5 for precise statements.
1.1.3 Public-Coin Log-Space Verification
Finally, we consider the power of interactive proofs with public-coin, log-space, poly-time
verifiers. We show such a proof system for every language in P. This gives a tight charac-
terization for the expressive power of interactive proof systems with such verifiers, settling
an open question [Con91, For89, For89, FL93]. This result is a corollary of Theorem 1.1.1,
using the fact that languages in P have (L-uniform) poly-size circuits. See Corollary 3.1.3
in Section 3.1.3 for a precise statement and further discussion.
1.1.4 Technical Highlights
We conclude with an overview of the techniques used to obtain the main result of Theorem
1.1.1. In a nutshell, our goal is to reduce the verifier's runtime to be proportional to the
depth of the circuit C being computed, rather than its size, while maintaining (honest)
prover running time that is proportional to the circuit's size.
In previous work, spanning both the single and multi prover models [LFKN92, Sha92,
BFL91, KR08], the entire computation of the underlying machine is arithmetized and turned
into an algebraic expression whose value is claimed and proved by the prover.
We assume without loss of generality that the circuit C is a depth d arithmetic circuit
in a layered form where there are as many layers as the depth of the circuit. Departing
from previous work, here we instead employ an interactive protocol that closely follows
the (parallelized) computation of C, layer by layer, from the output layer to the input
layer, numbering the layers in increasing order from the top (output) of the circuit to the
bottom (input) of the circuit.5  We consider a redundant high-distance encoding (a low-
degree extension) of the values of circuit's gates in each layer. The verifier has no time
to compute points in the low-degree extension of the computation on input x in layer i:
this is the low-degree extension (a high distance encoding) of the vector of values that the
gates in the circuit's i-th layer take on input z, and to compute it one needs to actually
evaluate C, which we want to avoid! Thus, the low-degree extension of the i-th layer, will
be instead supplied by the prover. Of course, the prover may cheat. Thus, each phase of
the protocol lets the verifier reduce verification of a single point in the low-degree extension
of an advanced step (layer) in the parallel computation, to verification of a single point in
the low-degree extension of the previous step (layer). This process is repeated iteratively
(for as many layers as the circuit has), until at the end the verification has been reduced
to verifying a single point in the extension of the first step in the computation. In the first
step of the computation (the input layer), the only information "computed" is the input z,
the verifier can compute the low degree extension of the input x on its own in nearly-linear
time.
Going from Layer to Layer: Given the outline above, the main remaining challenge is
how to reduce verification of a single point in the low degree extension of a layer in the
circuit, to verification of a single point in the low degree extension of the previous layer. One
of our main technical contributions is a protocol that achieves this task.
We observe that every point in the low degree extension (LDE) of the advanced layer
(layer i) is a linear combination, or a weighted sum, of the values of that layer's gates. The
circuit has fan-in 2, so the value of each gate is a function of the values of two gates in the
layer below (layer i + 1). We can express the value of each gate g in layer i as a sum, over
5I.e., layer 0 is the output layer, and layer d is the input layer.
all possible gate-pairs (k, £) in layer i + 1, of a low degree function of: (i) the values of gates
k and £, and (ii) a predicate that indicates whether gates k and f are indeed the "children"
of gate g. Arithmetizing this entire sum of sums, we run a sum-check protocol [LFKN92] to
verify the value of one point in the low-degree extension of layer i. Modulo many details, we
conclude that, given access to (a low-degree extension of) the predicate that says whether a
pair of gates (k, f) are the children of the gate g, at the end of this sum-check protocol the
verifier only needs to verify the values of a pair of points in the LDE of layer i + 1. This is
still not enough, as we need to reduce the verification of a single point in the LDE of layer i
to the verification of a single point in layer i + 1 and not of a pair of points. We finally use
an interactive protocol to reduce verifying two points in the LDE of layer i + 1 to verifying
just one.
The verifier's running time in each of these phases is poly-logarithmic in the circuit size.
In the final phase, computing one point in the low-degree extension of the input requires
only nearly-linear time, independent of the rest of the circuit. Another important point is
that the verifier does not need to remember anything about earlier phases of the verification,
at any point in time it only needs to remember what is being verified about a certain point
in the computation. This results in very space-efficient verifiers. The savings in the prover's
running time comes (intuitively) from the fact that the prover does not need to arithmetize
the entire computation, but rather proves statements about one (parallel) computation step
at a time.
Utilizing Uniformity: It remains then to show how the verifier can compute (a low-degree
extension of) a predicate that decides whether circuit gates are connected, without looking
at the entire circuit. To do this, we proceed in two steps. First, we examine low space com-
putations, e.g. uniform log-space Turing Machines (deterministic or non-deterministic). A
log-space machine can be transformed into a family of boolean circuits with poly-logarithmic
depth and polynomial size. We show that in this family of circuits, it is possible to compute
the predicate that decides whether circuit gates are connected in poly-logarithmic time and
constant (ACo) depth. This computation can itself be arithmetized, which allows the verifier
to compute a low-degree extension of the predicate in poly-logarithmic time. Thus we obtain
an interactive proof with an efficient prover and super-efficient verifier for any £ or A/L
computation.
Still, the result above took advantage of the (strong) uniformity of very specific circuits
that are constructed from log-space Turing Machines. We want to give interactive proofs for
general log-space uniform circuits, and not only for the specific ones we can construct for log-
space languages. How then can a verifier compute even the predicate that decides whether
circuit gates in a log-space uniform circuit are connected (let alone its low degree extension)?
In general, computing this predicate might require nearly as much time as evaluating the
entire circuit. We overcome this obstacle by observing that the verifier does not have to
compute this predicate on its own: it can ask the prover to compute the predicate for it. Of
course, the prover may cheat, but the verifier can use the above interactive proof for log-space
computations to force the prover to prove that it computed the (low degree extensions of)
the predicate correctly. This final protocol gives an interactive proof for general log-space
uniform circuits with low depth.
See Section 3.1.7 for an expanded and more detailed technical overview of the protocol.
1.2 Verifying Interactive Proofs in Constant Depth
We proceed to study a different notion of super-efficient verification, and consider the task
of proof verification by constant-depth verifiers. Whereas in Chapter 1.1 we focused mostly
on interactive proofs for efficient computations, and required all parties to run in polyno-
mial time, here we study interactive proofs for general (not necessarily polynomial-time)
computations. We are interested in exploring the expressive power of interactive proofs with
very restricted constant-depth verifiers, i.e. we ask which languages/computations have such
interactive proofs. As a special case we also consider the power of protocols where all parties
run in polynomial time.
Main Results: We show that interactive proofs remain surprisingly powerful even with
very restricted verifiers. In particular, we show general transformations from any (p-prover)
interactive proof with k rounds of interaction, to a (p-prover) interactive proof with k + O(1)
rounds and a constant depth (ArCo) verifier.6 By this we mean that the verifier's strategy
at each interaction round can be computed in constant depth (AC) when given access to
the input, the randomness, and the messages exchanged in the previous rounds. 7 This is
captured by the following Lemma:
Lemma 1.2.1. Every language that has a k-round simple interactive proof system with p > 1
provers, completeness c and soundness s, has an interactive proof system with p provers, k+2
rounds, completeness c and soundness s + 6, where 6 > 0 is an arbitrarily small constant,
and the vemfier's entire strategy (both interaction and decision) is n NC.
See Section 4.2 for proof intuition and a full proof. Here by a "simple" proof system
we mean one in which the verifier's messages (but not necessarily its decision bit) can be
computed in A/Co (see Definition 4.1.3, in particular any public coin proof system is "simple"
in this sense). Building on Lemma 1.2.1, we obtain the following characterizations (see
Section 4.2 for details):
Corollary 1.2.2. A language is in AM if and only if it can be verified in constant parallel
time with one prover, two rounds of interaction, and arbitrarily small constant soundness.
In particular, every language rn N/P has such a proof system.
Theorem 1.2.3. A language zs zn NEXP if and only if zt can be verified in constant parallel
time with two provers, five rounds, perfect completeness and soundness 6, where 6 > 0 zs an
arbitrarily small constant.
6We observe in Section 4.3 that by adding O(log n) communication rounds it is not hard to transform
any protocol into one with an KNC verifier. However, we achieve this while only adding a constant number
of communication rounds. this is what enables us to obtain constant parallel time verification for languages
in AM and NEXP.
7Here we follow the standard convention that measures the complexity of the protocol only in terms of
the resources used by the verifier, i.e. it is assumed that the prover's messages are generated instantly.
Thus, our statement about constant parallel-time verification follows from the fact that the protocols we
construct have a constant number of communication rounds and that each round the verifier's strategy can
be implemented in constant parallel time.
Negative results: We complement our positive results with two negative results. First,
we show that constant-round proof systems with an NA/C verifier cannot have sub-constant
soundness (unless the language itself is in ArC). Second, we show that there is no public-
coin proof system with an N/Co verifier (again, unless the language itself is in ANCo). This
result sheds light on private vs. public coins proof systems and in particular on our protocols
(which, naturally, use private coins). In particular, it shows that both interaction and prvate
randomness are provably essential for non-trivial NAC verification. See Section 4.3 for details.
Related Work: See Section 1.1 for an overview of past work on interactive proofs. We
emphasize that previous proof systems for complete languages in NAP, IP and AN XP
require, at the very least, the verification of an nAP statement at the end of the protocol
(even to achieve constant soundness). By the Cook-Levin reduction, this verification is very
efficient (i.e. in ACo); indeed, a key point in the Cook-Levin theorem is that computation
can be verified by making many local consistency checks and ensuring that they all hold.
However, while the local checks are of constant size, the verifier still needs to verify that all
of them hold by computing an AND of large fan-in, and therefore is not in ANCo. We show
that, perhaps surprisingly, a verifier can use interaction with the prover together with its
(prvate) random coins to avoid performing a global test on its entire input and proof. This
is done by replacing the global test with a test that the prover is not cheating. The size
(fan-in) of this new test is only a function of the soundness, independent of the size of the
input.8
1.2.1 Technical Overview and Comparison to Related Work
We conclude with an overview of some of the techniques used to prove the transformation
of Lemma 1.2.1. We improve the receiver's (verifier's) efficiency by delegating some of its
sAlthough we emphasize the locality of the verifier, one should not confuse our verifiers with PCP verifiers.
While the latter do look at a constant number of bits in the proof, they still need to check consistency with
the whole input (e.g. when computing the PCP reduction) and therefore are not in ANCo (as a function of
the input, the proof and the randomness). In fact, our lower bounds (see Section 4.3) show that non-trivial
languages cannot have VNCo PCP verifiers (roughly speaking, this is because PCPs are not interactive).
computation to the (possibly malicious) sender (the prover). As throughout this thesis, the
idea of delegating computation from the receiver to the untrusted sender seems dubious at
first glance: the receiver's computation is the only reliable part in the whole interaction!
Indeed, this seems to leave the receiver very vulnerable to malicious behavior of the sender.
To give the receiver a better guarantee, we ask more from the sender: we ask the sender to
convince the receiver that he has performed the computations correctly (in the case of proof
verification), or to send the results of the computations with redundancy that will allow
the receiver to easily recover the correct results even from a corrupted word (in the case of
codes). This may seem to bring us back to square one; namely, the receiver again needs
to verify a proof or to decode a code. So where do we gain in efficiency? The key point is
that we are not trying now to verify an arbitrary claim, or to recover arbitrary information,
but rather we are trying to make sure that a certain computation was conducted correctly.
Specifically, we show that if the receiver's computations have certain properties, which we
discuss shortly, then the tasks of verifying their correctness or decoding the correct results of
the computations can be done extremely efficiently - much more efficiently than the receiver's
original computation. To develop our approach we look at functions that the receiver needs
to compute and require them to have two properties (these properties will be useful in the
subsequent sections as well):
1. (Random instance reduction) One can compute the function on any given instance by
querying another function (say g) at a completely random location. This property
allows us to "mask" the receiver's computation as a random instance and to correct
the sender's computations.
2. (Solved instance generator) We can generate efficiently a random instance of the func-
tion g together with g's value on this instance. This property allows us to check the
correctness of the sender's computations.
Combining these properties allows us to ensure (w.h.p.) that the computations that the
sender conducts for the receiver are indeed correct. Of course, this approach would not
give us much if we could not show that the above properties can be implemented more
efficiently than the original computations. To that end we show, using techniques that
were developed in the field of cryptography [Bab87, Kil88a, FKN94, IK02, AIKO6], that for
functions computable in NAC 1 these properties can be implemented in probabilistic constant
parallel time. Thus, we can take any NAC1 receiver and transform it into one that runs in
constant parallel time or constant depth. This reduces our task to finding a sender-receiver
protocol for the required task in which the receiver is in nAC 1 .
Comparison with [AIKO6]: Our approach for improving the receiver's efficiency by del-
egating some of its computation to the (possibly malicious) sender, is related to and inspired
by the breakthrough work of Applebaum, Ishai and Kushilevitz [AIKO06] on improving the
efficiency of cryptographic primitives. A discussion about the similarities and differences
between these works and the results presented here follows.
The work of [AIKO6] can also be viewed as improving the efficiency of players participating
in a protocol by pushing computation from one of the participants to another (e.g. improving
the efficiency of encryption at the expense of adding to the complexity of decryption). The
main difference between this approach and ours is that they consider protocols or objects
in which the goal of the sender is to reveal the results of its computation to a receiver, so
there is no issue of a malicious party that may corrupt the computation. The main concern
in [AIKO6] is privacy, or in other words, how can one party (while conducting very efficient
computations) reveal the outcome of its computation without revealing how the computation
was conducted. In the settings considered in this thesis, on the other hand, the sender is
untrusted or error-prone, but the receiver still wants it to perform computations for him.
Our concern (in various settings, see below) is how to verify (very efficiently) the correctness
of outputs computed by the untrusted or error-prone sender. Given these differences, the
tools we use are somewhat different from those used in [AIKO6]. Nonetheless, some of the
techniques we employ are similar.
Comparison with Settings in Subsequent Sections: In Section 1.3 and Chapter 5
we develop a methodology of delegating computation as a way to increase the efficiency of
program checkers (see [BK95]) and program testers/correctors (see [BLR93]). In fact, one
can view program checking as an interactive proof setting where the prover is analogous
to the program and the checker is analogous to a verifier. The prover in the program
checking setting is fixed in advance and restricted to computing only the language being
proved, as opposed to being computationally unbounded and dynamic (according to the
messages exchanged in the protocol) in the usual proof verification setting. Moreover, a
program checker for a language gives such a proof system both for the language and for
its complement. These differences give rise to different challenges in the design of such
protocols, and in particular in the implementation of the delegation methodology. The fact
that the prover is restricted to answering queries about the language being proved, in the
case of program checkers, requires careful design of such protocols that typically use very
specific properties of the functions being proved (checked). In fact, it is not at all well
understood which languages have such proof systems. In Chapter 5 we give a methodology
for constructing such systems with very efficient verification (checking), and a family of
results for a wide variety of languages. While in this section we consider the (easier) setting
of an unbounded prover, we (as opposed to the program checking setting) must deal with
the challenge that the prover may change its answers according to the messages exchanged
in the interaction. For example, in our interactive proof setting one cannot design proof
systems that first test the prover on random inputs, and then correct it (which is a common
methodology for constructing program checkers).
The results in Section 1.4 and Chapter 6 on constructing efficient error-correcting codes
are also related to our results on interactive proofs and program checkers. In Section 1.4
we design decoders that delegate work to an encoder that can perform arbitrary (efficient)
computations. the challenge is for the encoder to relay to the decoder computationally helpful
information over a noisy channel in an error-robust way. There is a guarantee, though, that
the channel is not arbitrarily malicious and the noise rate is bounded. The main challenge
is then recovering from very large fractions of errors (especially in the list-decoding setting).
See Chapter 4 and the subsequent sections for further details.
1.3 Delegation in Program Checking and Correcting
Program checking, program self-correcting and program self-testing were pioneered by Blum
and Kannan [BK95] and Blum, Luby and Rubinfeld [BLR93] as a new way to gain confi-
dence in software, by considering program correctness on an input by input basis rather than
full program verification. In the setting of program checking, functions to be computed are
associated with a new algorithm, called the checker. The checker, given any possibly buggy
program for the function and any input, "checks" whether the program on this input com-
putes the function correctly. Work in the field of program checking focused on designing, for
specific functions, checkers, testers and correctors which are more efficient than the best pro-
gram known for the function. These were designed utilizing specific algebraic, combinatorial
or completeness properties of the function at hand.
We revisit program checking, taking a new approached based on delegating computation.
In the program checking scenario there are again two main components: a "powerful",
but potentially faulty, program that purportedly computes some complex function, and the
"weak" checker (presumably more efficient than any program for computing the function).
The approach we take is delegating computation from the checker to the program being
checked. Taking the approach of delegating computation in the program checking setting
faces new challenges. First, while the program being checked is supposed to compute a
complex function, it is not able to run arbitrary computations for us (unlike the interactive
proof setting we considered in previous sections). The challenge here is identifying "helpful"
(to the checker) computations that are reducible to the function that the program claims to
compute. The other challenge is, of course, that the program may be faulty and compute an
arbitrary different function. Thus, we need to delegate our computations in a reliable way.
Checker Composition and Delegating Computation: To realize the idea of designing
better program checkers by delegating computation, we propose a composition methodology
for improving the complexity of checkers. The crux of the idea is to start with a checker
C for the function at hand - this C may be a previously designed checker, or even just a
correct program for the function (which trivially gives a checker) - and then decompose this
checker into sub-computations. The work of these sub-computations is in turn replaced by
calls to P, the potentially faulty program being checked, on appropriate inputs. This is done
by applying a reduction that maps sub-computations to instances of the function that P
allegedly computes. In other words, we delegate the computations of these sub-tasks to P.
The correctness of these delegated sub-computations performed by P is finally verified by
checkers for the sub-computations.' When the checkers for the sub-computations are more
efficient than the sub-computations themselves, this results in a new checker with improved
efficiency.
One of our main contributions is a composition theorem that captures this approach. We
focus on reducing the computation depth of program checkers, but Take Lexterna, to be the
language being checked, and consider the case where the checker's sub-computations are of
a language Lnternal.
Theorem 1.3.1 (Checker Composition, Informal). Let Lmnternal and Lexternal be two lan-
guages that satisfy the following conditions:
1. There exists an efficient10 reduction from Lnternal to Lexternal.
2. Lexternal has an efficzent checker of depth dexternal that has oracle access to Lznternal
(note that by definition it also has oracle access to a program that allegedly computes
Lexternal.)
3. Lnternal has an efficient checker of depth dznternal.
9More precisely, we can consider the composed program, P', that applies the reduction and then applies
P on the result of the reduction. Thus, P' can be viewed as a program that allegedly computes the sub-
computation, and we can then check P' with a checker for this sub-computation.
1 0Throughout, efficient means poly-time (or poly-size when talking about circuits). In addition, we require
the reduction to have constant-depth. See Section 5.3 for the exact statement.
Then there exists an efficzent checker for Lexternal
, 
of depth O(dexternal * dinternal) .
The improvement comes from the fact that the depth of the resulting checker does not
depend on the depth of computing Lmnternal, only on the depth dinternal of checking it, which
may be much smaller. See Section 5.3 for a formal statement of the theorem, the proof and
extensions, as well as an analogous composition theorem for testers and correctors. 11
The composition methodology provides a simple way to design checkers that is very
similar to the top-down approach of algorithm design: first decompose the problem into
smaller (and easier) sub-problems, solve them and then combine these solutions to solve more
the complex problem, all the while ensuring errors are kept under control. This approach can
be used iteratively to get better and better checkers (for example see our checkers, testers
and correctors for matrix determinant in Section 5.6). Moreover, this approach enables us to
construct checkers for functions that do not necessarily have the type of self-reducibility or
completeness properties exploited in previous works of [BK95, BLR93, Lip91, Sha92, BFL91].
We proceed with an overview of some of the main results we obtain from the composition
theorem.
Checkers for Complexity Classes: We construct checkers that are provably more effi-
cient than computing the functions they check (in terms of circuit depth) for entire complex-
ity classes, and not just specific functions with special algebraic or combinatorial properties.
Theorem 1.3.2. For every i > 1, every language in RiAC' that is N/C1 -hard under NCO-
reductions has a checker in R C'i- 1 . Every language in RMAC' that is NC 1 -hard under ACo
reductions has a tester and corrector (and checker) that are mn RAC-1.
See Section 5.2 for the definitions of the complexity classes involved, and Section 5.5 for
a discussion and full proofs. This is the first time checkers are designed for a wide class
of functions characterized only by its complexity, rather than by algebraic or combinatorial
properties. This characterization immediately yields new and efficient checkers for languages
such as graph connectivity, perfect matching and bounded-degree graph isomorphism.
11We mention that while the proof of the composition theorem for program checkers is reasonably straight-
forward, for testers and correctors the argument is more delicate and involved.
Important ingredients in these results are new and very efficient checkers for complete
languages in low complexity classes (e.g. NC1). These constructions are based on techniques
that were developed in the field of cryptography, see Section 2.3.
Finally, we note that the proof of the theorem is constructive: it shows how to transform
any program in RNC' for a language into a checker in RTJC'- 1 (or a tester/corrector in
RAC'- 1 ) (for all programs) for that language. Languages satisfying the requirements of
Theorem 1.3.2 have checkers that are provably more efficient (in terms of circuit depth)
than their optimal program. Indeed, for a language L satisfying the theorem conditions, let
i > 1 be such that L is in RFC' but not in R PNC'- 1 (i is well defined, as ~ZRVCo is strictly
contained in RPNC1). By the theorem, this language has a checker in RnCi- 1 . Note that
even if we currently do not know the best algorithm for the language, the theorem (or rather
the proof) still yields a checker that satisfies the little-oh parallel time property with respect
to the best algorithm that is currently known. In the future, any algorithmic improvement
on the language (placing it in a lower RPC class), will immediately give rise to an even
better checker (placing it in an even lower RAP C class).
Constant Depth Checkers for Matrix Problems: [BLR93] consider the problem of
testing and correcting matrix functions such as multiplication, inverse, determinant and rank.
They suggested a non-standard model in which the checker/ tester/corrector can access (at
unit cost) not only the program to be checked, but also a library of (possibly faulty)
programs that allegedly compute other related functions. Within this extended model, they
show how to test and correct (and thus check) programs for the above matrix functions.
For example, their determinant checker uses access to a program that allegedly computes
matrix determinant (as in the usual setting), but it also has access to programs that allegedly
compute matrix multiplication and inversion.
We use the composition theorem to construct standard checkers, testers and correctors
for matrix multiplication, inversion, rank and determinant, removing altogether the need
for the matrix library introduced in [BLR93]. These checkers/testers/correctors can be
implemented in ACo, and for some ranges of parameters even in n/C0 .12 Except for the
matrix multiplication function, they are the first checkers that are provably more efficient
than the optimal program for computing these functions in terms of circuit depth.13 Previous
known checkers/testers/correctors for matrix problems both relied on a program library and
had high parallel complexity. Furthermore, we note that the checkers we build for matrix
multiplication and matrix inversion are optimal up to constant factors in every parameter:
depth (or parallel time), size (or number of processors) and number of queries. A summary
is given in Table 5.1 of Section 5.6.
Theorem 1.3.3. Matrix multiplication, inversion, determinant and rank have all probabilis-
tic ACo checkers, testers and correctors.14 Over a field of cardinality 2' for a constant s,
matrx multzplzcation and inversion have probabzlistic N.C checkers, testers and correctors
that perform a constant number of calls to the program oracle .
The checkers (and tester/correctors) for the various matrix operations are constructed
by starting from high depth checkers inspired by (though sometimes quite different from)
the library checkers of [BLR93]. We then apply the general method (i.e. the composition
theorem stated in Section 5.1.3), along with other algebraic ideas, to improve their circuit
depth. Often the theorem is applied more than once, gradually improving the checker until
it reaches constant depth. See Section 5.3 for discussion and proofs.
1.3.1 Further Remarks
The results above shed new light on the theory of program checking, we conclude this
overview of results by highlighting two of these contributions.
12An A/Co checker is a constant depth fan-in 2 checker with oracle gates to the program. Naturally, these
oracle gates have unbounded fan-in (as the checker runs the program on growing inputs). Previous work did
not present checkers in this low complexity class.
13 [BLR93, Rub96] give an ACo tester and corrector for matrix multiplication that make O(log n) program
oracle calls. These are somewhat non-standard in that the corrector needs the given program to work well
on each input length, from the length of its input and down, szmultaneously. The tester may reject a program
even if it is good on all input lengths but one, and in particular even if it is perfectly correct on the input
length being tested.
14For rank the result holds only over fields that are of size polynomial in the input length.
On Circuit Depth as a Checker Complexity Measure: In this work we focus on
the circuit depth (or parallel time) of checkers. To some extent this choice is because our
main building blocks (i.e. the checkers for complete functions) are more efficient in terms of
circuit depth than computing their functions. It is this fact that enables us to achieve one
of the primary goals of this work, namely to construct a variety of checkers that are more
efficient (in terms of depth) than any algorithm for the functions being checked. Obtaining
similar results for sequential time seems currently beyond our reach, as there are no known
non-trivial lower bounds on the time complexity of computing any explicit function (this
is in contrast to the circuit depth measure [FSS84]). We do emphasize again though, that
in principal the composition methodology can be used to improve the time complexity of
checkers, if we can identify sub-computations of the checker (L,nternal in Theorem 1.3.1) for
which checking is more efficient, in terms of time complexity, than computing. Thus the
depth measure, interesting on its own, also serves here as a test-bed for a general program
checking paradigm.
The Little-Oh property and Independence of Errors: Blum and Kannan [BK95],
followed by Blum and Wasserman [WB97], argue that since the little-oh time requirement
gives assurance that the checker is different than the program itself, then "heuristically it
must be doing something essentially different from what P (the program) does and so if buggy
may reasonably be expected to make different errors" ([WB97], page 8), which intuitively
will decrease the likelihood of "correlated errors" and a bug going undetected. Interestingly,
the proof of Theorem 1.3.2 suggests that the above intuition is not sound, at least as far
as the little-oh parallel time property is concerned. The idea used in the proof of Theorem
1.3.2 is to come up with an efficient checker by starting with a correct program for the
function. This checker has the little-oh parallel time property with respect to any program
(and not just the best known one), yet its description is based on the best algorithm for
the function being checked. In fact, if one has bugs in the implementation of the particular
correct algorithm from which the checker is derived, then these bugs are likely to also show
up in the checker!
1.3.2 More Technical Tools
We end this section by highlighting another of the technical tools we introduce and use.
Main Building Blocks: Checkers for Complete Languages. To apply our methodol-
ogy in a general manner (rather than only working on checkers for specific problems), we look
for sub-computations (as described above), that on one hand capture many functionalities,
and are thus helpful in the design of checkers, and on the other hand are themselves not
very complex, so we can delegate them to programs for many functions that we may want
to check. Furthermore, and just as importantly, these functions must have very efficient
checkers, testers and correctors, so that we gain in efficiency when replacing the task of com-
puting these functions with the task of checking them. We find such functions in the form of
complete languages for low complexity classes such as NC1 . For example, we build an A/Co
checker, and an ACo tester and corrector for the NAC1 -complete problem given by Barrington
[Bar89]. The efficiency of the checkers for this language (as well as other useful languages
such as Parity) are based on techniques that were developed in the field of cryptography by
Kilian [Kil88a], Feige, Kilian and Naor [FKN94] and Ishai and Kushilevitz [IK02]. See the
discussion in Section 1.2.1.
Theorem 1.3.4. There is an NC checker for the parity function, as well as for problems
that are complete (under A/Co reductions) zn the class N/C1 and classes that contain AC
(such as e-£ and modk-L).
For definitions of these complexity classes see Section 5.2, for proofs and full statements
of results, see Section 5.4. The Composition Theorem enables us to use these checkers for
languages complete for weak classes (such as nAC 1 ) to construct efficient checkers for lan-
guages in higher complexity classes. We emphasize that unlike other properties of functions
(or languages), the existence of checkers for complete languages did not previously seem to
imply or be related to the existence of checkers for non-complete languages (although, by
Beigel's Theorem, it does imply checkers for other languages that are complete). Indeed,
(likely for this reason) past work was more concerned with checkers for useful and practical
functions, and less with checkers for complete languages. This is in contrast to many other
areas of complexity theory, where demonstrating properties of complete languages has direct
implications for an entire complexity class. 15
See Section 1.2.1 for a comparison to the work of [AIKO6] and to the challenges presented
in the settings of Sections 1.2 and 1.4.
See Chapter 5 for further details and discussions of our results on program checkers.
1.4 Delegation in Error Correcting Codes
Error correcting codes are highly useful combinatorial objects that have found numerous
applications both in practical settings as well as in many areas of theoretical computer
science and mathematics. In the most common setting of error-correcting codes we have a
message space that contains strings over some finite alphabet F (for simplicity we assume
that all strings in the message space are of the same length). The goal is to design a function,
which we call the encoder, that encodes every message in the message space into a codeword
such that even if a fairly large fraction of symbols in the codeword are corrupted it is still
possible to recover from it the original message. The procedure that recovers the message
from a possibly corrupted codeword is called the decoder.
We examine this well-studied setting in light of our methodology of delegating compu-
tation, focusing on the goal of efficient decoding. We again examine two components of
the system: the "strong" encoder (which we are not trying to optimize), and the "weaker"
decoder (whose efficiency we aim to improve). Our approach is to delegate computation
from the decoder to the encoder. The main challenge is that the only "help" the encoder
can offer the decoder is via a single message (the codeword) sent over a noisy and unreliable
channel. Thus, we view the codeword as a computational resource that can be used by the
decoder, and we aim to design noise-resilient methods for conveying computationally useful
'
5 One such example is interactive proofs, where exhibiting an interactive proof for a complete language
immediately implies interactive proofs for the entire, and thus research on interactive proofs focused on
treating hard (non-polynomial time) complete languages and whole complexity classes.
information.
This general approach could, potentially, be applied in a wide variety of settings for
reducing different complexity measures of the decoding process. Here we apply it towards
reducing the circuit depth of the decoder in the settings of locally-decodable and locally
list-decodable codes. We proceed with a brief overview of the setting.
Locally Decodable and List-Decodable Codes: It is well known that beyond a cer-
tain fraction of errors, it is impossible to recover the original message, simply because the
relatively few symbols that are not corrupted do not carry enough information to specify
(uniquely) the original message. Still, one may hope to recover a list of candidate messages,
one of which is the original message. Such a procedure is called list-decodmig.
Typically, the goal of the decoder is to recover the entire message (or list of candidate
messages) by reading the entire (possibly corrupted) codeword. There are settings, however,
in which the codeword is too long to be read as a whole. Still, one may hope to recover any
given individual symbol of the message, by reading only a small number of symbols from
the corrupted codeword. This setting is called local-decoding, and both the unique and list
decoding variants (as discussed above) can be considered. See Trevisan's survey [Tre04] for
a more detailed discussion.
Locally decodable codes, both in the unique and list decoding settings, have found many
applications in theoretical computer science, most notably in private information retrieval
[CKGS98, KTOO], and worst-case to average-case hardness reductions [STV01] (see below).
Furthermore, they have the potential of being used for practical applications, such as reliably
storing a large static data file, only small portions of which need to be read at a time.
We note that all previously known decoders for locally (list-)decodable codes with similar
parameters, e.g. the codes of [STV01], compute majorities or finite field operations that
(provably) cannot be implemented in ACO.
Transformations for Reducing Decoding Depth: We show general transformations
for reducing the circuit depth of the decoders in error-correcting codes:
Theorem 1.4.1 (Transformation for binary locally decodable codes). Let C : {0, 1} --
{0, 1}N be an explicit locally-decodable binary code that can be non-adaptively decoded from
some constant distance 6 < 1/4 by a probabilistic AC circuit of size polylog(N). Then there
is an explicit binary code C': {0, 1}M {0, 1}2N that is locally-decodable from distance 6/2
by a probabilistic AC circuit of size polylog(N).
Theorem 1.4.2. (Transformation for non-binary codes) Let E be a finite alphabet and let
C:" M E N be an explicit code that is non-adaptively locally list-decodable by probabilistic
N.C1 circuits from agreement E and with list size £. Then there is an explict code C' : EM --
FN' that is locally list-decodable by probabilistic ACo circuits, from agreement E and with list
size 2f, where IFI = JE .O(1/E), and N' = max{N, 2 (log(N)/) 6 }, for arbitrarily small constant
6 > 0. In particular, for e > 1/poly(log N), we obtain N' = N. Finally, if C was uniquely
locally decodable (with £ = 1), then so zs C'.
The proofs and further discussion can be found in Sections 6.1.1 and 6.3.
Explicit Codes with Constant-Depth Decoding: Using the above transformations,
we obtain explicit locally decodable and locally list-decodable codes. Our first construction
is an explicit locally-decodable binary code:
Theorem 1.4.3 (Locally decodable binary code). There is an explicit code C: {0, 1}M
{0, 1}po ly (M) that can be locally decoded from distance 1/25 by probabilistic ACo circuits of
size poly(log M).
This code has roughly the same parameters (up to polynomial factors) as the canonical
example of a locally-decodable binary code with polynomial rate [STV01]. See Section 6.4
for more details. We also obtain an explicit family of locally list-decodable binary codes:
Theorem 1.4.4 (Locally list-decodable binary code). For every 2 -e(~ OgM) < E = e(M) <
1/2, there exists a (1/2-e, poly(1/E))-locally-list-decodable code {CM : {0, 1}M {0, 1}P"lY(M)}MEN
with a local-decoder that can be implemented by a family of constant depth circuits of size
poly(logM, 1/E) using majority gates of fan-in 0(1/e) (and AND/OR gates of unbounded
fan-in).
Remark 1.4.5. In the statement of Theorem 1.4 4, we view the decoder as a constant-depth
circutt with majority gates of fan-zn O(1/E). Thzs serves to demonstrate the connectzon
between local lzst-decoding and computzng majority. For dzstance bounded away from 1/2 by
polylogarithmically small fraction, the code obtained is simply in ACo.
In particular, for E = 1/polylog log(M) the decoder can be implemented in ACo with size
polylog(M). See Section 6.4 for further details.
Lower Bounds: We characterize the complexity of locally list-decoding binary codes,
showing that the codes of Theorem 1.4.4 are essentially optimal. The proof of the following
theorem is in section 6.5.
Theorem 1.4.6 (Informal). If there exzsts a binary code with a (1/2 - E, poly(1/E))-local-
list-decoder of szze s and depth d, then there exists a circutt of size poly(s) and depth O(d)
that computes majority on 9(1/E) bZts.
In particular, using known lower bounds for computing majority, this means that constant-
depth decoders cannot recover from large errors.
The question of lower bounding the complexity of local-list-decoders was raised by Viola
[Vio06]. He conjectured that (1/2 - E, £)-locally-list-decodable codes require computing ma-
jority over O(1/E) bits, even when the list size £ is exponential in 1/c. Theorem 1.4.6 proves
the conjecture for the case of sub-exponential size lists. Previous and independent works
gave results for other (incomparable) special cases: Viola [Vio06] gave a proof (which he
attributed to Madhu Sudan) of the conjecture for the special case of the standard non-local
list-decoding setting (this result does not imply, however, a strong lower bound for the local
list-decoding setting). Viola [Vio06] also proved that there are no constant-depth decoders
(with polynomial-size lists) for spectfic codes (Theorem 1.4.6, on the other hand, shows that
there are no such decoders for any code).
Recently (independently of our work), Shaltiel and Viola [SV08] gave a beautiful proof
of the conjecture for the local list-decoding setting, with £ exponential in 1/E, but for the
special case that the decoder is restricted to have non-adaptive access to the received word.
(I.e., they give a lower bound for decoders that make all their queries to the received word
simultanuously.) Our result is incomparable to [SV08]: we prove Viola's conjecture only for
the case that e is sub-exponential in 1/e, but do so for any decoder, even an adaptive one.
We emphasize that for important ranges of parameters the best codes known to be decodable
in constant depth use adaptive decoders. In particular, the constant depth decoders of this
work are adaptive. See Section 6.1.2 for a fuller discussion of related work.
Black-Box Reductions: Finally, we consider the consequences of our positive and neg-
ative results on local list-decoding to (fully black-box) hardness amplification for low com-
plexity classes. See Section 6.6 for a full discussion.
1.4.1 Technical Highlights
We seek to improve the decoder's efficiency by delegating some of its computation to the
encoder, in an error-robust way. The idea of delegating computation from the decoder to the
encoder seems dubious at first glance, as any information sent from the encoder might be
corrupted by the noisy channel. This seems to leave the decoder very vulnerable to malicious
behavior of the sender. To give the decoder a better guarantee, we ask more from the encoder:
to send the results of the computations with redundancy that will allow the decoder to easily
recover the correct results even from a corrupted word. This may seem to bring us back to
square one; namely, the decoder again needs to decode a code. So where do we gain in
efficiency? The key point is that we are not trying now to recover arbitrary information, but
rather we are trying to recover the results of a certain computation. Specifically, we show that
if the decoder's computations have certain properties (see Section 1.2.1 and below) then the
task of decoding the correct results of the computations can be done extremely efficiently -
much more efficiently than the decoder's original computation. The properties we utilize are
Properties 1, namely Random instance reduction, and 2, namely Solved instance generator,
as described in Section 1.2.1.
Combining these properties allows us to ensure (w.h.p.) that the decoder can recover
from error introduced by the channel into the results of computations that were delegated
to the encoder. As in Section 1.2.1, we use techniques from cryptography to show that for
functions computable in A/C1 these properties can be implemented in probabilistic constant
parallel time. Thus, we can take any NAC1 decoder and transform it into one that runs
in constant parallel time or constant depth. We obtain transformations for binary locally
decodacle codes and also for non-binary locally decodable and locally list decodable codes
see the theorem statement of Theorems 1.4.1 and 1.4.2 in Section 1.4 for theorem statements
for these transformations, the proofs are in Section 6.3. See Section 1.2.1 for a comparison
with work in cryptography such as that of [AIKO6] and with the techniques in Section 1.2
and 1.3.
See Chapter 6 for further discussion of all our results on error-correcting codes.
1.5 Thesis Roadmap
This thesis combines research done in several works. Detailed descriptions of all the results
highlighted above can be found in the corresponding chapters. Chapter 2 contains com-
mon definitions, preliminaries and technical tools used throughout the thesis. Beyond these
common tools, each chapter is a self-contained description of its results and each can be read
on its own.
Chapter 3 contains results on verifying interactive proofs for efficient computations and
applications, see the overview in Section 1.1. The results are joint work with Goldwasser
and Kalai, originally presented in [GKR08].
Chapter 4 contains results on verifying interactive proofs in constant depth, see the
overview in Section 1.2. The results are joint work with Goldwasser, Gutfreund, Healy and
Kaufman, and were originally presented in [GGH+07].
Chapter 5 contains results on delegating computation in the setting of program check-
ing, testing and correcting, see the overview in Section 1.3. The results are join work with
Goldwasser, Gutfreund, Healy and Kaufman, and were originally presented in [GGH+08].
Chapter 6 contains results on delegating computation in the setting of error-correcting
codes, see the overview in Section 1.4. These results are a combination of two works. The
first is joint work with Gutfreund, Healy and Kaufman on designing efficient decoding proce-
dures that was originally presented in [GGH+07]. The second is later work with Gutfreund,
improving the earlier codes and proving optimality of the final constructions, this work was
originally presented in [GRO08].
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Chapter 2
Definitions and Preliminaries
For a string x E E* (where E is some finite alphabet) we denote by Ix the length of the
string, and by x, or x[i] the i'th symbol in the string. For a finite set S we denote by
y ER S that y is a uniformly distributed sample from S. For n E N, we denote by [n] the set
{1, 2,... , n}. For a finite alphabet F we denote by Ar the relative (or fractional) Hamming
distance between strings over F. That is, let x, y E Fn then At(x, y) = PrER[n][x[i] y[i]],
where x[i], y[i] E F. Typically, F will be clear from the context, we will then drop it from
the subscript.
2.1 Circuit and Complexity Classes
We assume that the reader is familiar with standard complexity classes such as A/P, EXP
and AlNXP. For a positive integer i > 0, AC' circuits are Boolean circuits (with AND, OR
and NOT gates) of size poly(n), depth O(log' n), and unbounded fan-in AND and OR gates
(where n is the length of the input). AC' circuits are boolean circuits of size poly(n) and
depth O(log' n) where the fan-in of AND and OR gates is 2. We use the same notations
to denote the classes of functions computable by these circuit models. We denote by AC
the class U,,J AC', and by NC the class U,,e NC". RNC', RAC', RjNC and RAC are the
(one-sided) randomized analogs of the above classes. In particular, ACo circuits are boolean
circuits (with AND, OR and NOT gates) of constant-depth, polynomial size, and unbounded
fan-in AND and OR gates. ANC1 circuits are boolean circuits of fan-in 2, polynomial size and
logarithmic (in the input size) depth. NC0 circuits are similar to AC 1 , but have constant-
depth. Note that in N/C circuits, every output bit depends on a constant number of input
bits. ACo, ANC1 and A/Co are the classes of languages (or functions) computable (respectively)
by ACo1/A/C I/Co circuits. AC [q] (for a prime q) are similar to AC' circuits, but augmented
with mod q gates.
Throughout, circuits may have many output bits (we specify the exact number when it
is not clear from the context). Also, often we consider uniform circuit classes. Unless we
explicitly note otherwise, circuit families are log-space uniform, i.e. each circuit in the family
can be described by a Turing machine that uses a logarithmic amount of space in the size
of the circuit (for non-polynomial size circuit families the default uniformity is using space
logarithmic in the circuit family size). Thus AC (resp. AC 1 ) computations in this work
are equivalent to constant (resp. logarithmic) parallel time in the CREW PRAM model.
Finally, we extensively use oracle circuits: circuits that have (unit cost) access to an
oracle computing some function. We sometimes interpret this function as a string, in which
case the circuit queries and index and receives from the oracle the symbol in that location
in the string.
2.2 Interactive Proofs
We give here standard definitions for interactive proof systems.
Definition 2.2.1. An mnteractive proof system for a language L with completeness c and
soundness s, is a two party game between a probabilistic polynomial-time verifier V and a
computationally unbounded prover P. The system has two stages: First, in the interaction
stage, V and P are given a common input x and they exchange messages to produce a
transcript t = (V(r), P)(x) (the entire messages exchange) where r are the internal random
coins of V. Then, in the decision stage, V decides according to x, t and r, whether to accept
or reject. The following should hold:
1. (Completeness) There exist a (honest) prover strategy P, such that for every x E L,
Pr,[V(x, t, r) = accept] > c, where t = (V(r), P)(x).
2. (Soundness) For every x ' L and every prover P*, Pr,[V(x, t, r) = accept] < s, where
t = (V(r), P*)(x).
If we do not specify c and s then their respective default values are 2/3 and 1/3.
A multi-prover interactive proof system with p provers for a language L is the same as an
interactive proof system with the only difference that at the interaction stage V exchange
messages with p different provers that have no communication between them. Thus the
transcript t contains p separate sub-transcripts ti,..., tP each with a different prover.
A round of interaction is an exchange of p messages (p > 1) that are sent in parallel from
the verifier to the p provers (one to each prover) and p messages that are sent in parallel back
from the provers to the verifier (one from each prover). Note that the number of rounds may
depend on the length of the input to the protocol. We denote by AM (i.e., Arthur-Merlin
games) the class of languages that have protocols with one prover and a constant number of
interaction rounds.
We denote by IPc,s(k) the class of languages that have an interactive proof system with
completeness c, soundness s and k rounds of interaction. It is well known that IP 2/ 3,1/3 (k) =
IP-2-_,2-n (k) (see, e.g., [Go199]). We denote by MIPc,s(p, k) the class of languages that
have a multi-prover interactive proof system with completeness c, soundness s, p provers and
k rounds of interaction.
We use the following characterization of NSXP by Feige and Lovasz:
Theorem 2.2.2. [FL92] N/XP = MIP1,2-n (2, 1)
2.3 Randomized images
We start by defining the properties of functions and languages that we need for our approach
in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. The first property says that we can easily generate a random instance
together with the evaluation of the function on this input.
Definition 2.3.1 (Solved instance generator). Let f : {0,1}* - {0, 1}* be a function.
We say that a randomized algorithm G is a solved instance generator for f if, given i", it
generates a pair (x, y), where x is a uniformly random element of {0, 1}n and y = f(x).
The second property is a reduction from one function to another that says, roughly, that
we can evaluate the first function on every instance by querying the second function in a
random location.
Definition 2.3.2 (Random instance reduction). Let f : {0, 1}* -- {0, 1}* and g: {0, 1}* --
{0, 1}* be two functions. We say that a pair of algorithms (1, S) is a random instance
reducton from f to g if 7Z is a randomized algorithm that given x E {0, 1}n , generates a pair
(x', 7), where x' is a uniformly random element of {0, 1}m(n) and r E {0, 1}* and it holds
that (g(x'), T) = f(x).
If m(n) = n we say that the random instance reduction is length-preserving. If f and g
are the same function, we say that it is a random instance self-reduction.1 We call R the
Randomtzer and E the Evaluator.
The objects that we will be interested in are pairs of functions that have the above two
properties.
Definition 2.3.3 (Randomized image). Let f: {0, 1}) {0, 1}* and g : {0, 1}* -- {0, 1}*
be two functions. We say that g is a randomized image of f, if there is a random instance
reduction from f to g, and g has a solved instance generator.
1Random instance self-reductions are a special form of what is called in the literature random self-
reductons. The word instance in our terminology, should emphasize the fact that the reduction is from one
instance to another (random) instance. General random self-reductions can make many self-queries to the
function in order to compute its value on a given instance.
We say that it is length-preserving if the random instance reduction is length-preserving,
and that it is a randomized self-image if f = g. Finally, we say that the randomized image can
be implemented in some complexity class C, if the algorithms G, R and £ (from Definitions
2.3.1 and 2.3.2) can be implemented in this class.
Next we present several languages that have extremely efficient randomized images. In
the sequel we will abuse the term by saying that a language has a randomized image, meaning
that its characteristic function has a randomized image. Our constructions use techniques
that were developed in the field of cryptography, with some appropriate modifications.
One important family of functions that have randomized images are word problems over
finite groups.
Definition 2.3.4. Let (G, 0) be a group. We define the word problem of G to be the
function LG : G* - G, where LG(al,. . ., an) = al 0 a2  ... an.
Claim 2.3.5. Let (G, 0) be a finzte group. Then LG has a length-preserving randomized self-
image that can be zmplemented by A/C circuits given that they can sample random elements
from G.
Proof. Our constructions are based on a randomization technique from [Bab87, Kil88a].
Details follow.
Solved instance generator: We would like to sample a random instance x E G n
together with y = La(x). Given In and a random string d = (al,..., an) ER G n, define x to
be (a,, a-1 0 a2 , a2 1 0 a3...., an11 0 an), and y to be an. Since a, . . . , an are independently
and uniformly distributed, so are al, a-1 0 a2, a21 T a 3, ... , an1 an. Clearly, LG(x) =
a1  aD' ®a 2 a21  3 a3  a -11 an = an. Finally, note that every element in x' is a function
of two elements in d, therefore the procedure can be implemented by an ArCo circuit over
the alphabet G.
Random instance self-reduction: The randomizer 1, given x E Gn and a random
string a = (al,..., an) ER G n, outputs x' E G n which is (x1 0 al, al' O 2 0 a2, a21 0 x 3 0
a3 ,..., a-_1 0 Xn 0 an), and T which is a 1'. Define S(o, -) = 0 ® T. Since al,..., a, are
independently and uniformly distributed, so are xx 0al, a- 2 2 1  3 2 a 2 ,3, a a 3 , a-11 12 n
xnan . Clearly, S(f (x'), a- ) = x 10a 0a-1  x 2 @a2 a 1 x 3Oa 3  - a x11  nanOa 1 -
x1 0 x2 O'". ® Xn = LG(x). Finally, note that every element in y is a function of one element
in x and two elements in a, therefore R can be implemented by an A/Co circuit over the
alphabet G (E is over a finite domain so it is clearly in nA/C). 
Corollary 2.3.6. The parity function: Parity(xl,..., x)= - 1 xz where xzz  {0, 1} and
the sum is over GF(2) has a length-preservzng randomized self-image that can be implemented
by A/C circuits.
Barrington [Bar89] has shown that Ls5 is complete for the class A/C1 under A/Co reduc-
tions2 (S 5 is the symmetric group over five elements). We conclude:
Corollary 2.3.7. There is an NAC 1 -complete function under A/Co reductons that has a
length-preserving randomized self-image that can be implemented by ANC circuits that are
given access to a source of random elements in Ss.
Having access to a source of random elements in S5 is a non-standard requirement. The
reason that we need it is that standard (Boolean) A/C circuits cannot sample uniformly
from a set of size IS5 = 120 (given access to a source of random bits). This motivates
(as in [AIKO6]) the following construction, based on ideas from [IK02], which gives com-
plete languages in the (higher) class e-C that have efficient randomized images that can be
implemented by Boolean NCo circuits. Consider the following language:
Definition 2.3.8. The language CMD (for Connectivity Matrix Determinant3 ) is defined
as follows: an instance of the language is a n x n matrix A that has 0/1 entries on the main
diagonal and above it, -1 on the second diagonal (one below the main), and 0 below this
diagonal. A is represented by the list of n(n+A ) 0/1 entries on and above the main diagonal.
Define the characteristic function of L to be det(A) where the determinant is computed over
GF(2).
2While [Bar89] only considers ACo reductions, it is clear that the reduction is in fact n.CO as every element
of S 5 in the resulting word problem depends on exactly one input bit of the original instance.3The origin of the name comes from the fact that the determinant of matrices we consider represents
information about the number of of paths between two nodes in a directed acyclic graph.
Claim 2.3.9. [IK02] CMD zs e-£-complete under N/Co reductions.
Next, building on ideas from [Bab87, Kil88a, FKN94, IK02, AIKO6], we show that CMD
has a a randomized self-image that can be implemented in ACo [e]. We will then modify
the language to obtain a randomized image (but not a self-image) for CMD that can be
implemented in NC.
Claim 2.3.10. CMD has a length-preserving randomized self-image that can be implemented
by ACo[e] circuits.
Proof. For every integer n, Consider the family of n x n matrices M 1 with l's on the main
diagonal, O's below it and 0/1 above it. Similarly consider the family of n x n matrices
M 2 with l's on the main diagonal, 0/1 in the last column (except for entry (n, n) which
is 1), and O's in all other entries. Notice that every matrix in M 1 U M 2 has determinant
1. It is shown in [IK02] that for every instance A E CMD (respectively A ' CMD), the
matrix C, x A x C2 (represented by the entries on and above the main diagonal) is uniformly
distributed over the elements in CMD (respectively not in CMD) of the same length, when
C1 and C2 are uniformly distributed in M 1 and M 2 respectively. Furthermore, CMD halves
the space, that is, for every input length, exactly half the instances are in CMD.
Given these properties, we can construct a solved instance generator and a random in-
stance self-reduction for (the characteristic function of) CMD. The solved instance generator
on n1 chooses at random b ER {0, 1} and constructs the matrix Hb that has -1 on the second
diagonal, b in entry (1, n) and O's elsewhere. It then chooses C1 ER M 1 and C2 ER M 2 and
outputs the pair (C1 x Hb x C2, b). By the above properties L(x) = det(C1 x Hb x C2) = b,
and C1 x Hb X C2 is uniformly distributed (over the choice of b, C1, C2).
Notice that,
(C 1  Hb xC2)3 = E((C)zk - (Hb)k (C2)) (2.1)
£=1 k=1
Thus every entry in the output of the solved instance generator is a degree 3 polynomial
over GF(2) of the bits representing C1, C2 and Hb and it is therefore computable by ACO[@]
circuits.
For the random instance self-reduction, given an n x n matrix A as above, the randomizer
R chooses b En {0, 1} and constructs the matrix A' which is equal to A everywhere except
for entry (1, n) defined to be A",n = A1,, D b. Next R chooses C1 ER M 1 and C2 ER M 2
and outputs the pair (C1 x A' x C2, b). Finally, for 9 to retrieve the value of det(A) from
det(CI x A' x C2) and b, we notice that det(A) = det(A') e b (when the determinants are
computed over GF(2)). This is because the entry (1, n) appears in exactly one summand in
the determinant of A and A'. So det(C1 x A' x C2) E b = det(A') e b = det(A). As in the
case of the solved instance generator, the random instance self-reduction is computable in
AC [e]. 1
As in [AIK06], the reason the above construction is not in NCo, is that every entry in the
product matrix is a sum (over GF(2)) of many elements, each is a product (over GF(2)) of
three elements. Thus it does not depend on a constant number of input and randomness bits.
To overcome this, as in [AIKO6], we randomize this sum using the randomizing technique
for the word problem over the group Z + (Corollary 2.3.5).
Let us start by defining the following variant of CMD.
Definition 2.3.11. the language DCMD (for Decomposed Connectivity Matrix Determi-
nant) is defined as follows: for every integer n > 0, an instance (of length -41)) of DCMD
is described by n(~+1) n2-tuples of bits. The n2-tuples are indexed by 1 j < i < n. The
(i, j)'th tuple is denoted ( ,... (n2 ). We think of such an instance as a n x n matrix A
with -1 on the second diagonal, O's below the second diagonal, and the 2 entries above
the second diagonal are given by
n
2
=
k=1
We say that such an instance is in DCMD if and only if the determinant over GF(2) of the
matrix it represents is 1.
Claim 2.3.12. DCMD is a randomzzed image of CMD that can be implemented by A/C
circuits.
Proof. We describe the solved instance generator, the random instance reduction is obtained
similarly. The first step of the solved instance generator is as in the proof of Claim 2.3.10.
That is, let A = C1 x Hb x C2 where b ER {0, 1}, C1 ER M A and C2 ER M 2 . Now consider the
entries of A as given in Equation 2.1. For every entry, (i, j), the solved instance generator
chooses n2 random bits. (b1'1),...,b '). It then generates the DCMD instance whose
(k, f)'th entry (here we change to indexing in [n] x [n] instead of [n2]) in the (i,j)'th n2-tuple
is
bi,_ 1 E (C1)zk " (Hb)kf" (C2)3 D b(kf)
Where we define b(kO) = b "k-,n), and b(On) = b (n = 0 (note that we do not use our random
choice for b (n 'n ) it is included here only to simplify the indexing).
by applying the argument of Claim 2.3.5 w.r.t. the group Z2+ on each entry, we see that
this instance is a DCMD representation of the matrix A. Furthermore, For every entry on
and above the main diagonal of A, the n2-tuple associated with it is uniformly distributed
among all tuples whose parity equals to that entry. Since the value of every entry on and
above the main diagonal is uniformly and independently distributed (as argued in the proof of
Claim 2.3.10), we obtain a uniformly distributed instance of DCMD whose determinant is b.
Finally, we note that every bit of the DCMD instance is a function of five input/randmoness
bits, and thus the solved instance generator can be implemented by an A/Co circuit. M
Now that we have randomized images for several complete problems, we observe that the
property is preserved by reductions.
Claim 2.3.13. If a language L is hard for some complexity class C1 under some class C2 Of
Karp-reductions and if L has a randomized image that can be implemented in C2, then every
language L' E C1 has a randomized image that can be implemented in C2.
Proof. The randomized image of L' will be the one of L. To obtain a random instance
reduction, given an instance x for the language L', reduce it to an instance y for L. Then
apply on y the random instance reduction from L to its randomized image. M
Another useful property of functions is the following strong form of downward self-
reducibility.
Definition 2.3.14. We say that a language L is strongly downward self-reducble if, for
every constant 6 > 0, L can be decided by a family of polynomial-size constant-depth oracle
circuits, such that the circuit for length n makes queries to an oracle that solves L at input
length n6 .
Using associativity of group operations, the following is straightforward.
Claim 2.3.15. Let (G, 0) be a finite group. Then LG (the word problem over G) is strongly
downwards self reducible.
We conclude this section with the following lemma which says that there is an AC'1-
complete language that has all the properties that we need.
Lemma 2.3.16. There is an NC 1 -complete language under AC reductions, that is strongly
downwards self-reducible, and has a randomized image that can be implemented by NCo
circuits.
Proof. Barrington [Bar89] showed that the decisional version of Ls, (in which one has to
decide whether the resulting permutation in S5 is the identity or not) is NAC1 complete under
ANCo reductions. By Claim 2.3.15 it is strongly downwards self-reducible. Uniform ARC 1 is
contained in OL, so by Claims 2.3.9, 2.3.12 and 2.3.13, DCMD is a randomized image of
the decisional version of Ls that can be implemented by A/CO circuits. M
Chapter 3
Verifying Interactive Proofs for
Efficient Computations
3.1 Overview
Roadmap for Section 3.1. We begin with an overview and discussion of results. Our
main result in this chapter is described in Section 3.1.1. We further use our techniques
to obtain several other results: constructing computationally-sound one-round argument
systems for any (L-uniform) ArC computation, under computational assumptions (Section
3.1.2); Characterizing public-coin log-space interactive proofs (Section 3.1.3); Constructing
low communication zero-knowledge proofs (Section 3.1.5); Constructing Interactive PCPs
(IPCP) and Probabilistically Checkable Arguments (PCA), improving on [KR08, KR09]
(Section 3.1.6). A high-level overview of our techniques is given Section 3.1.7. We proceed in
Section 3.2 with preliminaries. The full protocols, proofs and technical details are presented
in the subsequent sections.
3.1.1 Main Result
Our most general result is a public-coin interactive proof for any language computable by a
family of boolean circuits that is £-uniform (or, more generally, can be generated using a low-
space Turing Machine).1 We view this as a very relaxed notion of uniformity. In particular,
it captures logarithmic space uniform computations and uniform parallel computing classes,
see the discussion following Corollary 3.1.1. The communication complexity is polynomial
in the depth of the computation and poly-logarithmic (rather than polynomial) in its size;
the running time of the verifier is linear in the input length, polynomial in the depth and
poly-logarithmic in its size; and the prover's running time zs polynomial in the computation
szze. See Theorem 1.1.1 in Section 1.1 for the formal statement
An overview of the proof idea is given in Section 3.1.7, see Section 3.4 (and 3.3) for a
full proof. The interactive proofs constructed in Theorem 1.1.1 provide a natural solution to
the delegating computation problem mentioned above. Namely, the statement to be proved
is that the delegated computation was executed correctly; the delegator is the verifier in
the interactive proof ; the delegatee zs the prover in the interactive proof, who convinces the
delegatee that he performed the computation correctly (and runs in polynomial time).
As a primary implication, we get that any computation with low parallel time (signifi-
cantly smaller than the computation's total size) has a very efficient interactive proof. In
particular, for languages in £-uniform A/C, we have:
Corollary 3.1.1. Let L be a language in L-uniform N/C, i.e. computable by a family of
O(log(n))-space uniform csrcuits of size poly(n) and depth polylog(n). L has an mnteractwve
proof where:
1. The prover runs zn time poly(n), the verifier runs in time n -polylog(n) and space
O(log(n)).
2. The protocol has perfect completeness and soundness 1/2.
3. The protocol is public-coin, with communzcatzon complexity polylog(n).
A natural question is how can this be done when the verifier cannot even take the circuit in
question as an additional input (it has no time to read it!). This is where the condition on the
1A circuit family is s(n)n-space uniform if there exists a Turing Machine that on input In runs in space
O(s(n)) and outputs the circuit for inputs of length n. A circuit family is £-uniform if it is log-space uniform.
log-space uniformity of the circuit family comes in. For such circuit families, the circuit has a
"short" implicit representation which the verifier can use without ever constructing the entire
circuit. We view log-space-uniformity as a relaxed notion of uniformity for polynomial-sized
circuits (though admittedly less relaxed than poly-time-uniformity). In particular, Corollary
3.1.1 applies to any language in NAC, and even to any language computable by a PRAM in
poly-logarithmic parallel time
Alternatively, by modifying the model (to include an on-line and an off-line stage of
computation) we also obtain results for the non-uniform setting. See Sections 3.1.4 and 3.1.7
for more details. See Section 1.1 for an overview of prior work on interactive proofs.
Comparison to Prior Work in Other Models. The goal of the work of Babai, Fortnow,
Lund and Szegedy [BFLS91] on Holographic Proofs for NAP (i.e., PCP-proofs where the input
is assumed to be given to the verifier in an error-correcting-code format), was to extend Blum
and Kannan's program checking model [BK95] to checking the results of executions (the
combination of software and hardware) of long computations. They show how to achieve
checking time that is poly-logarithmic in the length of the computation (on top of the time
taken to convert the input into an error correcting code format). Their proof-string has
length that is polynomial in the computation time (the verifier has random access to this
proof string). However the soundness of proofs in this PCP like model (as well as its more
efficient descendants [PS94, BGH+06, BGH+05, Din07]) requires that the verifier/delegator
either "posses" the entire PCP proof string (though only a few of its bits are read), or
somehow have a guarantee that the prover/delegatee cannot change the PCP proof string
after the verifier has started requesting bits of it. Such guarantees seem difficult to achieve
over a network as required in the delegation setting.
Kilian [Kil92, Kil95] gives an argument system for any NMP computation, with commu-
nication complexity that is polylogarithmic, and verifier runtime which is linear in the input
length (up to polylogarithmic factors). This is achieved by a constant round protocol, in
which the prover first constructs a PCP for the correctness of the computation, and then
Merkle-hashes it down to a short string and sends it to the verifier. To do this, one must
assume the existence of strong collision-intractable hash functions with poly-logarithmic out-
put size.2 We emphasize, that an argument system achieves only computational soundness
(soundness with respect to a computationally bounded dishonest prover). In the interactive
proof setting soundness is guaranteed against any cheating prover.
Finally, Micali raises similar goals to ours in his work on Computationally Sound (CS)
proofs [Mic94]. His results are however obtained in the random oracle model. This allows
him to achieve CS-proofs for the correctness of general time computations with a nearly
linear time verifier, a prover whose runtime is polynomial in the time complexity of the
computation, and a poly-log length non-interactive ("written down" rather than interactive)
proof. Alternatively viewed, Micali's work gets non-interactive CS-proofs under the same
assumption as [Kil92], and assuming the existence of Fiat-Shamir-hash-functions [FS86] to
remove interaction. The plausibility of realizing Fiat-Shamir-hash-functions by any explicit
function ensemble has been shown to be highly questionable [Bar01l, CGH04, DNRS03,
GK03].
Finally, we note that all of the above [BFLS91, Kil92, Kil95, Mic94] use the full PCP
machinery, and in fact this use of PCPs is to some extent inherent [RV09]. Our results, on
the other hand, do not use the full PCP machinery. In particular, we do not use low-degree
tests for our main results.
3.1.2 One-Round Arguments
So far, we mostly considered interactive settings with multiple rounds. We find it very
interesting to pursue the question of delegating computation in the non-interactive or
single-round setting as well. One may envision a delegator farming out computations
to a computing facility (say by renting computer time at a super-computer facility during
the night hours), where the result is later returned via e-mail with a fully written-down
"certificate" of correctness.
Thus, we further ask: for which polynomial time computations can a polynomial time
2With standard intractability assumptions, one could get arguments of small but polynomial communi-
cation complexity (using universal arguments [BG02]).
prover, after receiving a challenge from the verifier, write down a certificate of correctness
that is super-efficiently verifiable, and in particular is significantly shorter than the time of
computation (otherwise the verifier cannot even receive the certificate!). I.e. we envision a
one-round protocol, where the verifier sends the prover a (potentially private-coin) challenge,
and gets back a certificate of correctness for some claim. Micali's CS-proofs result [Mic94]
is the only solution known to this problem, and it is in the random oracle model. We note
that in the random oracle model CS proofs are fully non-interactive: there is no need for the
verifier to even send a challenge to the prover.
We address this problem and construct one-round arguments for any £-uniform .AC
computation, assuming the existence of a computational private information retrieval (PIR)
scheme with poly (,)-communication, where n is the security parameter. We note that such
a PIR scheme exists for any 2> log IDBI (where |DBj is the database size) under the
N-th Residuosity Assumption [Lip05, IP07], and under the -Hiding Assumption [CMS99].
For a polynomially small security parameter, such PIR schemes exist under a variety of
computational assumptions (see e.g. [K097]). Moreover, this argument has the property
that the verifier's challenge is independent of the language or the input whose membership
is being proved. This means, for example, that the challenge can be prepared in advance
and posted on the verifier's webpage (note, however, that we make no claims for soundness
if the verifier uses the same challenge more than once).
For security parameter i, the size of the certificates is poly(K , log n), the (honest) prover
runs in polynomial time, and the verifier runs in time n -poly(K, log n) to verify a certificate
(as in [Mic94]). Soundness holds only against computationally bounded cheating provers
(see Section 3.2.4 for a definition and more details about the computational assumption).
Theorem 3.1.2. Let L be a langauge computable by a family of O(log(S(n)))-space uniform
boolean circuits of szze S(n) and depth d(n). Let , > log(S(n)) be a security parameter.
Assume the existence of a secure PIR scheme, with communication poly(K), receiver work
poly(K), and sender work poly(n, K) (where n is the database size). The language L has a
1-round (private coin) argument system with the following properties:
1. The prover runs in time poly(S(n)), the verifier runs zn time n.poly(h, d(n), log(S(n))). 3
2. The protocol has perfect completeness and computatonal soundness 1/2 (can be made
arbztrarily small): for any input x V L and for any cheating prover running in time
< 2"3, the probabzlity that the verzfier accepts is < 1/2.
3. The szzes of the certzficate (the prover's message) and the verifier's challenge are
poly(, d(n)). The verifier's short challenge depends only on the parameters n and
K, and zs independent of the language L and the nput x.
The idea of the proof is as follows. We apply to the protocol of Theorem 1.1.1 a new
transformation due to Kalai and Raz in their paper on probabilistically checkable arguments
[KR09]. They use a computational PIR scheme to transform any public-coin interactive
proof into a one-round argument system (where the verifier's first and only message can be
computed independently and ahead of the input).
More specifically, [KR09] show how to convert any public-coin interactive proof system
(P, V) (for a language L), with communication complexity £, completeness c, and sound-
ness s, into a one-round (two-message) argument system (P', V') (for L), with communication
complexity poly(f, r), completeness c, and soundness s + 2-"2 against malicious provers of
size < 2"3, where n > log(S(n)) is the security parameter. The verifier V' runs in time
tv poly(K), where tv is V's running time. The prover P' runs in time tp -poly(/, 2A), where
tp is P's running time, and A satisfies that each message sent by the prover P depends only
on the A previous bits sent by V.
Note that if A is super-logarithmic, then the resulting prover p' is inefficient. Fortunately,
the protocol of Theorem 1.1.1 has the property that A = O(log(S(n)), and thus the resulting
P' runs in time poly(S(n)).
As discussed above, the resulting one-round argument system (P', V') has the property
that the first message, sent by V', depends only on the random coin tosses of V' (and is
independent of the language L and the instance x), and can be computed in time poly(r').
3Moreover, if the verifier is given oracle access to the low-degree extension of its input, then its running
time is only poly(Q, d(n), log(S(n))).
Thus, this challenge message can be computed by the verifier in advance and say posted on
its webpage. For further details, see Section 3.6.
Applying [KR09] to Other Interactive Proofs. We note that the [KR09] transfor-
mation can in principle be applied to any interactive proof for a PSPACE language (as
IP=PSPACE). This gives polynomial-communication 1-round arguments for PSPACE com-
putations, where the verifier runs in polynomial time, the honest prover runs in exponential
time, say 2P(n) for a polynomial p(.) (this is the time required to produce the certificate).
Choosing a security parameter K = poly(n), soundness can be made to hold against dis-
honest provers that run in time 2 p3 (n) . However, in this case the honest prover runs in
super-polynomial time. Scaling known interactive proofs (such as [LFKN92, Sha92]) to ef-
ficiently computable languages and applying the [KR09] transformation still results in an
inefficient prover.
3.1.3 Public-Coin Log-Space Verifiers
Theorem 1.1.1 as presented above, leads to the resolution of an open problem on character-
izing public-coin interactive proofs for log-space verifiers.
The power of interactive proof systems with a log-space verifier has received significant
attention (see Condon [Con91] and Fortnow and Sipser [For89]). It was shown that any
language that has a public-coin interactive proof with a log-space verifier is in P. Fortnow
and Sipser [For89] showed that such proof systems exist for the class LOGCFL. Fortnow and
Lund [FL93] improved this result, showing such protocols for any language in A/C. In fact,
log2 (n)for the class ', [FL93] achieve loglog(n)space public-coin verifiers.
We resolve this question. As a corollary of Theorem 1.1.1, and using the fact that
languages in P have £-uniform poly-size circuits, we show the following theorem (see Sec-
tion 3.4.2 for details):
Corollary 3.1.3. Let L be a language in P, i.e. one that can be computed by a deterministic
Turing machine in time poly(n). L has an interactive proof where:
1. The prover runs in time poly(n), the verifier runs in time poly(n) and space O(log(n)).
2. The protocol has perfect completeness and soundness 1/2.
3. The protocol is pubhc-coin, with communzcation complexzty poly(n).
3.1.4 Non-Uniform Circuit Families
We also obtain results for non-uniform circuits. In the non-uniform setting the verifier must
read the entire circuit, which is as expensive as carrying out the computation. Thus, we
separate the verification into an off-line (non-interactive) pre-processing phase, and an on-
line interactive proof phase. In the off-line phase, before the input x is specified, the verifier
is allowed to run in poly(S) time, but retains only poly(d, log(S)) bits of information about
C (where d is the depth and S is the size of the circuit C). These bits are retained for
the on-lhne interactive proof phase, where the verifier gets the input x and interacts with
the prover who tries to prove C(x) = 1. A similar distinction between on-line and off-line
computation for interactive proofs was made in the work of Dwork and Stockmeyer [DS02]
on provers that are resource-bounded during a protocol's execution. There the separation
is with respect to the prover. The prover (honest or malicious) is given a bounded amount
of advice from an offline stage, and it is shown how to construct secure protocols under the
assumption that the length of advice given to a dishonest prover is bounded (the honest
prover makes do with very short advice). In our case, the (short) advice is given to the
verifier. We emphasize that the information computed in the off-line phase can only be used
once, if it is used twice (even for different inputs) then soundness is compromised.
Theorem 3.1.4. Let L be a language computable by a (non-uniform) czrcuit family C of size
S(n) and depth d(n). There exists an on-lne/off-line interactive proof (P(C, x), V(x, data), Vpre(C))
for L. This protocol has completeness 1, and soundness 1 (can be made arbitrarily small).
The complexity of the protocol zs as follows:
1. The (randomized) pre-processing computation Vpre(C) takes time poly(S(n)). The out-
put data is of length Idatal = poly(d(n), log(S(n))).
2. The prover P(C, x) runs in tzme poly(S(n)).
3. The on-line verifier V(x, data) runs in time n-poly(d(n), log(S(n))) and space O(log(S(n))).
4. The communication complexity of the (on-line) interactive protocol is poly(d(n), log(S(n))).
See Section 3.4.3 for the details.
3.1.5 Succinct Zero Knowledge Proofs
Aside from the primary interest (to us) of delegating computation, Theorem 1.1.1 above, and
more importantly the techniques used, enable us to improve previous results on communica-
tion efficient zero-knowledge interactive proofs. The literature on zero-knowledge interactive
proofs and interactive arguments for fVP is immense. In this setting we have an AMP relation
R which takes as input an n-bit instance x and a k-bit witness w. A prover (who knows
both x and w) wants to convince a verifier (who knows only x and does not know w) in
zero-knowledge that R(x, w) = 1.
Recently, attention has shifted to constructing zero knowledge interactive proofs with
communication complexity that is polynomial or even linear in the length of the witness w,
rather than in R's worst case running time, as in traditional zero-knowledge proofs [GMW91,
Blu87].
Working towards this goal, Ishai, Kushilevitz, Ostrovsky, and Sahai [IKOS07] showed
that if one-way functions exist, then for any jNP relation R that can be verified by an
ACo circuit (i.e., a constant-depth circuit of unbounded fan-in), there is a zero-knowledge
interactive proof with communication complexity k - poly(K, log(n)), where n is a security
parameter. 4
We improve the results of [IKOS07, KRO08] significantly. We enlarge the set of languages
that have zero-knowledge proofs with communication complexity quasi-linear in the witness
size, from relations R which can be verified by ACo circuits (constant depth) to relations
4A similar result (with slightly higher communication: poly(k, r, log(n))) was obtained independently by
Kalai and Raz [KR08].
R which can be verified by A/C (polylog depth) circuits. More generally, we relate the
communication complexity to the depth of the relation R:
Theorem 3.1.5. Assume one-way functzons exist, and let i = K(n) > log(n) be a security
parameter. Let L be an AP language whose relation R can be computed on inputs of length
n with witnesses of length k = k(n) by Boolean circuits of size poly(n) and depth d(n). Then
L has a zero-knowledge interactive proof as follows:
1. The prover runs in time poly(n) (given a witness), the verifier runs in time poly(n)
and space O(log(n)).
2. The protocol has perfect completeness and soundness 1/2.
3. The protocol is public-coin, with communication complexity k -poly(K, d(n)).
In particular, for relations R in NC, the protocol of Theorem 3.1.5 matches the com-
munication complexity achieved by [IKOS07] for ACo; i.e., the communication complexity is
quasi-linear in the witness length.
From an application point of view, enlarging the set of communication efficient protocols
from relations verifiable in ACo to relations verifiable in NC, is significant. Many typical
statements that one wants to prove in zero knowledge involve proving the correctness of
cryptographic operations in zero knowledge, such as "The following is the result of proper
decryption" or "The following is a result of a pseudorandom function". Many such operations
are generally not implementable in ACo (see [LMN93]), but can often be done in ArC.
The idea behind this theorem is to use our public-coin interactive protocol from Theorem
1.1.1, and carefully apply to it the (standard) transformation from public-coin interactive
proofs to zero knowledge interactive proofs of [BGG+88]. This is done using statistically
binding commitments, which can be implemented using one-way functions [Nao89, HILL99].
Details are in Section 3.5.
For ANP languages whose relations can be verified in £-uniform ANC, the verifier in our
zero knowledge proof runs in time that is quasi-linear in the input size. We note that the
works of [IKOS07, KR08] mentioned above, on zero knowledge interactive proofs for ACO
computable relations, do not address (nor do they achieve) improvements in the verifier's
computation time. This is captured by the following theorem:
Theorem 3.1.6. Assume one-way functions exist, and let K = K(n) > log(n) be a secumty
parameter. Let L be an NP language whose relation R can be computed on inputs of length
n with witnesses of length k = k(n) by a £-uniform family of boolean circuits of size poly(n)
and depth d(n). Then L has a zero-knowledge interactive proof as follows:
1. The prover runs in time poly(n) (given a witness), the verifier runs in time n-poly(k, K, d)
and space O(log(n)).
2. The protocol has perfect completeness and soundness 1/2.
3. The protocol is public-coin, with communication complexity k -poly(K, d(n)).
We note that in the setting of arguments and computational soundness, it is known by
[Kil92] how to obtain asymptotically very efficient zero-knowledge argument systems with
polylogarithmic communication complexity for all of HP. Besides the weaker soundness
guarantees, those results require assuming collision-resistant hashing (we assume only one-
way functions), and use the full PCP machinery.
3.1.6 Results on IPCP and PCA
Building on our interactive proofs, we show constructions, with better parameters and novel
features, of two new proof systems introduced by Kalai and Raz [KR08, KR09].
Low communication and short Interactive PCP. In [KR08] Kalai and Raz proposed
the notion of an interactive PCP (IPCP): a proof system in which a polynomial time verifier
has access to a proof-string (a la PCP) as well as an interactive prover. When an NAP
relation R is implementable by a constant-depth circuit (i.e., R E ACo) they show an
IPCP for R with polylog query complexity, where the proof-string is of size polynomial
in the length of the witness to R (rather than the size of R) and an interactive phase of
communication complexity polylog(n). We extend this result to AnP relations implementable
by poly-size circuits of depth d. Namely, we demonstrate an IPCP with a proof-string of
length polynomial in the length of the witness and an interactive phase of communication
complexity poly(log n, d). In particular, this extends the results of [KR08] from relations
in ACo to relations in A/C. Moreover, the work of [KR08] focuses on the communication
complexity of the proof system, but not the runtime of the verifier5 (the complexity of their
verifier is proportional to the size of R). For relations in £-uniform A/C, our techniques yield
IPCPs with verifier time complexity that is quasi-linear in the input and witness sizes. See
Section 3.7 for details and theorem statements.
PCA with Efficient Provers. Another work of Kalai and Raz [KR09] proposes a new
proof system model called probabzhlstically checkable argument (PCA). A PCA is a relaxation
of a probabilistically checkable proof (PCP): a verifier first specifies a challenge to the prover,
and the proof (PCA) is tailored to this verifier challenge. The soundness property is required
to hold only computationally, i.e. against bounded malicious provers. Other than these
differences, the setting is the same as that of PCPs: after specifying the challenge and
receiving the proof, the probabilistic polynomial time verifier only reads a few bits of the
proof string in order to verify. A PCA is said to be efficient if the honest prover, given a
witness, runs in time poly(n).
Using the assumption that (computational) PIR schemes with polylog communication
exist, [KR09] show a transformation from any IPCP with certain properties to a short
PCA. Applying this transformation to our IPCP (the conditions of the transformation are
met) yields an efficient PCA with proof-string length poly(witness size, log n, d) and query
complexity poly(log n, d) for any language in AP whose relation can be computed by depth
d and poly-size circuits. We note that the efficiency of the prover is derived from a special
property of our proof system. In particular, previous PCAs (obtained when one starts with
the IPCPs of [KR08]) require non-polynomial time provers. See Section 3.8 for details and
5In both this work and in [KR08], the prover always runs in polynomial time.
theorem statements.
3.1.7 Bird's Eye View of the Protocol
The Big Picture. In a nutshell, our goal is to reduce the verifier's runtime to be propor-
tional to the depth of the circuit C being computed, rather than its size, without increasing
the prover's runtime by too much.
To do this we use many of the ideas developed for the MIP and PCP setting, starting with
the works of [BGKW88, BFL91, BFLS91, AS98, ALM+98, FGL+96]. We apply these ideas to
the problem of proving that the computation of a (uniform) circuit C is progressing properly,
without the verifier actually performing it or even looking at the entire circuit. Applying
the ideas pioneered in the MIP/PCP setting to our setting, however, runs into immediate
difficulties. The MIP/PCP constructions require assuming that the verifier somehow has
access to a committed string (usually the string should contain a low degree extension
a high-distance encoding-of C's computation on the input x). This assumption is built
into the PCP model, and is implicitly achieved in the MIP model by the fact that the
provers cannot communicate. Our challenge is that in our setting we cannot assume such a
commitment! Instead, we force the prover to recursively prove the values he claims for this
low-degree extension, and do this while preserving the prover's time complexity.
Elaborating on the above, we proceed to give the idea of the proof of our main theorem.
Assume without loss of generality that the circuit C is a depth d arithmetic circuit in a
layered form where there are as many layers as the depth of the circuit. 6
In previous work, spanning both the single and multi prover models [LFKN92, Sha92,
BFL91, KR08] ,7 the entire computation of the underlying machine is arithmetized and turned
into an algebraic expression whose value is claimed and proved by the prover.
Departing from previous work, here we instead employ an interactive protocol that closely
follows the (parallelized) computation of C, layer by layer, from the output layer to the input
layer, numbering the layers in increasing order from the top (output) of the circuit to the
6Every circuit can be converted into this format by at most squaring its size and not changing the depth.
7One exception is the work of Feige and Kilian on refereed games [FK97], which is in a different model.
bottom (input) of the circuit. s The verifier has no time to compute points in the low-degree
extension of the computation on x in layer i: this is the low-degree extension (a high distance
encoding) of the vector of values that the gates in the circuit's i-th layer take on input x,
and to compute it one needs to actually evaluate C, which we want to avoid! Thus, the
low-degree extension of the i-th layer, will be instead supplied by the prover. Of course,
the prover may cheat. Thus, each phase of the protocol lets the verifier reduce verification
of a single point in the low-degree extension of an advanced step (layer) in the parallel
computation, to verification of a single point in the low-degree extension of the previous step
(layer). This process is repeated iteratively (for as many layers as the circuit has), until at
the end the verification has been reduced to verifying a single point in the extension of the
first step in the computation. In the first step of the computation (the input layer), the only
information "computed" is the input x, the verifier can compute the low degree extension of
the input x on its own in nearly-linear time.
Going from Layer to Layer. Given the outline above, the main remaining challenge is
how to reduce verification of a single point in the low degree extension of a layer in the
circuit, to verification of a single point in the low degree extension of the previous layer.
As an aside, we note that at first glance this may seem similar to a problem faced by
[FK97] in their work on refereed games: a two-prover setting where one prover is honest and
the other is cheating, and the verifier does not know which is which. They also examine the
computation step by step or layer by layer, but they do this for a sequentzal (exponential-
time) computation. To grossly simplify their work, they play the provers against each other,
running a binary search to find a point t of the computation where the provers agree on the
results of the computation up to time t, but not on the result at time t + 1. Intuitively, once
this is achieved the verifier can run on his own that single computation step and find out
which prover is cheating. We, on the other hand, do not have two provers to play against
each other for binary search. Also, while we also layer the computation, we deal with a
highly parallel computation (i.e. any circuit layout), and so the verifier cannot even run a
sI.e., layer 0 is the output layer, and layer d is the input layer.
single step of the computation.
So the question remains, how can the verifier go from an advanced layer i in the compu-
tation to an earlier layer i + 1, without even being able to look at the entire layer? The main
ingredient we use to do this is a sum-check protocol (see [LFKN92]) applied to the gates of
level i.
We observe that every point in the low degree extension (LDE) of the advanced layer
(layer i) is a linear combination, or a weighted sum, of the values of that layer's gates. The
circuit has fan-in 2, so the value of each gate is a function of the values of two gates in the
layer below (layer i + 1). We can express the value of each gate g in layer i as a sum, over
all possible gate-pairs (k, f) in layer i + 1, of a low degree function of: (i) the values of gates
k and £, and (ii) a predicate that indicates whether gates k and f are indeed the "children"
of gate g. Arithmetizing this entire sum of sums, we run a sum-check protocol to verify the
value of one point in the low-degree extension of layer i. To simplify matters, we assume
for now that the verifier has access to (a low-degree extension of) the predicate that says
whether a pair of gates (k, f) are the children of the gate g. Then (modulo many details)
at the end of this sum-check protocol the verifier only needs to verify the values of a pair of
points in the LDE of layer i +1. This is still not enough, as we need to reduce the verification
of a single point in the LDE of layer i to the verification of a single point in layer i + 1 and
not of a pair of points. We finally use an interactive protocol to reduce verifying two points
in the LDE of layer i + 1 to verifying just one.
We assumed for simplicity of exposition above that the verifier has access to a low degree
extension of the predicate describing arbitrary circuit gates. Thus, the (central) remaining
question is how the verifier gains access to such LDE's of predicates that decide whether
circuit gates are connected, without looking at the entire circuit (as the circuit itself is much
larger than the verifier's running time). This is where we use the uniformity of the circuit,
described below.
The verifier's running time in each of these phases is poly-logarithmic in the circuit size.
In the final phase, computing one point in the low-degree extension of the input requires
only nearly-linear time, independent of the rest of the circuit. Another important point is
that the verifier does not need to remember anything about earlier phases of the verification,
at any point in time it only needs to remember what is being verified about a certain point
in the computation. This results in very space-efficient verifiers. The savings in the prover's
running time comes (intuitively) from the fact that the prover does not need to arithmetize
the entire computation, but rather proves statements about one (parallel) computation step
at a time.
Utilizing Uniformity. It remains then to show how the verifier can compute (a low-degree
extension of) a predicate that decides whether circuit gates are connected, without looking
at the entire circuit. To do this, we use the uniformity of the circuit. Namely, the fact
that it has a very short implicit representation. A similar problem was faced by [BFL91]:
There a computation is reduced to an (exponential) 3SAT formula, and the (polynomial-
time) verifier needs to access a low-degree extension of a function computing which variables
are in a specific clause of the formula. In the [BFL91] setting this can be done because the
Cook-Levin reduction transforms even exponential-time uniform computations into formulas
where information on specific clauses can be computed efficiently. Unfortunately, we cannot
use the Cook-Levin reduction as [BFL91] and other works do, because we need to transform
uniform computations into low-depth circuits without blowing up the input size.
To do this, we proceed in two steps. First, we examine low space computations, e.g. uni-
form log-space Turing Machines (deterministic or non-deterministic). A log-space machine
can be transformed into a family of boolean circuits with poly-logarithmic depth and poly-
nomial size. We show that in this family of circuits, it is possible to compute the predicate
that decides whether circuit gates are connected in poly-logarithmic time and constant (ACO)
depth. This computation can itself be arithmetized, which allows the verifier to compute a
low-degree extension of the predicate in poly-logarithmic time. Thus we obtain an interactive
proof with an efficient prover and super-efficient verifier for any £ or AC computation.
Still, the result above took advantage of the (strong) uniformity of very specific circuits
that are constructed from log-space Turing Machines. We want to give interactive proofs for
general log-space uniform circuits, and not only for the specific ones we can construct for log-
space languages. How then can a verifier compute even the predicate that decides whether
circuit gates in a log-space uniform circuit are connected (let alone its low degree extension)?
In general, computing this predicate might require nearly as much time as evaluating the
entire circuit. We overcome this obstacle by observing that the verifier does not have to
compute this predicate on its own: it can ask the prover to compute the predicate for it! Of
course, the prover may cheat, but the verifier can use the above interactive proof for log-space
computations to force the prover to prove that it computed the (low degree extensions of)
the predicate correctly. This final protocol gives an interactive proof for general log-space
uniform circuits with low depth.
Finally, we note that even for non-uniform circuits, the only "heavy" computation that
the verifier needs to do is computing low-degree extensions of the predicate that decides
whether circuit gates are connected. The locations at which the verifier needs to access this
predicate are only a function of its own randomness (and not of the input or the prover's
responses). This means that even for a completely non-uniform circuit, the verifier can
compute these evaluations of the predicate's low-degree extension off-line on its own, without
knowing the input or interacting with the prover. This off-line phase requires run-time that
is proportional to the circuit size. Once the input is specified, the verifier, who has the (poly-
logarithmically many) evaluations of the predicate's low degree extension that it computed
off-line, can run the interactive proof on-line with the prover. The verifier will be super
efficient in this on-line phase. See Section 3.3 and 3.4 for details.
Organization of the Exposition. The full exposition of the main result (Theorem 1.1.1)
is organized in two phases. First, to highlight and clarify some of the new technical ideas,
we present in Section 3.3 a bare-bones interactive proof protocol. In this protocol (which
is an abstraction), we assume that the verifier "magically" gets access to (low-degree ex-
tensions of) the predicates that decide whether (and how) triplets of circuit gates are con-
nected (predicates that specify the circuit). Given oracle access to (low degree extensions
of) these predicates, we show in Theorem 3.3.1 an interactive proof with the parameters
claimed above. This still is not an interactive proof in the standard model, as the veri-
fier gets these oracle functions "magically". In Section 3.4 we show how to implement the
above bare-bones protocol for uniform circuits. We begin in Section 3.4.1 by showing that
(non-deterministic) log-space languages have low-depth polynomial-size circuits for which
the verifier can compute low-degree extensions of the predicates on its own in polylogarith-
mic time. This immediately gives an interactive proof with a super-efficient verifier for ANC
languages, the result is stated in that section as Theorem 3.4.4. We then proceed in Section
3.4.2 with a general result for £-uniform circuits, another implementation of the bare-bones
protocol. Here the verifier cannot compute the predicates super-efficiently on its own. In-
stead, the prover computes the values of the predicates for the verifier. Of course, the prover
may cheat, but these are £ computations. Thus, we can use the interactive proofs for ArN
computations (of Theorem 3.4.4) as a sub-protocol, where the prover proves the correctness
of his answers. This gives the result of Theorem 1.1.1.
The remainder of the paper is devoted to applications and consequences. In Section 3.5
we construct low-communication (succinct) zero-knowledge proofs. Combining our protocols
with a transformation of Kalai and Raz [KR09], we obtain one-round arguments in Section
3.6. Section 3.7 shows constructions of new and improved IPCPs. Finally, in Section 3.8 we
present new construction of PCAs.
3.2 Preliminaries
3.2.1 Low Degree Extension
Fix H to be an extension field of GF[2], and fix F to be an extension field of H (and in
particular, an extension field of GF[2]), where JF = poly(IHI). 9 We always assume (without
loss of generality) that field operations can be performed in time that is poly-logarithmic in
the field size, and space that is logarithmic in the field size. Fix an integer m E N. In what
9Usually, when doing low degree extensions, F is taken to be an extension field of GF[2], and IHI is simply
a subset of F (not necessarily a subfield). In this paper, we take IHI to be a subfield. However, all we actually
use is the fact that it of size 2 k for some k.
follows, we define the low degree extension of a k-element string (wo, wl, . Wk-1) E Fk with
respect to IF, H, m, where k < IHIm.
Fix a : Hm --+0, ,., .. m., m- 1} to be any (efficiently computable) one-to-one function.
In this paper, we take ac to be the lexicographic order of Hm . We can view (wo, wl,..., ,k-1)
as a function W : HIm -+ F, where
de2(z) f if(a(z) k- 1 (3.1)
0 o.w.
A basic fact is that there exists a unique extension of W into a function W : Fm --+ F (which
agrees with W on Hm: WjHm =- W), such that W is an m-variate polynomial of degree at
most |H| - 1 in each variable. Moreover, as is formally stated in the proposition below, the
function W can be expressed as
k-1
(til,..., m) t=) -(l,...,) ' w ,
Z=0
where each F : m -+ F is an m-variate polynomial, that depends only on the parameters
H, F, and m (and is independent of w), of size poly( HI, m) and of degree at most IH - 1 in
each variable.
The function W is called the low degree extension of w = (wo, l,., k- 1) with respect
to , F, m, and is denoted by LDEn,F,m(w).
Proposition 3.2.1. There exists a Turing machine that takes as input an extension field
H of GF[2], 10 an extension field F of H, and an integer m. The machine runs in time
poly(IHI, m) and space O(log(llHI)+ log(m)). It outputs the unique 2m-variate polynomial
S: Fm x Fm -- F of degree IH - 1 in each variable (represented as an arithmetic circuit of
degree ]HI - 1 in each variable), such that for every (wo, w,. ., k-1) E IFk with k < ]HI m ,
'OThroughout this work, when we refer to a machine that takes as input a field, we mean the machine is
given a short (poly-logarithmic in the field size) description of the field, that permits field operations to be
computed in time that is poly-logarithmic in the field size and space that is logarithmic in the field size.
and for every z E Fm,
W(z) = (Zp) -W(p), (3.2)
where W : Hm -- > F is the function corresponding to (w0 , wl1 ..., wk-1) as defined in Equa-
tzon (3.1), and W : Fm -- F is its low degree extension (z.e., the unzque extension of
W : Hm --, F of degree at most IH! - 1 in each variable).
Moreover, 3 can be evaluated zn time poly(IHI, m) and space O(log(IHI) + log(m)).
Namely, there exists a Turzng machzne wzth the above time and space bounds, that takes
as input parameters H,F,m (as above), and a pazr (z,p) E Fm x Fm, and outputs (z,p).
Proof of Proposition 3.2.1. Consider the function 3 : H m x H m -- F defined by
(z,p)= 1  if z = p
0 0o.w.
Let : F m x Fm -- F be the unique extension of /, of degree at most IHI - 1 in each variable.
It is easy to see that 3 satisfies Equation (3.2), since it satisfies Equation (3.2) for every
z E H m , and it is of degree at most IHI - 1 in each variable.
It remains to prove that ) can be both evaluated on an input, and generated (given
(H, F, m)), in time poly(IH) and space O(log(IHI)).
1. Let b : F x F -+ F be the unique bivariate polynomial of degree < JHJ - 1 in each
variable, such that for every t, x E H,
Sif t = x
b(t, x) =
0 o.w.
This function is a polynomial (or arithmetic circuit) of size poly(IH). It can be both
evaluated on an input, and generated (given (H, F, m)), in time poly(IH) and space
O(log(|HI)).
2. Consider the arithmetic circuit C : F m x F m -+ F defined by
m
C(z, p) = I b(z,,p,).
3=1
This circuit of size poly(H, m) and degree IEH - 1 in each of its variables. It can be
evaluated on an input, and generated (given (IHI, F, m)), in time poly(HI, m) and space
O(log(IH) + log(m)).
It remains to note that C computes the function f, since it agrees with 3 on Hm x ]Hm,
and is a polynomial of degree |H - 1 in each variable. I
Claim 3.2.2. There exzsts a Turing machine that takes as input an extension field H of
GF[2], an extension field F of H, an integer m, a sequence w = (wo, W1, - , Wk-1) E ]k
such that k < IHImt , and a coordinate z E IFm . It outputs the value W(z), where W is the
unique low-degree extension of w (with respect to H, F, m). The machine's running tzme is
IIHm . poly(I H, m) and its space usage is O(m -log(IHI)).
Proof of Claim 3.2.2. The proof is a direct corollary of Proposition 3.2.1. Let W : Hm
F be the function corresponding to w, as defined in Equation (3.1). By Equation 3.2, for
every z E F m ,
W(z) = (z,p) - W(p).
pEH
m
By Proposition 3.2.1, we know that / can be computed in time poly(IH, m ) and space
O(log(IHI) + log(m)). Thus, computing the entire sum (of products) can be done in time
HIm . poly(IHI, m) and space O(m -log(lHI)). I
In Section 3.4 we refer to the low-degree extension of a k-element string, where each
element is a vector. Namely, we consider the low degree extension of
W = (WO, W1 , ... , k - 1) (]~e )k
with respect to F, H, m, where again k < |Hm.
Similarly to what was done above for the case f = 1, we view (WO, W1,. .. ,k-) as
a (vector valued) function W : Hm -*Ff (in particular, W is again 0 on inputs whose
lexicographic order is IH' or more). As before, there is a unique extension of W into a
function W : Fm -+ F which agrees with W on H m , and where each of the outputs is
a function of degree at most IHJ - 1 in every input variable. As before, the function W
is called the low-degree extension of w with respect to H, IF, m and denoted (as usual) by
LDEHI,m(w).
Finally, note that IW can be expressed as the low degree extensions of f standard functions
(from Hm to IF), each computing one of the f items in W's output. By Claim 3.2.2, the
function W can be expressed as an arithmetic circuit over F, that can be generated and
evaluated in time HIm . poly(IHI, m, f) and space O(log(f) + m - log(IHI)).
3.2.2 Low Degree Test
We next explain what a low degree test is. We note that in this work, a low degree test is
used only in Section 3.7, the section on interactive PCPs.
Fix a finite field F. Suppose that a verifier wishes to test whether a function 7 : Fm -- F
is close to an m-variate polynomial of degree < d (think of d as significantly smaller than
|F ). We think of a low degree test as an interactive proof for 7 being close to an m-variate
polynomial of degree < d. This proof should be short (say, of size < poly(IF, m)). The
verifier has only oracle access to 7r, and is allowed to query 7r at only a few points (say, only
one point).
In this work, we need a low degree test with sub-constant error. Three such tests exist in
the literature: One due to Raz and Safra [RS97], one due to Arora and Sudan [AS03], and
one due to Moshkovitz and Raz [MR08]. For the sake of convenience, we use the latter. The
low degree test of [MR08] is described in Figure 3-1, and is denoted by (PLDT(r), VLDT).
Lemma 3.2.3. For any m > 3 and 1 < d < IF, the low degree test (PLDT('),VLDT)
described in Figure 3-1 has the following guarantees.
Low Degree Test for r :IFm - IF
1. The verifier chooses uniformly and independently z1, z2, Z3 R IFm. If they are
linearly dependent then he accepts. Otherwise, he sends the prover the triplet
(Zi, Z2, Z3)
2. The prover sends r : F 3 --+ F, which is supposedly the function 7r restricted to the
subspace U spanned by the vectors zi, z2 , z 3. Namely,
def
?7(al, a2, a3) = 7(allZ + a2Z2 t z  3Z3).
3. The verifier checks that 7j is of degree at most d. If the check fails then the verifier
rejects. Otherwise, the verifier chooses a random point z in the subspace U, by
choosing uniformly al, a2, a3 ER F and setting z = alzl + a2z2 + a3z 3 . He queries
the oracle 7r at the point z, and accepts if and only if
,q(al, a2, a3) = 7r(Z).
Figure 3-1: Low degree test (PLDT(W), VLDT)
* Completeness: If r : Fm -+ F is an m-variate polynomial of total degree < d then
Pr [(PLDT(7r), VLDT)= 1] 1
* Soundness (decoding): For every r :Fm - IF and every (unbounded) interactive
Turing machine P, if
Pr[(P(7r), VLDT)= ]>
then there exists an m-variate polynomial f : IFm -+ F of total degree < d, such that
Przem [(z) = f(z)] -y 7- E, where
def ~210 md
" Complexity: PLDT(7T) is an interactive Turing machine, and VLDT is a probabilistic
interactive Turing machine with oracle access to 7r F m --+ F. The prover PLDT runs
in time < poly( F m ). The verifier VLDT runs in time < poly( F, m) and queries the
oracle 7r at a single point. The communication complexity is < poly( IFI, m).
We refer the reader to [MR08] for a proof of Lemma 3.2.3.
3.2.3 Interactive Sum-Check Protocol
Fix a finite field F. In a sum-check protocol, a (not necessarily efficient) prover takes as
input an m-variate polynomial f : Fm - F of degree < d in each variable (think of d as
significantly smaller than IFI). His goal is to convince a verifier that
Sf(z) = o,
zcH m
for a subset H C F. The verifier only has oracle access to f, and is required to be efficient
in both its running time and its number of oracle queries. In Figure 3-2, we review the
standard sum-check protocol, as it appeared for example in [LFKN92, Sha92]. We denote
this protocol by (Psc(f), Vc).
Lemma 3.2.4. Let f : Fm -+ F be an m-variate polynomial of degree at most d in each
varzable, where d < IF. The sum-check protocol (Psc(f),V/c), described n Figure 3-2,
satzsfies the following properties.
* Completeness: If -zEHm f(z) = 0 then
Pr [(Psc(f)Vsfc)= 1] = 1.
* Soundness: If EzeHm f(z) 4 0 then for every (unbounded) interactve Turng ma-
chzne P,
Pr ) 1] <md
* Complexity: Psc(f) is an interactive Turing machine, and Vsf is a probabilstic
interactive Turing machzne with oracle access to f : Fm -- F. The prover Psc(f)
runs zn time < poly(IF m).11 The verifier Vsfc runs in time < poly(IFI, m) and space
"Here we assume the prover's input is a description of the function f, from which f can be computed (on
any input) in time < poly(IF m l).
Sum-Check Protocol for t...,tmEH f(ti,. .. , tinm) = 0
* In the first round, P computes the univariate polynomial gl : F - IF defined by
g91(X) df E f(x, t2,...,tm)
t2,...,tmEH
and sends gi to V. Then, V checks that gi : F - F is a univariate polynomial of
degree at most d, and that
7 91g(x) = 0.
xEH
If not V rejects. Otherwise, V chooses a random element cl ER F, and sends cl to
P.
* In the i'th round, P computes the univariate polynomial
gz(x) def f(Cl, ... , Cz-1,, tz+1, ... tm),
tz+, ..,tmEH
and sends g, to V. Then, V checks that g, is a univariate polynomial of degree at
most d, and that
E gZ(x) - g2-1(C-1).
xEH
If not V rejects. Otherwise, V chooses a random element c, ER F, and sends c, to
P.
* In the last round, P computes the univariate polynomial
gm(X) ef f(C1, .. ,Cm-1, X)
and sends gm to V. Finally, V checks that gm is a univariate polynomial of degree
at most d, and that
E gm() = gm-1(Cm-i).
xEH
If not V rejects. Otherwise, V chooses a random element cm ER F and checks that
gm(cm) = f(cl, . c., Cm),
by querying the oracle at the point z = (ci,..., cm).
Figure 3-2: Sum-check protocol (Psc(f), Vk) [LFKN92, Sha92]
O(log(lF|) -m), and queries the oracle f at a single point. The communication complex-
ity is < poly(lFI, m), and the total number of bits sent from the verifier to the prover
is O(m . log IFI). Moreover, this protocol is public-coin; i.e., all the messages sent by
the verzfier are truly random and consist of the verifier's random coin tosses.
Proof of Lemma 3.2.4: The completeness condition and the complexity condition follow
immediately from the protocol description. As for the soundness, let f : IFm -- F be a
polynomial of degree at most d in each variable, such that EzEHm f(z) j 0. Assume for the
sake of contradiction that there exists a cheating prover P for which
s = Pr [(f), =) 1 > .
Recall that in the sum-check protocol the prover sends m univariate polynomials gY,..., 9m,
and the verifier sends m - 1 random field elements cl,. . . , cm-1 E F. For every i C [m], let
A, denote the event that
gz(x) = f (cl,, CZ-1,, tz+l1 ... , tm)
tz+j,...,trnEH
Let S denote the event that (P(f), Vc) = 1. Notice that Pr[SIAi A ... A Am]= 0. We will
reach a contradiction by proving that
md
Pr[SIA1 A ... AAm] s - .
JIF
To this end, we prove by (reverse) induction that for every j E [m],
(m - j + 1)dPr[SIA, A ... A Am] > s - I)d (3.3)
For j = m,
d
s = Pr[S] < Pr[SI-(Am)] + Pr[SIAm] < - + Pr[S Am],IF
where the latter inequality follows from the fact that every two distinct univariate polyno-
mials of degree < d over F agree in at most d points. Thus,
86
Pr[S|Am] > s - d
Assume that Equation (3.3) holds for j, and we will show that it holds for j - 1.
(m - j + 1)d
s - + Pr[S|A, A ... A A,] <|F1
Pr[SI-'(A,_I) A A3 A ... A Am] + Pr[SA, 1 A A, A ... A Am]
d
S+ Pr[SIA3 1 A ... A Am],
which implies that
Pr[SIA,_1 A... A Am] (> s -
as desired. 0
3.2.4 Private Information Retrieval (PIR)
A Pmvate Information Retrieval (PIR) scheme, a concept introduced by Chor, Goldreich,
Kushilevitz, and Sudan [CKGS98], allows a user to retrieve information from a database in a
private manner. More formally, the database is modeled as an N bit string x = (xl,..., XN),
out of which the user retrieves the i'th bit x1, without revealing any information about the
index i. A trivial PIR scheme consists of sending the entire database to the user, thus
satisfying the PIR privacy requirement in the information-theoretic sense. A PIR scheme
with communication complexity smaller than N is said to be non-trvial.
A PIR scheme consists of three algorithms: QPIR, DPIR and RPIR. The query algorithm
QPIR takes as input a security parameter t, the database size N, and an index i E [N]
(that the user wishes to retrieve from the database). It outputs a query q, which should
reveal no information about the index i, together with an additional output s, which is kept
secret by the user and will later assist the user in retrieving the desired element from the
database. The database algorithm DPIR takes as input a security parameter t, the database
(Xl,..., XN) and a query q, and outputs an answer a. This answer enables the user to retrieve
x., by applying the retrieval algorithm RPIR, which takes as input a security parameter t,
the database size N, an index i E [N], a corresponding pair (q, s) obtained from the query
algorithm, and the database answer a corresponding to the query q. It outputs a value which
is supposed to be the i'th value of the database.
In this paper we are interested in poly-logarithmic PIR schemes, formally defined by
Cachin et al. [CMS99], as follows. 12
Definition 3.2.5. Let t be the security parameter and N be the database size. Let QPIR
and DPIR be probabilistic circuits, and let RPIR be a deterministic circuit. We say that
(QPIR, DPIR, RPIR) is a poly-logarithmic private information retrzeval scheme if the following
conditions are satisfied:
1. (Size Restriction:) QPIR and RPIR are of size < poly(t, log N), and DPIR is of size
< poly(t, N). The output of QPIR and DPIR is of size < poly(t, log N).
2. (Correctness:) VN, Vt, Vdatabase x = (xl,... ,XN) E {0, 1}N, and Vi E [N],
Pr[RPIR(t, N, i, (q, s), a) = x (q, s) < QPIR(t, N, i), a -- DPIR(t, x, q)] > 1 - 2- t 3
3. (User Privacy:) VN, Vt, Vi, j E [N], and Vadversary A of size at most 2 3,
Pr[A(t, N, q)= 1 I (q, s) QPIR(t, N, i)]-
Pr[A(t, N, q) = 1 (q, s) <- QPIR(t, N, j)] < 2- t3
12Definition 3.2.5 is not worded exactly as the one in [CMS99], but was shown to be equivalent to it
in [KR06].
3.3 The Bare-Bones Protocol for Delegating Compu-
tation
Our goal is constructing a protocol in which a prover, who is given a circuit C : {0, 1}k -
{0, 1} of size S and of depth d, and a string x E {0, I}k, proves to a verifier that C(x) = 0.
The verifier's running time should be significantly smaller than S (the time it would take
him to evaluate C(x) on his own). At the same time, we want the prover to be efficient,
running in time that is polynomial in S.
Since we want the verifier to run in time that is smaller than the circuit size, we must
utilize the uniformity of the circuit, as discussed in Section 3.1.7. In this section, however, we
do not focus on this issue, and we do not directly obtain protocols for delegating computation.
Rather, we work around the circuit uniformity issue by giving the verifier oracle access to
(an extension of) the function that on input three gates outputs 1 if one gate is the addition
(or the multiplication) of the other two gates. The verifier will run in quasi-linear time given
this oracle. We call this protocol a bare-bones interactive proof protocol, it should be taken
as an abstraction, meant to highlight and clarify some of the new technical ideas in our
work. It is not an interactive proof in the standard model. Rather, we slightly change the
model. We give the verifier oracle access to (an extension F of) the function that specifies C.
Namely, he gets oracle access to (an extension F of) the function that on input three gates
outputs 1 if one gate is the addition (or the multiplication) of the other two gates in C.13
We defer fully specifying the oracle function F to Subsection 3.3.1 below. For the details
on how we realize the bare-bones protocol as an interactive proof (removing the oracle), see
the overview in Section 3.1.7 and the full Details in Section 3.4.
Let C : {0, 1}k --- {0, 1} be a boolean circuit. We now proceed to present our first
result, the bare-bones protocol, denoted by (Pi, V1), for efficiently proving that C(x) = 0.
The prover and the verifier take as input a string x E {0, i}k, and are both given oracle
13We also give the prover oracle access to this function. We note that the prover can compute on his own
(an extension of) the function that defines C. However, he needs to know which extension is given to V, as
the function specifying C may have many extensions.
access to the function F specifying C (as defined in Subsection 3.3.1), where F is of degree
poly-logarithmic in S. In the protocol, the verifier Vi1 's running time (with unit-cost oracle
access to .) will be very small (quasi-linear in the input size for the ranges of parameters
we focus on), and the prover Pi will remain efficient.
Of course, this result on its own does not imply an interactive proof with a fast verifier in
the standard model, as computing the values of F may take as much time as evaluating the
circuit C on an input! Nonetheless, in Section 3.4 we show how to "fill in the blanks" in this
bare-bones protocol. This is done by showing that for wide classes of uniform computations,
the values of the oracle F can be computed by the verifier (on its own or with help from the
prover) in poly-logarithmic (in S) time. This leads to implementations of the bare-bones
protocol which are standard interactive proofs (without any oracles).
Giving the verifier (and prover) access to this oracle function F, the properties of the
bare-bones protocol for delegating computation are specified in the theorem below.
Theorem 3.3.1. Let C : {0, 1}k {0, 1} be a boolean circuit with fan-zn 2 of size S and
depth d. Let F be an oracle computing (an extension of) the function specifying C, as
defined in Subsection 3.3.1, of polylog(S)-degree. Protocol (P'(x), V(x)) has the following
properties:
* Completeness: If C(x) = 0 then
Pr [(Pj(x), Vl(x))= 1] = 1
* Soundness: If C(x) 7 0 then for every (unbounded) mnteractve Turmng machine P *,
100
* Complexity: The running time of the prover pi zs poly(S). The running tzme of
the verifier V1 is k -poly(d, log(S)) and it uses O(log(S)) space. The communication
complexity is poly(d, log(S)).
Moreover, the following four addztzonal properties are satisfied:
1. The protocol is public-comn.
2. The verifier makes O(d) queres to F. Moreover, the points where the verifier
queres F are determined solely by its (publzc) coins, and are uniformly random.
3. Each message sent by the prover Pi depends only on the preceding O(log(S)) bzts
sent by the verifier (and on the input x and oracle F).1 4
4. If, instead of the input x, V is given oracle access to the low degree extension of x
(with respect to 1H, F, m' as defined in Subsection 3.3.1), the protocol stzll satisfies
all claims above. Moreover, the verifier runs in time poly(d, log(S)) and space
O(log(S)). In this case, V1 queries the low-degree extension of x at a single point,
which zs uniformly random (over his coins).
The rest of this section is devoted to specifying the oracle F and then proving Theorem
3.3.1. We begin in Subsection 3.3.1 with preliminaries, conventions, and specifications of the
protocol's parameters, including the oracle function F. The bare-bones protocol is given in
Subsection 3.3.2. Finally, we prove Theorem 3.3.1 in Subsection 3.3.3.
3.3.1 Preliminaries
Parameters. Fix any circuit C {0, 1}k - {0, 1}. We denote the circuit size by S, and
the circuit depth by d < S. Let IHI be an extension field of GF[2] such that
max{d, log(S)} I HI poly(d, log(S)).
Let m be an integer such that
S < IHI'm poly(S).
14This fact will be used in Section 3.8, which uses the bare-bones protocol to construct efficzent "short"
probabilistically checkable arguments.
Let m' < m be an integer such that
k < IHJm' < k + poly(d, log(S)).
Let F be an extension field of H, where
IF| < poly(|H|).
And let 6 E N be a (degree) parameter such that
HI-1<6< IFl.
Assumptions and notations. Note that any Boolean (or arithmetic) circuit C : {0, 1}k _
{0, 1} can be converted into an arithmetic circuit C : Fk - IF over the field F, while increas-
ing the size and the depth of the circuit by at most a constant factor. Indeed, throughout
Section 3.3, we assume (without loss of generality) that C : Fk - IF is an arithmetic circuit
over the field F. We also assume for simplicity that the circuit C : Fk - IF is a layered
arithmetic circuit of fan-zn 2 (over the gates x and + and over the field F). This is without
loss of generality, since any arithmetic circuit can be converted into a layered arithmetic
circuit of fan-in 2, while increasing the size of the circuit by at most a polynomial factor and
while increasing the depth of the circuit by at most a factor of O(log S).
When considering the d layers of C, we think of the 0 layer as the output layer, and of
the d layer as the input layer. For simplicity of notations, we assume that all the layers in C
are of the same size (except for the input layer), and we assume that the size of each layer
is S.15 We note that any circuit (of size S) can be transformed into one with exactly S gates
in each level, by adding < S dummy gates (that are the constant zero) to each layer. In
15Note the discrepancy between the input layer and the other layers. For our results in Sections 3.3 and 3.4
we can assume that the input layer is also of size S (and this will simplify the notations a bit). However, the
proof of Theorem 3.7.2 in Section 3.7 makes use of the fact that the input layer is small (of size k), whereas
the other layers may be large (of size S).
particular, the transformed circuit
C' : Fk FS
satisfies that for every (l,..., Xk) E IFk,
C'( 1 ,..., k)= (C(X1,..., k),O,...,O).
This increases the size of the circuit by at most a quadratic factor (and does not increase its
depth).
For each 0 < i < d- 1, we denote the S gates in the i'th layer of C by (g2 ,o, g, ,., .. , ,s-),
and we denote the k gates in the d'th layer of C (i.e., the input layer) by (gd,o, gd,1,... , gd,k- 1)
For each i [d - 1], we associate with C two functions
adds, mult,: {0,1,...,S- 1}3 - {0,1},
defined by
add,(jl , j23) =
and
{10
if gz-1, 31  9,32 + 9Z,3 3
O.W.
if g2-1,31 92,32 X 9z,33
O.W.
(3.4)
(3.5)
Similarly, and we associate with C two additional functions
addd, multd : {0,1,...,S- 1} x {0,1,...,k - 1}2 {0, 1},
defined as in Equations (3.4) and (3.5), respectively.
We say that the functions {adds, mult}e[d] specify the circuit C.
mult (1,j2, J3) =
For each i E [d - 1], let
add,, mult, : F3m F
be multivariate polynomials of degree < 6 in each variable, that extend the functions add, and
mult,, respectively. 16 Namely, the functions add, and mult, satisfy that for every z1, z, 3 E
H m , such that a(zl),a(z2),a(z3 ) < S - 1 (where a : Hm -- {(0, 1,...,EHlI m - 1} is the
lexicographic order),
add,(zi, z 2, 3)= add,(a (zi), a(z 2 ), a(z 3))
and
mult, (Z1, Z2 Z3) = mult,( ( l), a (Z2), a (Z3))
If Z1, z2, z3 E H m but for one of them, say z3, it is the case that a(z,) > S - 1, then both
add,, mult, return 0. The fact that such functions add, and mult, exist follows from the fact
that 6 > HJ - 1. In particular, add, (resp. mult,) could be the low degree extension of add,
(resp. mult,), 1 7 though we will sometimes take them to be different extensions (of slightly
higher degree).
Similarly, let
addd, multd • F m x Fm' x Fm' --+ F
be multivariate polynomials of degree < 6 in each variable, that extend the functions addd
and multd, respectively. Namely, the functions addd and multd satisfy that for every zl E Hm
such that a(zi) < S - 1, and for every every z2 , 3 CE m' such that a(z 2), a(z 3 ) < k - 1,
addd(Zl, z 2, 3) = addd(a(zl), ca(z 2), c(z 3))
16See Subsection 3.2.1 for a discussion on low degree extensions.
'
7We note that in Section 3.2 we only defined the low degree extension of a strng (not of a function).
The low degree extension of a function f : Hm --+ F (for any m) can be defined analogously, as the unique
function f : Fm -4 IF of degree < IHI - 1 in each variable, such that for every z E Hm, f(z) = f(z).
and
multd(z1, Z2, Z3) = multd (a(Zl), a(z 2), a(Z 3 )).
And if zl E Hm and z 2 , 3 E Hm', but either a(zi) > S - 1, or a(z 2) > k - 1, or G(z 3 ) > k- 1,
then both addd, multd return 0.
We say that the functions {add~, mult'}L[d] are extensions of the functions that specify
the circuit C. Note that unlike the functions {adds, mult}eL[d] that specify C, the extensions
{add,, mult },[dl are not uniquely determined by the circuit C. For 6 > IHI - 1 there are
many possible extensions of the functions that specify the circuit C, and {add,, multZ}E[d]
are some such extensions. We specify {add,, multi} separately in each implementation of the
bare-bones protocol.
We are now ready to specify the oracle F accessed by the prover and verifier in the
bare-bones protocol. This oracle consists of the collection of functions {add, mult,} e[d]:
F = {addz, mult 2}E[ld,
where the prover and verifier can access add, or mult, by querying F with the proper i, a
bit specifying add or mult, and an input in (Fm)3 or (for i = d) in mFm x (Fm )2).
Finally, for each 0 < i < d - 1 we associate a vector v, = (vn,o, . . 7 ,,s-1) E FS with the
i'th layer of the circuit C, and we associate a vector vd = (Vd, , Vd,k-1) Fk with the d'th
layer of the circuit C. The vector vo is associated with the output layer of the circuit, and
the vector Vd is associated with the input layer of the circuit. These vectors are functions of
the input x = (xl,.. ., k) E Fk, and are defined as follows: For each 0 < i < d we let v, be
the vector that consists of the values of all the gates in the i'th layer of the circuit on input x.
So, the vector vo, that corresponds to the output layer, satisfies vo = (C(x), 0,..., 0) E FS.
Similarly, the vector vd, that corresponds to the input layer, satisfies Vd = (Xl,..., Xk) E Fk.
For each 0 < i < d - 1, let
V,: F m -- F
be the low degree extension of v, with respect to H, F, m (as defined in Subsection 3.2.1).
Claim 3.2.2 implies that the function V, is of degree < liH - 1 in each of its m variables, and
can be computed in time < poly( FIm ) = poly(S).
Let
Vd : Fm' F
be the low degree extension of vad with respect to H, F, m'. Claim 3.2.2 implies that the
function Va is of of degree < IHj - 1 in each of its m variables, and can be computed in time
< JIHJm' poly(IEI, m) = k -poly(d, log(S)).
3.3.2 The Bare-Bones Protocol
In this subsection, we present the bare-bones protocol (P1, 11) for efficiently proving that
C(x) = 0. In this protocol we give both the verifier V1 and the prover Pi oracle access to
the set of functions
7 = {add,, mult, }E[d],
as defined in Subsection 3.3.1.18,19 The prover and verifier also take as input the sting x E
{0, 1}k . We begin with a protocol overview, and then proceed with the full protocol.
Protocol Overview. The prover wants to prove C(x) = 0, or equivalently, that Vo(0,..., 0) =
0. This is done in d phases (where d is the depth of C). In the i'th phase (1 < i < d)
the prover reduces the task of proving that V,-(z,-1) = r,_ 1 to the task of proving that
V,(z,) = r,, where z, is a random value determined by the protocol (and z0o = (0,..., 0),
1sWe note that the functions in F could have been given to the prover P1 as input (say, via their truth-
tables). We decided to give Pi oracle access to these functions only for the sake of simplicity of the exposition
(and not because of size constraints). Note also, that given oracle access to these functions, the prover P,
can reconstruct the circuit C in time O(ICI).
19In Section 3.4 we show how these oracles can be realized in some specific cases (for example, if C is an
L-uniform circuit).
ro = 0). Finally, after the d'th phase, the verifier checks on his own that Vd(Zd) = rd. Note
that Vd is the low degree extension of the input x with respect to H, F, m. Thus, this last
verification task requires computing a single point in the low degree extension of the input
x. This is the "heaviest" computation run by the verifier, and this final computation is inde-
pendent of the circuit C; it can be done in quasi-linear time in the input length. Moreover,
if the verifier is given oracle access to the low-degree extension of x, then this only requires
a single oracle call.
The Bare-Bones Protocol:
Parameters.
We use the parameters defined in Subsection 3.3.1: circuit size S, circuit depth d,
input size k, where k, d < S. We also defined there the fields H, F, integers m, m' and
a degree parameter 6.
The layered arithmetic circuit C : Fk - F is of fan-in 2 (over the gates + and x), of
size S and depth d.
Input.
The prover and the verifier take as input a string x E Fk, and are both given oracle
access to a set functions Y = {add, mult,}%e[d] corresponding to C (as defined in
Subsection 3.3.1), where each function in F is of degree < 6 in each variable.
The protocol (P(l(x), V(x)).
The prover needs to prove that C(x) = 0, or equivalently, that Vo(0,..., 0) = 0. This
is done in d phases (where d is the depth of C). In the i'th phase (1 < i < d) the
prover reduces the task of proving that Vi-1(z,-1) = r,_1 to the task of proving that
V,(z,) = r2, where z, is a random value determined by the protocol (and zo = (0,..., 0),
ro = 0). Finally, after the d'th phase, the verifier checks on his own that Vd(Zd) = rd.
Note that fd is the low degree extension of x with respect to H, F, m'. Thus, this
last verification task requires computing a single point in the low degree extension of
the input x. This is the "heaviest" computation run by the verifier (for the ranges of
parameters we focus on in this work), and this final computation is independent of the
circuit C. It depends only on the input x (and on the randomness of the verifier and
the parameters), and can be done in quasi-linear time in the input length. Moreover,
note that if the verifier is given oracle access to the low-degree extension of x, then
this only requires a single oracle call.
In what follows we describe these phases in more detail. In each phase, the communi-
cation complexity is poly(d, log S), the running time of the prover is at most poly(S),
and the running time of the verifier is poly(d, log S).
The i'th phase (1 < i < d - 1). In this phase, we reduce the task of proving that
to the task of proving that
14(z') = -,
where z, E Fm is a random value determined by the verifier, and r, is a value determined by
the protocol.
According to Proposition 3.2.1, for every z E Fm ,
V, -(Z) E 3(z,p) _l(p)
p6H
m
where /3 x Fm -m F is a polynomial of size poly( H, m) and of degree at most JHJ - 1
in each variable, that can be computed by a Turing machine that runs in time < poly( H, mn).
Notice that for every p E Hm ,
V-I() = add(P, w,1 w 2 ) (, (wi) + V(W 2 ) + mUlt(P W1 , 2 -) l(Wl) V4 ( 2 )
W1,W 2EHm
Thus, for every z E Fm ,
l(z) = (z,p). (aad,(p,wl, 2 ). (V(wi) + '(w 2 ))+ mult1(p, w,w 2) V,(wl) -V,(w2)).
p,wl ,W2 HIm
For every z E Fm , let fz : (]Fm)3 -- F be the function defined by
fz(W, aL,)2) d (z,p)- (ald(p, w 1,W 2) " V((1) + V(W2)) + mult,( , lW2) - V (1) - V(W2))
Proposition 3.2.1, together with the definitions of add,, mult, and V, implies that the function
fz is a 3m-variate polynomial of size < poly(S) and of degree at most 6 + |HI - 1 < 26 in
each variable. Note that, for every z E Fm,
_, 1(z) = fz(p, I,w 2).
p,wl ,02 EH
m
Thus, proving that Vl(z,-1) = r,-1 is equivalent to proving that
-1= 1 (p, 1, W2).
p,wl ,W2 EIHIm
This is done by running the interactive sum-check protocol, as described in Figure 3-2.20
However, in order to carry out the verification task, the verifier needs to compute on his
own the function fz,_ (p, wl, W2 ), on random inputs p, w1, W2 ER Fm (chosen by the verifier).
Recall that the verifier has oracle access to the functions add, and mult,. Moreover, according
to Proposition 3.2.1, computing the function 3 requires time < poly(IHI, m). So, the main
20Note that in the interactive sum-check protocol the prover takes the function fz as input, whereas our
prover Pi does not take fz as input. This is not a problem since Pi can compute the function fz (as a
polynomial or as a truth-table) using his oracles, in time poly(S).
computational burden in this verification task is computing fV(w 1) and V,(w 2 ), which requires
time poly(S) (and thus cannot be computed by our computationally bo.unded verifier).
In the protocol, the prover Pi now sends both these values, 1V(w 1) and Vf(W 2), to the
verifier. The verifier V1 (who knows w1 and W2) receives two values v 1, v 2 and now wants to
verify that V4(w 1) = V1 and V,(W 2 ) = V2.
Thus, so far, using the sum-check protocol, we reduced task of proving that 1_1(z2 1) =
r,-1 to the task of proving that both V(wi) = vi and V(w 2) = v2 . However, recall that our
goal was to reduce the task of proving that 1,_(z-_) = r,_1 to the task of proving a single
equality of the form V,(z,) = r,. Therefore, what remains (in the i'th phase) is to reduce the
task of proving two equalities of the form V,(wi) = vi and Vz,(2 ) = v2 to the task of proving
a single equality of the form V,(z,) = r,. This is done via the following (standard) interactive
process.
1. Let tl1 , t 2 E F be two distinct fixed elements known to the prover Pi and the verifier V1 .
Let 7 : F - Fm be the unique line (i.e., polynomial of degree at most 1), such that for
every i E {1, 2}, y(t ) = w. It is well known that for any t 1,t 2, w, w 2 , the conditions
7(t-) = w, determine y uniquely, and that y can be computed (by both Pi and V1 ) in
time poly(|FI, m) and space O(log(|FI) - m).
2. The prover Pi sends the function V, o y : F -+ F to the verifier V1.
3. Upon receiving a function f : F -+ F from the prover (supposedly, f = ,o 7), the
verifier V1 checks that f is a polynomial of degree at most m - (IHI - 1), and that
f (tl) = vi and f(t 2 ) = v2. If these tests pass, then V1 chooses a random element t E F
and sends it to Pi.
def def4. The prover and verifier continue to Phase i + 1 with z, = 7(t) and r, f(t).
The d'th phase. This phase is very similar to the previous phases. The only difference
stems from the fact that the d'th layer of C is smaller than its previous layers. Namely, it
is of size IH m' rather than size |H m. Thus, in this phase the sum-check protocol is over
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p E IFm and over wl, w2 E Hm' . Similarly, the proceeding interactive protocol in this phase
reduces the task of proving two equalities of the form Vd(wi) = vi and Vd(W2) = v2 to the
task of proving a single equality of the form Vd(zd) = r , where now wl, 2, Zd E Fm'.
The final verification. After the final verification phase, the verifier V1 needs to verify
on his own that Va(zd) = rd. This amounts to computing a single point in the low-degree
extension of the input x (with respect to F, H, m'). The verifier runs this computation on its
own (or, if given oracle access to the low degree extension of the input x, the verifier queries
the oracle at point zd and verifies that the answer returned is rd).
3.3.3 Proof of Theorem 3.3.1
Completeness. The perfect completeness follows immediately from the protocol descrip-
tion, as well as the perfect completeness of the sum-check protocol (see Lemma 3.2.4).
Soundness. For the soundness condition, fix any layered arithmetic circuit C : k IF,
any x E Fk such that C(x) f 0, and any set of functions F (as defined in Subsection 3.3.1).
Assume that there exists a cheating prover P* such that
Pr [(P*F(x), V1(x)) = 1] = s.
Recall that the protocol (P (x), VT(x)) consists of d phases. Each phase consists of a
sum-check protocol and an additional short interactive protocol. According to our notations,
the sum-check protocol requires the values of V,(wl) and V,(w2) for verification, and the
additional interactive protocol reduces the verification of V,(wi) = vl and V,(w 2 ) = v2 to the
verification of a single equality V,(z,) = r,.
Let A denote the event that (P*F(x), V1'(x)) = 1. For every 0 < i < d, let T, denote the
event that indeed V1(z,) = r,. Thus, assuming C(x) z 0 is equivalent to assuming -,(T).
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Notice that
s = Pr[A] = Pr[A A -- (To) A Td] < Pr[3i E [d] s.t. A A --(T_-1) A T] Pr[A A -(T,-1) A T].
For every i E [d], let E, denote the event that indeed V(Wl) = vl and V(w 2) = V21
Then,
Pr [AA -(T-_) A T,] = Pr[AA -,(T-1) A T, A E] + Pr[AA -n(T_1) A T A - (E)]
The soundness property of the interactive sum-check protocol implies that
Pr[A A -(T-_l) A T A E] < Pr[A A -(T_-1) 3m - 26A E,]<
IFj
The fact that any two distinct univariate degree t polynomials agree on at most t points
implies that
Pr[A A -(T,_) m(H|- 1)A T A -(E)] < Pr[A A T A -(E)] < - 1)JF
Pr[A A -(T,-1) 6m65A T1< 6IF +
1F|
All in all, we get that
7md6
Taking F such that IFl > 700md6 = poly(IHI), we get that s < - as desired.
Complexity. Recall that the bare-bones protocol proceeds in d phases (where d is the
depth of C). In the i'th phase (1 < i < d) the prover reduces the task of proving that
V,-l(z-_) = r,_1 to the task of proving that V,(z,) = r,. This is done by running a sum-
21Note that (wi, vi) and (w2, v 2) depend on the phase z e [d]. For the sake of simplicity, this dependence
is not captured in our notations.
102
6m6
_ --
Thus,
m-
SIFI
m6
F
7m6
IFI '
check protocol and an additional short interactive protocol.
The complexity of the i'th phase of the protocol, 1 < i < d, is as follows (we ignore the
difference between m and m' that comes into play only in the d'th phase):
1. The running time of the prover P is poly( FmI) = poly(S), both in the sum-check
protocol (see Lemma 3.2.4) and in the proceeding interactive process.
2. The running time of the verifier Vi (with oracle access to F) is poly( IF, m) = poly(d, log(S)),
both in the sum-check protocol (see Lemma 3.2.4) and in the proceeding interactive
process.
The space used by V1 is O(log(IFI) -m) = O(log(S)), both in the sum-check protocol
(see Lemma 3.2.4) and in the proceeding interactive process. Note that the only
information that the prover and verifier need to "remember" for the next phase is
the values i, z7, r (and they don't need to remember any information from previous
phases). This implies, in particular, that the total space used by the verifier in all
phases is only O(log(IFI) . m) = O(log(S)), not much larger than the space used in a
single phase.
3. The sum-check protocol has communication complexity poly(JFI, m) (see Lemma 3.2.4),
and the proceeding interactive process has communication complexity poly(|FI). Thus,
in total, each phase has communication complexity poly(l F, m) = poly(d,log(S)).
Moreover, the verifier V1 is public-coin, and the number of random bits it sends to
the prover Pi in each phase is O(log(jFI) - m). This, together with the fact that the
only information that the prover needs to "remember" for the next phase is the values
i, z,, r, (and does not need to remember any information from previous phases), implies
that each message sent by the prover depends only on the preceding O(log(lFI) -m) =
O(log(S)) random bits sent by the verifier.
4. In each phase, the verifier queries each add, and mult, only at a single location. The
verifier's queries to add, and mult, are determined by its (public) coin tosses in the
sum-check protocol and are thus also uniformly random (over the verifier's coin tosses).
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Finally, the verifier V1 needs to verify on his own that Vd(Zd) = rd. This amounts to
computing a single point in the low-degree extension of the input x (with respect to F, H, m').
This can be done (by Claim 3.2.2) in time k - poly(IH, m') = k - poly(d, log(S)) and space
O(log(HI) - m') = O(log(S)). If the verifier has an oracle to the low degree extension of
x, then this can instead be accomplished by a single (unit cost) oracle query to point Zd,
a uniformly random point determined by the verifier's coin tosses in the d'th phase of the
protocol. M
3.4 Interactive Proofs: Implementing the Bare-Bones
Protocol
Recall that our goal is to construct a protocol in which a prover, who is given a circuit
C : {0, 1}k {0, 1} of size S and of depth d, and a string x E {0, 1}k, can prove to a verifier
that C(x) = 0, while the verifier runs in time significantly less than S, which is the time
that it would take him to evaluate C(x) on his own. We also want the verifier to use as little
space as possible, continuing the study of space-bounded verifiers.
In Section 3.3 we presented the bare-bones protocol, where we gave the verifier oracle
access to a set of functions F = {add,, mult,}LE[d], which are (extensions of) functions that
define C. With these oracles the verifier was both time efficient and space efficient. In our
results, however, we want to work in the standard model of interactive proofs, where the
verifier does not have oracle access to these functions. Thus, our goal in this section is to
nmplement or realize the bare-bones protocol in the standard model of interactive proofs.
We build on the foundations laid in the previous section to construct standard interac-
tive proofs for uniform languages, where the complexity of the verifier and the prover are
comparable to those in the bare-bones protocol. In particular, we provide methods for the
verifier to reliably obtain the values of {adds, mult}1E[dl in a time-efficient and space-efficient
manner. This section consists of three parts:
First, in Subsection 3.4.1 we show how to implement the bare-bones protocol for lan-
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guages in NLC; i.e., languages computable in logarithmic non-deterministic space. To prove
this result, we show that such languages have circuits of poly-size and polylog-depth, for
which {add,, mult,},E[d] can be evaluated by the verifier in polylog-time and log-space (with-
out using any non-standard oracles).
Second, in Subsection 3.4.2 we use the above result on delegating N/C computations,
to show how to implement the bare-bones protocol for any language in (£-uniform) nAC.
To this end, we show that for such languages, there exists an interactive sub-protocol that
the prover can use to prove to the verifier the values of {add,, mult,},E[d]. In these sub-
protocols the verifier runs in poly-logarithmic time and logarithmic space (and the prover
runs in polynomial time). We then implement the bare-bones protocol by replacing the
verifier's oracle calls to F with these interactive sub-protocols, in which the prover provides
the verifier with the values of functions in F and proves their correctness. We also use
this idea to obtain interactive public-coin proofs with log-space verifiers for all of P (see
Corollary 3.1.3).
Finally, in Subsection 3.4.3 we take an alternate approach that does not rely on the
uniformity of the circuit (the computation) being delegated. Instead, we split the delegation
process into two phases: an off-line (non-interactive) pre-processing phase, run (only) by the
verifier before the input x to the circuit is even specified. In this phase the verifier gets access
the entire circuit and works in time that is polynomial in the size of the circuit. The output
of the pre-processing phase is a short data string (much shorter than the circuit size). Then,
after the input x is specified, the prover and verifier run an on-line interactive proof phase.
This on-line protocol is an implementation of the bare-bones protocol. In particular, in this
on-line phase the verifier's and the prover's running times, as well as the communication
complexity, is as in the bare-bones protocol. This result is formally stated in Theorem 3.1.4.
We begin by (briefly) reviewing the notation and conventions introduced in Section 3.3.
Conventions: a Recap. Throughout this section, whenever we speak of a circuit C for
computing a language or function, we follow the conventions introduced in the bare-bones
protocol (Section 3.3.1). Let H be an extension field of GF[2], F an extension field of 1H (and
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thus also of GF[2]). We always think of the circuit C (which is defined over the field GF[2]),
as a layered arithmetic circuit with fan-in 2, over the extension field F. Further, C's gates
are labeled so that g,,z denotes the z-th gate in layer i, where we alternately treat i and z
as boolean strings or values in {0, 1, ... , d} and {0, 1, ... , IC - 1} (respectively). The top
or output layer is layer 0, the bottom or input layer is layer d. We assume here that the
bottom layer includes n input gates and 2 "constant" gates, one for the constant 0 and one
for the constant 1.
We define the functions adds, mult, as in Section 3.3.1: they take as input three labels
in {0, 1,..., ICI - 1}, the first corresponding to a gate in layer i- 1 and the other two
corresponding to gates in layer i. The functions answer 1 if the first gate is an addition
or multiplication (respectively) of the other two. Note that, as in Section 3.3.1, addd and
multd take as input three labels, where the first label in {0, 1,..., ICI - 1} corresponds to a
gate in layer d - 1, and the other two labels in {0, 1, . . ., n + 1} correspond to input gates.
Throughout this section we abuse notation and do not distinguish between the functions
add,, mult,, as defined above, and the boolean circu2ts we construct to compute them, which
we also call add, mult,.
For m, m' such that IHm|j > ICI and IHIm'I > n + 2, the functions a, a' are the functions
that take a vector in Hm (respectively Hm ' ) and output its lexicographic order.
As before, let add, mult, : (Fm )3 - F be some extensions of adds, mult, (with respect to
(H, F, m, m')). Namely, if all three of their inputs are in Hm , they translate them into three
gate labels (using a, a'), and answer as adds, mult,. In particular, if the inputs are all in
H m , then the answer is always 0 or 1. If even one of the inputs is an element of F m that is
not in HIm, add, mult, output some value in F. An important property we want from these
functions is that they have low degree 6, in particular 6 will be significantly smaller than
IFI. Throughout this section we abuse notation and do not distinguish between functions
add,, mult,, as described above, and the arithmetic circuits we construct to compute them,
which we also call add,, mult.
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3.4.1 Interactive Proofs for A/C
In this subsection we show how to implement the bare-bones protocol for any language in NAC.
The full result is stated in Theorem 3.4.4. We proceed by first showing in Subsection 3.4.1
that languages in Arn are computable by circuits for which add,, mult, can be evaluated in
poly-logarithmic time and logarithmic space. In Section 3.4.1 we implement the bare-bones
protocol by having the verifier replace its oracle F with these easy to evaluate add, and
mult,.
Circuits for NAE Languages with Efficient Low Degree add,, mult,
Overview. Our goal in this subsection is to show that every language in NAE has (for
every input length) a polylog-depth and poly-size arithmetic circuit that computes it. This
circuit has the additional property that {add,, mult,} are polylog-size arithmetic circuits
that are log log-space uniform.22 This implies, in particular, that they can be evaluated in
polylog-time and log-space, as desired. The degree of these circuits is denoted by 6, and is
significantly smaller than IFI. We do this in three steps:
First, we show that every language in NAr has (for every input length) a poly-size and
polylog-depth arithmetic circuit, for which add,, mult, are polylog-size, log log-space uniform,
constant-depth (ACo) boolean circuits. This result is stated in Lemma 3.4.1. Second, we
show how to compute the low-degree extensions of a, a' using a polylog-size, log log-space
uniform and low degree (degree IHJ - 1) arithmetic circuit. This result is stated in Claim
3.4.2. Finally, we combine the two results above, to show that every language in NC has (for
every input length) a poly-size and polylog-depth arithmetic circuit, for which add,, mult,
are polylog-size, log log-space uniform, low degree (6) arithmetic circuits. This is the result
we need for implementing the Bare-Bones protocol for NL computations, and it is stated in
Lemma 3.4.3.
22Throughout this section, when we refer to a circuit as being s(n)-space uniform we always refer (implicitly
or explicitly) to a family of circuits, one for every input length. The family is s(n)-space uniform if there
exists a Turing machine that takes as input In , outputs the entire circuit, and uses only O(s(n)) space. It
thus also runs in time at most 20(s(n))
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Step 1: Small, Uniform, Constant Depth Boolean adds, mult. We begin by showing
that every language in AVN has (for each input length) a poly-size, polylog-depth circuit, for
which adds, mult, are log log-space uniform, polylog-size and constant-depth (ACo) boolean
circuits. We state this result in a more general manner, for any space and time bounds.
Lemma 3.4.1. Let L be any language computed by a non-determinzsthc Turing Machine T
in time t(n) and space s(n) (we assume s(n) = Q(log(n))). Let n be any input length.
There exists an arthmetic czrcuit C over GF[2] for computing L on inputs of length n.
The circuit C is of size poly(2(n")) and depth d(n) = O(s(n) -log(t(n))) (with fan-in 2).
For all i E {1,... , d(n)}, the czrcuits add, and mult, are poly(s(n))-size constant depth
(ACo) circuits. These circuits can be generated by a O(log(s(n)))-space Turing machine G,
that takes (n, i, b) as input (where i E {1, ... , d(n)}, b c {0, 1}). It outputs the czrcut add, if
b = 0, and it outputs the czrcut mult, if b = 1.
Proof of Lemma 3.4.1.
Preliminaries. We begin with notation and preliminaries, reviewing how to translate T's
computations into questions about the adjacency matrix of it's computation graph.
We assume (without loss of generality) that the machine T has an input-tape and a
single work-tape, both over a boolean alphabet. Let Q be the (constant size) set of possible
machine states. The transition table RT of T is a (constant-size) collection of pairs of tuples:
RT C (Q x {0, 1} x {0, 1}, Q x {L, R} x {0, 1} x {L, R}).
The first tuple includes a state and two alphabet symbols (the first read by the input-tape
reading head, the second by the work-tape reading head). The second tuple includes a new
machine state, a direction to move the input-tape reading head, a new value for location just
read from the work-tape, and a direction to move the work-tape reading head. Two tuples
are in the (non-deterministic) machine's table RT if the (non-deterministic) machine may
move from the state described by the first item in the tuple in the manner specified by the
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second item.
For an input x E {0, 1}n , we encode a configuration of the machine as a vector c =
(q, i, j, t) E {0, 1}g(n), where g(n) = 0(1) + log(n) + log(s(n)) + s(n) = O(s(n)) is the length
of the representation of a configuration. Each configuration includes q, the machine's internal
state (0(1) bits), the location i E [n] of the input-tape reading head, the location j E [s(n)]
of the work-tape reading head, and the contents t E {0, 1}"(") of the work-tape. Assume
w.l.o.g. that the all 0 vector denotes the machine's initial configuration (we call this vector
a) and that the machine has a unique accepting configuration, encoded by the vector b (say
this is the all l's vector).
One can view the machine's configurations on an input x E {0, 1}" as vertices of a directed
acyclic graph, where there is an edge from configuration u to configuration v if, on the input
x, the (non-deterministic) machine T can move from configuration u to configuration v. We
add self-loops to all the vertices in the graph. T accepts an input x if and only if there is a
directed path from a to b in the graph.
Let B. denote the (0/1) adjacency matrix of this graph (with l's on the main diagonal
denoting the self-loops). We construct a sequence of matrices: Blog(t(n)), ... , B 1, Bo. The
(u, v)-th entry of Bp is 1 iff there is a path of length at most 2 log(t(n))- p from u to v in the
machine's configuration graph, i.e. iff the machine T on input x can go from configuration
u to configuration v in 2 log(t(n ) ) - p steps or less. Otherwise the (u, v)-th entry is 0. Observe
that Blog(t(n)) is simply the adjacency matrix Bx. To compute the matrix B,_ 1 from Bp, we
use the fact that there is a path of length at most 2 -£ from u to v iff there exists w such
that there is a path of length at most f from u to w and a path of length at most f from w
to v. In other words (using arithmetic over GF[2]):
Bp_1[u, v] = 1 + (1 + B,[u, w] - B,[w, v]). (3.6)
we{0,1}g(n)
The question of whether T accepts an input x is equivalent to asking whether or not B 0 [a, b] =
1.
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The Circuit C. The layered circuit C computes one after another the matrices Blog(t(n)) =
Bx, Blog(t(n)-1),..., B 1 , Bo. Once C computes B0 it outputs its [a, b]-th entry. Each layer of
C is made up entirely of either addition or multiplication gates. The computation is done
by layered sub-circuits: the bottom sub-circuit, given the input x E {0, 1}, computes (in
constant depth) the adjacency matrix Bx = Blog(t(n)). There are log(t(n)) intermediate sub-
circuits above the bottom sub-circuit (numbered from top to bottom 0,... ,log(t(n)) - 1),
each of depth g(n) + 0(1) = O(s(n)) and size poly(2(n)). The i-th sub-circuit uses the
matrix B,+ 1, computed by the previous sub-circuit, to compute B, (this is done as specified
by Equation (3.6)). Finally the top (0-th) sub-circuit computes B 0 and outputs its (a, b)-th
entry. The depth and size of C are as claimed in the lemma statement.
The input layer includes the n input gates as well as 2 "constant gates" labeled n, n + 1,
and holding the values 0 and 1 (respectively). Each of the other layers includes at most
2 3'g(n) + 2 gates. These include at most 2 3g(n) "standard" gates (whose values differ between
layers), and 2 "constant gates", as in the input layer, whose values are 0 and 1. As we
did for the input layer, we label the constant gates within each layer by 2 3"g(n), 23 g(n) + 1
(respectively). By convention, if an intermediate layer includes less than 2 3.g(n) "standard"
gates, then we sometimes use shorter labels, implicitly fixing their least significant bits to
be 0 and ignoring them in the exposition below.23
Thus, each intermediate gate in the circuit is labeled as a tuple £ = (p, k, z), where
p E {0, 1,... ,log(t(n))} denotes the gate's sub-circuit, k E {1,... g(n) + O(1)} denotes its
layer within that sub-circuit and z E {0, 1,... ,poly(2(n)))} is its index within that layer.
We proceed with a detailed layer-by-layer construction. As we describe each layer of the
circuit (say the i - 1-th), we also argue that add., mult, are both log(g(n))-space uniform,
poly(g(n))-size, constant depth (ACo) circuits.
The Constant Gates. We begin by describing how the constant gates are computed.
Then, throughout the rest of the exposition we take for granted the fact that in each layer
23in fact the circuits add, and mult, constructed below must verify that these bits are all 0, this is easily
accomplished.
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of the circuit, the values of two constant gates (labeled as above) are computed correctly.
For every layer i except the layer above the input layer (the (log(t(n)), 0)-th layer): if i is
a layer of multiplication gates, then its constant gate 23.g(n) + b (computing the constant
b E {0, 1}) is a multiplication gate, multiplying the gates 2 3.g(n) + b (computing b) and
23 g(n) + 1 (computing 1) in layer i + 1. For an addition layer, its constant gate 23 g(n) + b
is an addition gate, adding the gates 23,g(n) + b (computing b) and 2 3.g(n) (computing 0) in
layer i + 1. For the layer above the input layer (layer (log(t(n)), 0), an addition layer in the
construction below), its constant gate 2 3.g(n) + b is an addition gate of the input layer gates:
n + b (computing b), and n (computing 0).
The output of adds, mult, on the constant gates in layer i - 1 is simple to compute. It is
just a matter of checking whether the labels of the layer i gates (of size O(g(n))) are exactly
equal to what they should be. For example, for an addition layer, on input zi = 23g( ) + 1
(constant value 1), add, accepts iff z 2 = 23g(n) +1 (constant value 1) and z 2 = 23g(n) (constant
value 0). These computations can be done by poly(g(n))-size ACo circuits (one for addition
gates, one for multiplication). Moreover, these circuits can be generated in log(g(n))-space
(given n, i). In the descriptions that follow, when we describe the circuits add, and mult,,
we always implicitly mean that they first check (in ACo) whether the gate label in layer i is
of a constant gate, and if so they run the circuits described above. It is easy to verify that
this maintains the depth, size and uniformity of the circuits described below (up to constant
factors). For simplicity, we do not explicitly note this below.
The Input Sub-Circuit. The input (or bottom) sub-circuit of C, has as its input x E
{0, 1} n . As its 29(n) .29(n) ("standard") outputs it has the adjacency matrix Bx (or Blog(t(n)))-
The sub-circuit has 2 layers: the input layer, with n + 2 gates, and the top layer with 22'g(n)
standard addition gates (and 2 constant gates as described above).
Let us examine the (u, v)-th entry of the matrix Bx: configuration u reads only one input
bit, say the i-th (i E [n]) bit from the input x. There are only 4 possibilities (arithmetic is
over GIF[2]):
1. Configuration u can never go to v, regardless of x,: Bx[u, v] = 0.
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2. Configuration u can always go to v, regardless of x,: Bx [u, v] = 1. Note that this also
includes the case u = v, as all vertices in the graph have self-loops.
3. Configuration u can go to v iff x, = 1: Bx[u, v] = x,.
4. Configuration u can go to v iff x, = 0: B [u, v] = 1 + x,.
Thus each entry of the bottom sub-circuit's output depends on (at most) a single input
bit, and certainly this layer's output can be computed in depth 1.
We now turn to describing the circuits add, and mult, for the top layer of the input
sub-circuit (layer (log(t(n)), 0) of C). This layer has only addition gates. Thus for any query
about multiplication gates, mult(log(t(n)),1) simply answers 0. To compute whether the input
gates with labels z2 , z3 E [n + 2] are the children of an addition gate zi E {0, 1 }2g(n) at the
top layer of the input sub-circuit, the circuit add(log(t(n)),1) proceeds as follows:
1. Parse zl as a pair (u, v) of machine configurations. Parse u = (ql, il, j, tl) and v =
(q2, i 2 ,j 2, t 2 ). Now the question is what is the value of Bx(u, v).
2. There are four possible cases (as above). The circuit add(log(t(n)),l) computes which of
these four cases occurs. We claim this can be done by a log(g(n))-space uniform ACo
boolean circuit of size poly(g(n)).
First, the circuit checks whether u = v. If so, then there is a self loop at this graph
entry and we treat this gate as a Case 2 gate. Otherwise (u = v), the circuit first
verifies that t1 and t 2 are identical everywhere except at location jl. It then checks for
each possible transition in the machine's (constant-size) transition table RT, whether
reading either or both of the possible values of x1, could cause configuration u to move
to configuration v via that transition. This is equivalent to checking (for each possible
transition) whether either or both possible bit values of x,1 could make the internal
state qi change to q2, the input-tape reading head move from location i1 to i 2 , the
work-tape reading head move from location jl to j2, and the j 1 -th bit of tl to be
overwritten by that of t 2 . All of these conditions can be verified by a log(g(n))-space
uniform ACo circuit of poly(g(n))-size.
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3. After running this computation, add(log(t(n)),1) "knows" which of the four possibilities
above is the case for (u, v). In Case 1 neither possible value can cause the transition.
In this case, add(log(t(n)),1) accepts if and only if z 2 = n and z3 = n (i.e., this gate's
value is 0 = 0 + 0). In Case 2 both possible values can cause the transition. In this
case, add(log(t(n)),1) accepts if and only if z 2 = n + 1 and z3 = n (i.e., this gate's value
is 1 = 1 + 0). In Case 3 only xz, = 1 causes the transition. In this case, add(log(t(n)),1)
accepts if and only if z2 = i and z3 = n (i.e., this gate's value is x,1 = x,, +0). Finally,
in Case 4 only x,1 = 0 causes the transition. In this case, add(log(t(n)),l) accepts if and
only if z2 = i1 and z 3 = n + 1 (this gate's value is x,, + 1).
The circuit add(log(t(n)),1) as above is a O(logg(n))-space uniform ACo boolean circuit of
size poly(g(n)).
Intermediate Sub-Circuits. The p-th intermediate sub-circuit takes as input the 2 9(n) x
2g(n) 0/1-matrix B,+1, the output layer of the sub-circuit below it, and outputs Bp (also a
2 g(n) x 2 9(n) 0/1 matrix). This is done via the rule stated in Equation 3.6, using g(n)+3 layers.
The bottom layer computes the 2 3,g(n) products of pairs of matrix entries needed to compute
the large product in Equation 3.6. For each such pair product Bp+l [u, w]. B,+l [w, v], the next
layer computes 1+Bp+l [u, w]B p+[w, v]. Then, the next g(n) layers compute Hwe{O,1}g(n) (1+
B,+l [u, w] -Bp+l[w, v]). Finally, the top layer of the sub-circuit adds 1 to each such product.
It computes for each pair (u, v) the value 1 + IwE{0,1},(n) (1 + B+l1 [u, w] -Bp+l [w, v]), which
is the (u, v)-th entry of Bp (by Equation 3.6).
A more detailed account follows: let p E {0, 1..., log(t(n))- 1} be the sub-circuit's index
among all the intermediate sub-circuits. Let B+l1 be the 29(") x 29(n ) 0/1-matrix which is
the output of the sub-circuit below this one. We label the sub-circuit's layers top to bottom
as (p, 0), (p, 1),..., (p, g(n) + 2). The intermediate sub-circuits are all identical, and so we
can mostly disregard p for the rest of this exposition.
The bottom layer (layer (p, g(n))+2) has 23-g(n) multiplication gates, each labeled by three
configurations (u, v, w). The value of the (u, v, w)-th gate should be Bp+l[u, w] - Bp+l[w, v].
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For this layer add, is always 0, mult, is easy to compute, as it accepts z1 = (u, v, w) iff
2 = (u, w) and 3 = (w, v).
In the next layer (layer (p, g(n) + 1)), the gate labeled (u, v, w) computes the value of
gate (u, v, w) in the bottom layer plus 1. Here mult, is always 0, add, accepts zl = (u, v, w)
iff z 2 = (u, v, w) and z3 = 2 3g(n) + 1 (the constant 1 gate).
For k E {g(n),..., 1}, the (p, k)-th layer has 2 2.g(n)+k-1 gates, each labeled by a pair of
configurations (u, v) and a string y E {0, 1}k - 1 . The value of the (u, v, y)-th gate in the
(p, k)-th layer is the product of the (u, v, y o 0)-th gate and the (u, v, y o 1)-th gate in the
(p, k + 1)-th layer. The value of the (u, v)-th gate at layer 2 will indeed be the product
Hwe{o,,}g(n) (1 + Bp+l[u, w] Bp+[w, v]), just as required. For these layers, add(p,k) always
outputs 0, as there are only multiplication gates. mult(p,k) for zl = (u, v, y) accepts if and
only if z 2 = (u, v, y o 0) and z3 = (u, v, y o 1); otherwise it outputs 0.
It remains to describe the top layer (layer (p, 0)) in the sub-circuit, which has 2 2g(* )
gates. Gate (u, v) in layer (p, 0) computes 1 plus the value in gate (u, v) of layer (p, 1). The
value computed by gate (u, v) in layer (p, 0) is (as required) 1 + wle{0o,1g(n) (1 + Bp1[u, w] -
B,+l[w,v]). Here mult, always outputs 0, add, accepts z1 = (u, v) iff z 2 = (u,v) and
Z3 = 23-g (n) + 1 (the constant 1 gate).
We conclude that each layer in each of the intermediate sub-circuits has, as required,
circuits add,, mult, that are O(log g(n))-space uniform AC O boolean circuit of size poly(g(n)).
The Machine G: It remains to show that there exists a single log(g(n))-space machine G
that generates the circuit C. More precisely, it remains to argue that there exists a log(g(n))-
space machine G, that takes as input a triple (n, i, b), and outputs the circuit add, if b = 0,
and the circuit mult, if b = 1. The existence of such a machine follows easily from the above
constructions of add, and mult, for each layer of the circuit C. Note that all the intermediate
sub-circuits are identical, there exists a single log(g(n))-space machine that on input (n, i, b)
generates add, or mult, for each layer of these sub-circuits. The input sub-circuit (which is
different from the intermediate ones) has only two layers, for which add, and mult, can be
generated in log(g(n))-space as above. Thus there exists a single log(g(n))-space machine
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G, such that for every layer i in C, on input (n, i, b), G generates add, or mult, as required.
I
Step 2: Small Low-Degree Circuits for a, a'. Recall that our goal in this section is
proving that every language in .VL has circuits for which add, and mult, are themselves small
low-degree uniform arithmetic circuits. Lemma 3.4.1 was the first step towards this goal.
We now turn our attention to the mappings a, a' that map arithmetic vectors to boolean (or
numerical) labels of circuit gates. If we want to create small arithmetic circuits computing
add,, mult,, these circuits should themselves be able to compute the mappings a and a'. We
show that a, a' can be computed by O(log(IFI) + log(m))-space uniform, poly(lFI, m)-size
arithmetic circuits (over F) of degree IHI - 1.
Claim 3.4.2. Fix H, an extension field of GF[2], F an extension field of H, and m an
integer value. Let a : H m -+ GF[2]log (IHm l) be the function that maps a vector in HJ to its
lexicographic order, represented as a sequence of log(jHm|) O's and 1's (we can think of these
as elements of GF[2] or of its extension field F).
There exists an arithmetic circuzt TH,g,m : Fm ,' Flog(IHIm ) that computes the low degree
extension (with respect to H, F, m) of a. 24 The circuit TH,F,m is of size poly(IHI) • m and
degree IHI - 1 in each of its inputs. It can be generated (from (IHI, IFj, m)) or evaluated (on
an input in Fm ) by a O(log(lFI) + log(m))-space unzform Turing machine.
Proof of Claim 3.4.2. Let al : H --+ Flog(II) be the function that takes a single element
of H and maps it to its lexicographic order, represented as a sequence of log(HI) O's and
l's (elements of GF[2] and thus also of F). Let 61i be the unique low-degree extension of
a 1 .
25 The circuit TH,F,m applies dl to each of its m inputs (elements of F), and outputs
the concatenation of the m outputs of a 1. The reason that TB,F,m indeed computes the low
24Recall that the notion of a low degree extension also applies to functions with multiple outputs, as
described in Section 3.2.1.
25Again, in the past we usually worked with low degree extensions of functions that map multiple H-
elements to a single F element, whereas al maps a single H element to many F elements. This is a special
case of a low degree extension (where the function may have multiple outputs). All the general results and
construction still hold for this special case.
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degree extension & of a, follows from the fact that the size of H is a power of 2, which in
turn follows from the fact that it is an extension field of GF[2].
To compute the low degree extension 61, the circuit uses a lookup table (with IHI entries)
that contains the lexicographic order of each element in H. The lookup table and its low-
degree extension can be generated (given m, F, H), and evaluated on an input, in space
O(log(lFI)) and time poly(lHI). This follows from Proposition 3.2.1, and from our assumption
that addition and multiplication of field elements can be done in O(log IFI)-space. Thus, the
entire circuit TH,,F,m is of size poly(IHI) -m. It can be generated, and evaluated on an input,
by a O(log(IFI) + log(m))-space uniform Turing machine. U
Step 3: Small, Uniform, Low Degree Arithmetic add,, mult,. We are now ready to
prove the main lemma of this subsection, showing that every language in /VC has (for each
input length) a poly-size and polylog-depth circuit, for which add, and mult, are log log-space
uniform, polylog-size arithmetic circuits of degree that is significantly smaller than FI. We
state the Lemma for any time and space bounds.
Lemma 3.4.3. Let L be any language computed by a non-deterministic Turing Machine T
zn tzme t(n) and space s(n) (we assume s(n) = Q(log(n))). Fzzx H to be an extension field
of GF[2], and F an extension field of H (and thus also of GF[2]) of size at most poly(s(n)).
Let n be an input length.
There exists an arithmetic circuit C over GF[2] (and thus also over F) for computing L
on inputs of length n. The circuit C is of size poly(2s(n)) and depth d(n) = O(s(n) -log(t(n)))
(with fan-zn 2).
For all i E {1,..., d(n)}, add, and mult, are arthmetc circuits over IF. All these circuits
have degree at most IHI -poly(s(n)) (independent of IFI), and size poly(s(n), m). Moreover,
they can be evaluated on an input or generated by O(log(s(n)) + log(m))-space uniform
Turing machines. The generating machine G takes (n,i, b, H, IF, m,m') as input (i E
{1,... , d(n)}, b E {0, 1}). If b = 0, then G outputs the circuit add,. If b = 1, then G outputs
the circuit mult,.
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Proof of Lemma 3.4.3. The circuit C is exactly the same circuit constructed in the
proof of Lemma 3.4.1. The (arithmetic) circuits add, and mult, take as input 3 "gate labels"
in F m . They apply the circuit TH,F,m (from Claim 3.4.2), which computes the low degree
extension of a, to each of these labels. If a "gate label" was in Hm, the output should be
a boolean translation: its lexicographic order. The circuits add, and mult, take the result
of this translation, and use it as input for an arithmetization of the boolean circuit add, or
mult, (respectively) from Lemma 3.4.1. If the original gate labels were all in Hm , then the
output should be equal to add,'s or mult,'s output on their boolean translations. A more
detailed description follows.
Let {add,, mult,} be the boolean circuit families constructed in Lemma 3.4.1, and let G be
the machine that generates them. Transforming the boolean circuits into arithmetic circuits
over F is easily done in the (by now) standard way: AND gates become multiplication, and
a gate computing the NOT of some wire w is turned into an arithmetic gate computing the
value 1 - w. This does not increase the circuit size, depth or uniformity by more than a
constant factor. Since {add,, mult,} are ACo circuits of size poly(s(n)) (independent of IFI),
the resulting arithmetic circuits are of size and degree at most poly(s(n)) (also independent
of IFI). We note also that since the boolean circuits are O(log(s(n)))-space uniform and
constant-depth, they, and their arithmetized versions, can be generated and evaluated in
O(log(s(n)))-space.
Note that these new (arithmetic) circuits take as input a boolean representation of gate
labels, i.e. where each label is given as O(log(Cni)) "boolean" inputs that are all the 0 or
the 1 field element. The circuits add, and mult,, on the other hand, take as input gate labels
represented as arithmetic vectors in Fm.26 Thus, what remains is to translate the arithmetic
labels into boolean ones, by running them through translation circuit TH,F,m as constructed
in Claim 3.4.2. This adds a (multiplicative) IHI-factor to the degree, and a poly(IFI, m)
additive factor to the size. When the inputs are all elements in H, the translation circuits
output the correct (boolean, i.e. consisting of 0/1 field elements) gate labels, and the circuit
26We ignore here the fact that addd(n) and multd(n) work over m' inputs instead of m, this can be handled
in a similar manner.
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(the "arithmetized" add, or mult,) correctly outputs whether or not the first gate is an
addition or multiplication of the other two.
We obtain, as required, add, and mult, that have degree HI -poly(s(n)) (independent of
IFI), and size poly(s(n), m). Moreover, they are (again, as required), O(log(s(n))+ log(m))-
space uniform: they can be generated by running a combination of G and the machine
generating TH,,m, and can be evaluated on an input in O(log(s(n)) + log(m)) space. U
Realizing the Bare-Bones Protocol
Using the above construction of small, low degree and uniform circuits add, and mult,, we
can now proceed to present our first implementation of the bare-bones protocol: a protocol
for delegating N/L computations.
Recall that to implement the bare-bones protocol one must have a way for the verifier
to implement add and mult, oracles, whose degree is not too large. This is exactly what
Lemma 3.4.3 provides! Namely, we now have a way for the verifier to implement the oracles
in the bare-bones protocol on its own, where it can compute the answer to each "oracle"
query in poly-logarithmic time and logarithmic space. This gives a protocol for delegating
n/C computations. We state this result more generally, for given non-deterministic time and
space bounds.
Theorem 3.4.4. Let L be a language that can be computed by a non-deterministic Turing
Machine using space s(n) and time t(n) (we assume s(n) = Q(log(n))). L has an interactive
proof (an implementation of the bare-bones protocol) where:
1. The prover runs in time poly(2s(n)), the vermfier runs in time n -poly(s(n)) and space
O(s(n)).
2. The protocol has perfect completeness and soundness 1/100.
3. The protocol is public-coin, with communication complexity poly(s(n)).
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Proof of Theorem 3.4.4. Fix an input length n. By Lemma 3.4.3, the language L can
be computed by a circuit C of size poly(2s(n)) and depth d(n) = O(s 2 (n)). Fix H, F, m, m' as
in the bare-bones protocol (see Subsection 3.3.1). Namely, H is an extension field of GF[2])
of size O(s(n)2 ), F is an extension field of H of size poly(s(n)), m = O(s(n)/ log(s(n))), and
m' = O(log(n)/log(s(n))).
The circuits add, and multi, constructed in Lemma 3.4.3, are of degree 6 = poly(s(n)),
and can be generated and evaluated (over IF) in time poly(s(n)) and space O(log(s(n))).
Now all that remains is to run the bare-bones protocol, replacing oracle calls to F for
computing {add,, mult,} with explicit computations of add, and mult, constructed above.
From Theorem 3.3.1 we get that the protocol has perfect completeness, and soundness 1
The prover's work is poly(2(n)). The verifier's work is only n.poly(s(n)), and his space usage
is O(s(n)). The protocol is public-coin, and the communication complexity is poly(s(n)).
U
Plugging in the parameters for languages in ANC, i.e. space O(log(n)) and time poly(n),
we get that the prover is efficient, the verifier runs in quasi-linear time, and the communi-
cation complexity is polylog(n). This is stated formally below (the proof is immediate from
Theorem 3.4.4):
Corollary 3.4.5. Let L be a language im N , i.e. one that can be computed by a non-
deterministic Turing Machine using space O(log(n)) and time poly(n). L has an interactive
proof (an implementatzon of the bare-bones protocol) where:
1. The prover runs in time poly(n), the verifier runs in time n -polylog(n) and space
O(log(n)).
2. The protocol has perfect completeness and soundness 1/100.
3. The protocol is public-corn, with communication complexity polylog(n).
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3.4.2 Interactive Proofs for L-Uniform Circuits
In this subsection, we show how to implement the bare-bones protocol for any polynomial-
size circuit that is log-space uniform. The complexity of the prover is polynomial in the
circuit size, the complexity of the verifier is quasi-linear in the input length and polynomial
in the circuit depth. The communication complexity is polynomial in the circuit depth and
logarithmic in the circuit size.
This result uses Theorem 3.4.4 from the previous subsection for delegating A/C compu-
tations. We proceed in two steps. First we show that for log-space uniform circuits, the
functions add, and mult, which are the unique low degree extensions of add, and mult, can
themselves be computed in log-space (with respect to appropriately chosen fields). Then,
applying Theorem 3.4.4 (or rather Corollary 3.4.5), we immediately conclude that a verifier
can delegate the computation of add, and mult, to the prover. In this delegation protocol, the
prover's work is polynomial in the circuit size, but the verifier's work is only poly-logarithmic
in the circuit size (note that the input size of add and mult, is itself only logarithmic).
So, given any log-space uniform circuit, the verifier and prover can run the bare-bones
protocol. Whenever the bare-bones verifier needs to compute the value of add or mult,
the prover supplies it with the value, and proves that this value is correct by running, as a
sub-protocol, the protocol of Theorem 3.4.4.
We begin by showing that for log-space uniform circuits, add, and mult, can be computed
in log-space. We state the claim for any space bounds:
Claim 3.4.6. Let C = {C,} be a family of s(n)-space uniform czrcuits. Fix fields H (an
extension field of GF[2]) of size O(s(n)), and F (an extenszon field of H) of size poly(s(n)).
Take m = O(s(n)/log(s(n))) and m' = O(n/log(s(n))).
There exists an O(s(n))-space Turing machine that computes the functions add, mult,
for the circuit C, (with respect to H, F, m, m'). Here we take add,, mult, to be the unique low
degree extensions of adds, mult,, of degree IHI - 1. The machine takes as input i n , H, F, m, m'
and the input (in Fm or F "m') to add, or mult,.
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Proof of Claim 3.4.6. Fix an input length n. Every bit of the circuit C, can be generated
using O(s(n)) space, and thus the (boolean) functions add, and mult, can be evaluated using
O(s(n)) space. By Claim 3.4.2, the function a (or a') that converts a vector in Hm (resp.
Hm') into its (boolean) lexicographic order can be computed in space O(log(IFI)+log(m)) =
O(log(s(n))) (the same holds for a').
Consider the two functions that take inputs in Hm, convert them into boolean gate labels
using a, and then run add, or mult, on the result. By the above, these functions can be
evaluated on inputs in Hm in space O(s(n)). Now, note that add, and mult, are the unique
low-degree extension of these functions. Thus, by Claim 3.2.2, these low-degree extensions
can themselves be computed using an additional O(m . log(IFI)) = O(s(n)) bits of space.
The total space needed to compute add,, mult, is O(s(n)). Clearly, the above holds also for
addd, multd, where d is the bottom layer of the circuit. U
We now proceed with a result about delegating the computation of languages computable
by log-space uniform circuits. This is the result claimed in Theorem 1.1.1 of Section 3.1.1.
Theorem 3.4.7 (Theorem 1.1.1 of Section 3.1.1, restated). Let L be a language that can be
computed by a family of O(log(S(n)))-space uniform boolean circuits of size S(n) and depth
d(n). L has an interactive proof where:
1. The prover runs in time poly(S(n)). The verifier runs in time n.poly(log(d(n), S(n)))
and space O(log(S(n))). Moreover, if the verifier is given oracle access to the low-degree
extension of its input, then its running time is only poly(log(d(n), S(n))).
2. The protocol has perfect completeness and soundness 1/2.
3. The protocol is public-comn, with communication complexity d(n) . polylog(S(n)).
Proof of Theorem 1.1.1. Fix an input length n. By the conditions of the theorem, on any
input length n, the language L can be computed by a O(log(S(n)))-space uniform arithmetic
circuit C over GF[2], of size S(n) and depth d(n). Assume (without loss of generality) that
C has fan-in 2.
Fix H, F, m, m' as in the bare-bones protocol (see Subsection 3.3.1). Namely, H is an
extension field of GF[2]) of size max{log(S(n)), d(n)}, F is an extension field of H of size
poly(HI), m = O(log(S(n))/ log(IHI)), and m' = O(log(n)/log(HI)).
We run the bare-bones protocol of Section 3.3, taking add, and mult, to be the umque
low-degree extensions of add, and mult, respectively (of degree jHI - 1 in each variable). The
verifier in the bare-bones protocol queries add, and mult, at most 2d(n) times: In each phase
of the protocol (or layer of the circuit) he queries add, once and queries mult, once. Now,
when implementing the bare-bones protocol, the prover will send the verifier the values of
add, and mult, at the points the verifier needs. The prover can do this, since these points
are specified by the verifier's public coins in previous rounds. Of course, a dishonest prover
may lie, so we run a separate protocol for verifying the correctness of the add, and mult,
computations.
By Claim 3.4.6, since C is a log(S(n))-space uniform circuit, add, and mult, can be
computed in O(log(S(n))) space. In turn, by Theorem 3.4.4, there exists an interactive
proof for verifying the correctness of each bit of add,'s and mult,'s outputs (the output
is a log(lIF)-bit string representing an element in F). For each verifier query, we repeat
this interactive proof protocol O(log(d(n)) + log log(lFI)) times for each bit of the output,
to get soundness I for the entire (log(|IF)-bit) answer. In all these invocations, by
Theorem 3.4.4, the total prover running time is poly(S(n)), the verifier running time is
d(n) - polylog(S(n)) (recall that the input to add, and mult, is only of size O(log(S(n)))),
and the verifier uses O(log(S(n))) total space. The probability that prover cheating in any
one of the O(d(n)) invocations goes undetected, is (by a Union bound) at most 1
So, in summary, we run the bare-bones protocol, replacing oracle calls to F for computing
{add,, mult, } with an interactive sub-protocol where the prover sends the verifier the value of
add, or mult,, and then proves its correctness. From Theorem 3.3.1 we get that the protocol
has perfect completeness, and the total probability of a cheating prover not being detected
is (by a Union bound) i + 1 <
The prover's work is poly(S(n)). The verifier's work is only polylog(S(n)) - (n + d(n)),
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and its space usage is O(log(S(n))). The protocol is public-coin, and its communication
complexity is d(n) - polylog(S(n)). N
As an immediate consequence of Theorem 1.1.1 we obtain two main corollaries. The
first, stated as Corollary 3.1.1 in Section 3.1.1, gives interactive proofs for languages that
are computable by C-uniform AVC circuit families (circuits families of poly-size and polylog-
depth). The second corollary, stated as Corollary 3.1.3 in Section 3.1.3, gives a public-coin
interactive proofs with a log-space verifier for every language in P. This second corollary
is also immediate, using the well known fact that languages in P have C-uniform poly-size
circuits.
Finally, Theorem 1.1.1 also yields a new corollary for interactive proofs for languages
computed by uniform Turing Machines (rather than uniform circuits). Using the fact that
a langauge that can be computed by a Turing machine in time t(n) and space s(n) can also
be computed by a O(s(n))-space uniform circuit of size poly(t(n) . 2"(")) and depth s2 (n) we
conclude that:
Corollary 3.4.8. Let L be a language that can be computed by a Turing Machine in time
t(n) and space s(n). L has an interactive proof where:
1. The prover runs in time poly(t(n) . 28(n)). The verifier runs rn time n -poly(s(n)) and
space poly(s(n)).
2. The protocol has perfect completeness and soundness 1/2.
3. The protocol zs public-coin, with communication complexity poly(s(n)).
It is instructive to compare Corollary 3.4.8 in terms of the honest prover's running time
with the well-known IP = PSPACS theorem of [LFKN92, Sha92].
Theorem 3.4.9 (IP = PSPACS [LFKN92, Sha92]). Let L be a language that can be
computed by a Turing Machine in time t(n) and space s(n). L has an interactive proof
where:
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1. The prover runs in tzme 2poly(s(n),log(t(n))) . The verzfier runs in time n - poly(s(n)) and
space poly(s(n)).
2. The protocol has perfect completeness and soundness 1/2.
3. The protocol zs publzc-cozn, with communication complexity poly(s(n)).
Thus, using Theorem 1.1.1 (via Corollary 3.4.8), we actually obtain a significant reduc-
tion in the running time of the honest prover: from 2poly(s(n)-log(t(n))) to poly(t(n) - 2"(n)).
In particular for logarithmic space (and polynomial time) computations, this gap means
the difference between efficient and inefficient (quasi-polynomial time) honest provers. A
fascinating open questions is obtaining a protocol with an honest prover that runs in time
poly(t(n)) and space poly(s(n)) (while maintaining the verifier running time and communi-
cation complexity of known protocol).
3.4.3 Protocols for Delegating Non-Uniform Computation
So far we have focused on interactive proofs for delegating uniform computations. In the
non-uniform setting we cannot escape having the verifier read the entire circuit, so there
is no hope for the verifier's running time to be smaller than the circuit size. As a result,
in the non-uniform setting, we do not require the entire computation of the verifier to be
super-efficient. Instead, we separate the verification into an off-line (non-interactzve) pre-
processing phase, which occurs before the input is even specified, and an on-line nteractive
proof phase, in which the input is known to both the prover and the verifier. We only require
that the verifier be super efficient in the on-line interactive phase. In what follows, let C be
a boolean circuit family of size S(n) and depth d(n) on inputs of length n.
In the off-line phase, before the input x is specified, the verifier is allowed to run a
long (poly(IC|)-time) randomized computation data - Vpre(C), resulting in an output data,
which will be retained in the proceeding on-line interactive phase. The output data of
the verifier's preprocessing computation should be significantly smaller than ICI. In our
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construction, data will be of size poly(d, log(S)) (for circuits of polylog depth this is much
less than ICI).
Next, after the input x is specified, the prover and verifier run an on-line interactive
phase. In this phase, the verifier V takes as input x and data (but not the circuit C).
The prover P takes as input the (entire) circuit C and the input x, and proves to the
verifier that C(x) = b for some value b. It is crucial that the prover does not know data.
Moreover, data is only good for a single invocation of the on-line protocol, and cannot be
reused for multiple inputs (intuitively, this is because during the interactive phase, the prover
may learn information about data). We make the usual completeness and (information-
theoretic) soundness requirements. We require that the verifier's running time in the on-line
phase is significantly smaller than the size of C, that the prover is efficient, and that the
communication be small.
We present such an on-line/off-line protocol for delegating the computation of non-
uniform circuits, where the size of data is polynomial in the depth of the circuit being
delegated (and poly-logarithmic in its size), and the verifier's running time in the on-line
phase is linear in the input length and polynomial in the circuit depth (and poly-logarithmic
in its size). This protocol (as the protocols for the uniform case) is an implementation of
the bare-bones protocol. The idea is for the verifier to choose its random coins in the pre-
processing phase. His oracle queries to F = {add , multj} are uniquely determined by these
random coins. The verifier can thus compute the oracle answers in the preprocessing phase.
He will then save these answers, together with the random coins, in the data string. A formal
Theorem follows:
Theorem 3.4.10 (Theorem 3.1.4 of Section 3.1.4, restated). Let L be a language computable
by a (non-unmform) czrcuit family C of size S(n) and depth d(n). There exists an on-line/off-
line interactive proof (P(C, x), V(x, data), Vpre(C)) for L. This protocol has completeness 1,
and soundness 1 (can be made arbitrarily small). The complexity of the protocol is as follows:
1. The (randomized) pre-processing computatzon Vpre(C) takes time poly(S(n)). The out-
put data is of length Idatal = poly(d(n), log(S(n))).
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2. The prover P(C, x) runs in time poly(S(n)).
3. The on-line verifier V(x, data) runs in time n.poly(d(n), log(S(n))) and space O(log(S(n))).
4. The communicatzon complexity of the (on-line) interactive protocol is poly(d(n), log(S(n))).
Proof of Theorem 3.1.4. As noted above, the protocol is another implementation of the
bare-bones protocol of Theorem 3.3.1. Recall, that in the bare-bones protocol, the running
times of the prover and verifier, as well as the communication complexity, are exactly as
we want. The only problem is that there the verifier is given oracle access to the functions
{add,, mult,}= 1 . Here we would like to implement these functions.
To avoid ambiguity, we think of {add, mult, } as the (unique) low-degree extensions of
{adds, mult,}. The prover P(C, x) can implement the bare-bones protocol while simulating
these oracles on his own, since he is allowed to run in time poly(S). The verifier, on the other
hand, will use the off-line pre-processing phase to "take care" of computing the values of
{add,, mult} that will be needed in the on-line interactive phase. Note that these O(d) oracle
queries are a function of the poly(d - log(S)) public coins chosen by the verifier throughout
the bare-bones protocol.
Thus, the pre-processing algorithm Vpre(C), chooses the poly(d . log(S)) public coins.
These immediately specify the verifier's O(d) queries to the functions {add,, mult,}. Then,
Upre(C) computes the answers to all these queries. To do this, it computes the truth table
(of size poly(S)) of the boolean functions add,, mult,, and then computes their low-degree
extensions (note that this can be done without knowing the input x). By Claim 3.2.2,
computing the low-degree extension takes time poly(S). Finally, Vpre(C) outputs the string
data consisting of the poly(d . log(S)) random coins it chose, as well as the O(d) oracle
function values (each of size poly(d, log(S))). The total length of the data string is thus
poly(d, log(S)). In the on-line interactive phase, the verifier V(x, data) simulates the verifier
of the bare-bones protocol, while using the random coins and the oracle answers, as specified
in data.
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The completeness, soundness and complexity properties of the interactive phase are in-
herited directly from the bare-bones protocol for delegating computation (Theorem 3.3.1).
As a final note, observe that indeed once the data string is used in an interactive protocol,
the prover knows the random coins chosen in the pre-processing phase, and thus if the same
data string is used again (with this prover), even for a different input, the protocol is no
longer sound. I
3.5 Low Communication Zero-Knowledge Interactive
Proofs
In this section, we construct succinct zero-knowledge proofs for many P languages: In
particular, the communication complexity of these proofs is quasi-linear in the witness size
for any language whose NP relation is computable by an nC circuit. We consider both the
(L)-uniform setting, and the non-uniform setting.
In the non-uniform setting, we use the bare-bones protocol (described in Subsection 3.3.2)
to show that (based on the existence of one-way functions) every .P language L, verifiable
by a depth d Boolean circuit, has a zero knowledge proof with communication complexity
k - poly(d, K), where k is the witness size, and ' is the security parameter. Note that the
communication complexity may be significantly smaller than the instance size.
In the uniform setting, we show that every ANP language L, verifiable by a log-space uni-
form Boolean circuit of depth d, has a zero knowledge proof with communication complexity
is as above, and moreover, the runtime of the verifier is very efficient: it is only linear in the
input size, and polynomial in the witness size, the circuit depth and the security parameter.
Notations. In what follows let L = {x : 3w s.t. RL(x, w) = 1} be an NP language. We
think of the relation RL as a Boolean circuit (rather than a function). We denote by d the
depth of RL, by n = |x| the instance size, by k = Iwl the witness size, and by K the security
parameter. The reader should think of k, d, K as functions of n.
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We start by recalling formally our two theorems, starting with the theorem for the non-
uniform setting.
Theorem 3.5.1 (Theorem 3.1.5 of Section 3.1.5, restated). Assume one-way functions exist,
and let K = K(n) > log(n) be a security parameter. Let L be an NP language whose relation
R can be computed on inputs of length n wzth wztnesses of length k = k(n) by Boolean circuits
of szze poly(n) and depth d(n). Then L has a zero-knowledge interactive proof
1. The prover runs in time poly(n) (given a witness), the verifier runs in time poly(n)
and space O(log(n)).
2. The protocol has perfect completeness and soundness 1/2.
3. The protocol is public-corn, wzth communication complexity k -poly(, d(n)).
The theorem for the uniform setting is similar, with the additional property that the
verifier is very efficient.
Theorem 3.5.2 (Theorem 3.1.6 of Section 3.1.5, restated). Assume one-way functions exist,
and let K = K(n) > log(n) be a securty parameter. Let L be an NP language whose relation
R can be computed on znputs of length n with witnesses of length k = k(n) by a 1-uniform
family of boolean czrcuits of size poly(n) and depth d(n). Then L has a zero-knowledge
znteractve proof
1. The prover runs in tzme poly(n) (given a witness), the verifier runs in time n-poly(k, K, d)
and space O(log(n)).
2. The protocol has perfect completeness and soundness 1/2.
3. The protocol is public-coin, with communicatzon complexity k -poly(K, d(n)).
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Proof idea of Theorems 3.1.5 and 3.1.6. The idea is to use the bare-bones protocol
of Theorem 3.3.1, together with the (by now) standard transformation of [BGG+88], that
converts public-coin interactive proofs into zero-knowledge ones. More specifically, we first
consider the (not zero-knowledge) interactive proof, where the prover first sends the verifier
the witness w, and then they both run the bare-bones protocol. This interactive proof is
public-coin, and has the desired complexity parameters.
Next we use the transformation of [BGG+88], to convert this protocol into a zero-
knowledge one: The prover does not send his messages in the clear, but instead commits
to them. The prover then proves using a (standard) zero-knowledge proof (e.g. that of
[GMW91], though we will use a more efficient proof), that the underlying verifier would
have accepted this transcript. It may seem that we are right back where we started, as we
need again to prove a statement in zero-knowledge. The point (and the reason we make
progress) is that the bare-bones protocol guarantees that this final statement involves only
a very small verifier computation, and thus this final zero-knowledge proof is very efficient
with low communication complexity.
However, recall that in the bare-bones protocol, the verifier gets access to oracle functions
specifying the circuit. So, in order to use the bare-bones protocol, we need to implement
these oracles. In the non-uniform case we implement these oracles (as in Theorem 3.1.4)
by having the verifier compute the oracle answers by himself (an efficient computation). In
the uniform case (as in Theorem 1.1.1), we solve this by having the prover give these oracle
answers to the verifier, and prove that he computed these values correctly. Note that this
computation is polynomial time, so this does not violate zero-knowledge. We proceed with
formal proofs.
Proof of Theorem 3.1.5: Fix an ?VP language L, as above. Fix a security parameter
S= <(n) _ , and assume the existence of a (one-way) function f : {0, 1}) -- {0, 1}) . This
implies that there exists a statistically binding and computationally hiding bit commitment
scheme, with sender work, receiver work, and communication that are all poly() [Nao89,
HILL99] (see Goldreich's book [Gol01] for the definition of a commitment scheme and for
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the proof method).
Our zero-knowledge interactive proof (PZK(x, W), VZK(x)) for L, makes use of the bare-
bones protocol (presented in Section 3.3) to prove that 7ZL(X, w) = 1, while assuming that
the bare-bones verifier, instead of taking the pair (x, w) as input, has oracle access to the
low degree extension of (x, w), denoted by G : Fm' --+ F. It was shown in Theorem 3.3.1,
that in this case the runtime of the verifier is < poly(k, d). In conclusion, in the bare-bones
protocol, both the prover and the verifier have oracle access to a set of functions F; and the
verifier, in addition, has oracle access to G. We denote this bare-bones protocol by
According to the notation in Section 3.3,
F = {add,, mult,} ,[d],
where add,, mult, are some (low degree) extensions of add,, mult,, respectively. We take
add, and mult, to be the unique low-degree extensions of add, and mult, respectively, so as
to ensure that they are uniquely defined (and can be computed in polynomial time). See
Section 3.3 for the details.
The protocol (PZK(X, W), VZK(x)) proceeds as follows:
1. The prover PZK(X, W) first sends the verifier a bit-by-bit commitment to w.
2. The prover PZK(X, w) and verifier VZK(x) run the bare-bones protocol (PI, V1 ) (see
Theorem 3.3.1) with the following difference: The prover PZK, rather than sending his
messages "in the clear", will send commitments to all his messages. Namely, if the
bare-bones protocol consists of a transcript of the form:
(then in the zero-knowledge pr tocol (PzK , w), K(), this transcript will be con-
then in the zero-knowledge protocol (PZK(X,w), VZK(X)), this transcript will be con-
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verted to a transcript of the form:
(rl, com(m1), r2, coM(m2). .. , , com (m)).
The prover PZK(X, w) emulates the prover Pi of the bare-bones protocol (simulating
the oracle calls to F on his own). Recall that this can be done in time poly(n). The
verifier VZK(x) emulates the verifier V1 . Recall that the bare-bones protocol is public-
coin, and so the verifier VZK(x) does not need to "know" the messages mi, ... , m, nor
does he need to use the oracle F (or the oracle G to a low-degree extension of the
input), in order to generate ri,..., r .
3. By Theorem 3.3.1, the verifier VT ',G queries the oracle F at O(d) points, determined
uniquely by the verifier's randomness rl,..., re. Moreover, these points, as well as the
oracle's answers, can be computed in time poly(n) given the verifier's randomness.
Both the prover PZK(X, w) and the verifier VZK(x) compute these oracle queries, and
simulate the oracle's answer on each of these queries. We denote the answers by
Vl, ... ,VO(d)E IF.
4. Also, according to Theorem 3.3.1, the verifier VF' queries his oracle G (i.e., the
low-degree extension of the input) at a single point. This point depends only on his
randomness r, ... , re (and can be computed in polynomial time given the verifier's
randomness).
Both the prover PZK (, w) and the verifier VZK () compute this oracle query, denoted
by z E F m . This can be done in time poly(n).
5. According to Proposition 3.2.1,
G(z) = (z,,p) - 0(p).
pEH
m
Moreover, can be evaluated in time poly(d, log n) (with respect to the parameters
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chosen by the bare-bones protocol). Denote by pl,...,p, E HPm the n points that
satisfy G(p,) = xt, where x = (xl,...,xn). Denote by Pn+l,...,Pn+k E Hm the k
points that satisfy G(pn+,) = w , where w = (w, ... , k).
Both the prover PZK(X, w) and the verifier VZK(x) compute the value t _ E (z, p).
G(p,). This can be done in time poly(n).
6. Next, the prover and verifier run a previously known (but communication-efficient)
zero knowledge proof, say that of [CD97] or [IKOS07]. The statement being proved is
that:
(com(w), ri, com(m), ... ., re, com(me), v, . VO(. , o d), t) E L', (3.7)
where the language L' is defined as follows. Equation (3.7) holds if the verifier VF ,G
with randomness ri,..., rf, accepts the transcript
(rl, m l,..., r, mf),
assuming that v, .... , VO(d) are the answers obtained by the oracle F, and
t + Z/3(Z, pn+z) * Wz
Z=1
is the answer obtained by the oracle G, where z is the point that VFiG queries G.
We use the zero knowledge proof of [CD97] (or, alternatively, an even further optimized
construction of [IKOS07]). The properties we use are that the proof has perfect com-
pleteness, soundness 1/3 and communication that is hnear in the size of the verifying
circuit (and polynomial in the security parameter K). In our case the circuit size is
k -poly(K, d)) (see below), and so the communication complexity is also k -poly(K, d)).
7. The verifier VZK(x) accepts if and only if he accepts this zero-knowledge proof.
We next show that this protocol is zero-knowledge, has perfect completeness, soundness
1/2, and communication complexity k - poly(r, d), as desired.
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The fact that this protocol is zero-knowledge follows from the fact that the underlying
commitment scheme is computationally hiding and from the fact that the underlying zero-
knowledge proof is indeed zero-knowledge (see [BGG+88] for details). Perfect completeness
follows from the fact that the underlying zero-knowledge proof used has perfect completeness.
The fact that the soundness is 1/2 follows (by a union bound) from the soundness of the
bare-bones protocol, from the fact that the underlying zero-knowledge proof has soundness
at most 1/3, and from the fact that the commitment scheme is statistically binding. It
remains to argue that the communication complexity is k - poly(r,, d).
To prove that the communication complexity of (PZK(x, W), VZK(x)) is k poly(/, d), it
suffices to prove that L' is an NP language with a verification circuit of size k - poly(K, d).
To this end, we consider the witness consisting of all the de-commitment values, and show
that it can be verified in time k -poly(, d)).
Given these de-commitment values, the value of w and mi,..., me can be computed in
time k -poly(n, d). Moreover, given:
(w, rl, ml,..., rim ,l, V ... , vo(d), t),
checking whether V1'G accepts the transcript (rl, mi,..., re, me), assuming that the oracle
answers of F are v1 ... ,VO(d), and given the value G(z), can be done in time poly(d, log n).
Finally, given w and t (the part of the low-degree extension of (x, w) at point z that depends
on x), the value of the oracle G at point z can be computed in time k -poly(d, log n). So the
total size of the verification circuit is k -poly(d, K). U
Proof of Theorem 3.1.6: The proof of Theorem 3.1.6 is almost identical to the proof (and
protocol) of Theorem 3.1.5. The only differences are that now the circuit computing RZL is
uniform, and we want to leverage this fact to reduce the verifier's running time. The running
time of the verifier presented in the above proof of Theorem 3.1.5 is as required, except for
its computation of the O(d) values of the functions add,, mult,, which takes polynomial time
in the circuit size.
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However, recalling Claim 3.4.6, if the circuit computing ]7L is itself E-uniform, then
add,, mult, can be computed in O(log(n))-space (the inputs to these functions are themselves
of size O(log(n))). We used this fact in Theorem 1.1.1 of Section 3.4 to show that the prover
can simply send to the verifier the values of add,, mult, at the points that the verifier needs.
The prover then proves that it sent the correct values using the protocol of Theorem 3.4.4
(with soundness O(1/d)). The verifier's running time to verify the values of add,, mult, on
the desired points is only polylog(n).
We modify the above protocol of Theorem 3.1.5 in a similar manner. Instead of computing
the values vl,...,VO(d) of add,, mult, on its own, the verifier asks the prover to send him
these values and prove that they were computed correctly. This is done after running the
bare-bones protocol (i.e. after the prover has already committed to all its messages). Note
that the function value being proven here is efficiently computable, and so zero-knowledge
is not violated (the simulator can run this computation itself). The above protocol has all
the properties of the protocol in Theorem 3.1.5 (in particular soundness is maintained), and
also the verifier's work is n -poly(k, d, n). We note that by using (in the last step of the
protocol) a zero-knowledge proof with a verifier whose running time is linear in the size of
the verification circuit, we can get the verifier's running time down to (n + k) -poly(d, n),
the details are omitted. M
3.6 One-Round Arguments for Delegating Computa-
tion
In this section we are concerned with the question of reducing the amount of interaction in
protocols for delegating computation. As discussed in Section 3.1.2, we seek to construct
one round protocols, where a verifier can issue a challenge to a polynomial-time prover,
and get back a (computationally sound) certificate of correctness for a claim made by the
prover. In this setting, the verifier with a Turing machine M computing a language L wants
to verify that x E L, but without taking the time to run the Turing machine M on the
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input x (the case of verifying that x L or certifying computation of functions rather than
languages can be done similarly). Towards this end, the verifier wants to send M and x to
an un-trusted prover, who will then provide a short (non-interactive) computationally sound
certificate that x E L. We only allow the verifier to send the prover (together with x), a
single challenge message my, that may help guarantee the soundness of the certificate. The
certificate is thus a function of the machine M, the input x, and the verifier's challenge my.
Ideally, the challenge my is independent of the input x and the language being proved, in
which case the verifier can compute the challenge my in advance and, say, publish it on his
webpage (this will be the case in the scheme we present below).
Following the exposition above, we view a system for certifying computations as a 1-
round computationally sound argument system for a language L. The verifier and prover
know a machine M computing L and an input x. The verifier sends a challenge message my,
the prover replies with a certificate, and the verifier accepts or rejects. Completeness is the
guarantee that if x E L, the verifier should accept when it interacts with the (honest) prover.
Soundness is the guarantee that if x L, no efficient prover can make the verifier accept.
The main complexity measures we are interested in bounding are the running time of the
verifier and the prover (as a function of the complexity of computing L) and the length of
the certificate and the challenge.
Our main result in this section is a system for certifying computation (a one-round
argument system) for a language computed by a family of (L-uniform) AC circuits. The
prover's running time is polynomial in the circuit size. The verifier's running time is quasi-
linear. The lengths of the certificate and the verifier's challenge are poly-logarithmic (using
a poly-logarithmic security parameter).
This result uses our interactive proof for delegating computation (Theorem 1.1.1), to-
gether with a recent result of Kalai and Raz [KR09] on transforming interactive proof systems
into a one-round (two-message) computationally sound argument systems. The soundness of
the certificate relies on the privacy of a (computational) PIR scheme with poly-logarithmic
communication (see Section 3.2.4 for a definition of PIR schemes and more details).
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We first re-state the result we use from [KRO9], and then present our main theorem about
certifying efficient computations.
Theorem 3.6.1. [KR09] Let r > log n be a security parameter. Assume the existence of
a secure PIR scheme (as defined in Definitzon 3.2.5), with communicatzon poly(K), receiver
work poly(K), and sender work poly(n, ,) (where n zs the database size).
Assume that there exists an interactzve proof system (P, V) for proving membershzp in
some language L, with the following properties:
1. Completeness c, soundness s and communication complexity E.
2. Verifier running time tv and prover running time tp.
3. Each message sent by the prover depends only on the A previous bits sent by V.
4. The verifier's messages depend only on the verifier's random coin tosses (and are in-
dependent of the znteracton and the nput).
Then there exists a one-round (two-message) argument system (p', V') for L, with com-
munication complexity f' = poly(£, K), completeness c' > c-2-"2 , and soundness s' < s+2 - 2
against provers of size < 2". The verfier V' runs in time < tv -poly(n). The prover P' runs
in time < poly(tp, K, 2A).
Moreover, the resulting one-round argument system (P', V') has the property that the first
message, sent by V', depends only on the random con tosses of V', and is independent of
the instance x or of the language being proven.
Applying the transformation of the above theorem to our efficient interactive proofs from
Theorem 1.1.1, we directly obtain efficient one-round arguments for delegating computation:
Theorem 3.6.2 (Theorem 3.1.2 of Section 3.1.2, restated). Let L be a langauge computable
by a family of O(log(S(n)))-space uniform boolean circuits of size S(n) and depth d(n). Let
K > log(S(n)) be a security parameter. Assume the existence of a secure PIR scheme, with
communicaton poly(n), receiver work poly(K), and sender work poly(n, ,) (where n is the
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database size). The language L has a 1-round (private coin) argument system with the
following properties:
1. The prover runs in time poly(S(n)), the verifier runs in time n-poly(K, d(n), log(S(n))). 27
2. The protocol has perfect completeness and computational soundness 1/2 (can be made
arbitrarily small): for any input x L and for any cheating prover running in time
< 2"3 , the probabiltty that the verzfier accepts is < 1/2.
3. The sizes of the certificate (the prover's message) and the verifier's challenge are
poly(K, d(n)). The verifier's message depends only on the parameters n and K, and
is independent of the language L and the input x.
We conclude with a few Remarks:
1. Since the verifier's challenge depends only on the parameters (and is independent of the
computation being certified), the verifier can prepare the challenge in advance, before
he knows the language or input whose membership is proved. We note, however, that
a fresh challenge must be used for every invocation of the argument system, otherwise
soundness might break down.
2. The protocol is private coins. Moreover, a certificate (which is verifier dependent)
cannot be verified without the verifier's (private) random coins. This means that our
certificates cannot be used to convince anyone that an input is in the language, except
the verifier, who knows his private coins, and knows that they were generated randomly.
3. It is instructive to compare this result to two previous works on providing certificates
for efficient computation (i.e. for languages in P). The results of [BFLS91] give long
certificates, of size polynomial in the circuit size (even for languages in A/C). Though
these results are efficiently probabilistically checkable. The result of Micali [Mic94]
on CS Proofs, requires the use of a random oracle, a primitive whose realization is
27Moreover, if the verifier is given oracle access to the low-degree extension of its input, then its running
time is only poly(K, d(n), log(S(n))).
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by now notoriously questionable (though he obtains short certificates for any efficient
computation, not only for NAC).
3.7 An Interactive PCP
In this section, we use the bare-bones protocol (described in Subsection 3.3.2) to construct an
interactive PCP scheme, as introduced in [KR08]. An interactive PCP (say for membership
of an input x in a language L) is a combination of a PCP and a short interactive proof.
Roughly speaking, an interactive PCP is a proof that can be verified by reading only a small
number of its bits, with the help of a short interactive proof. We begin in Subsection 3.7.1
with a brief introduction to interactive PCPs, and then present our new construction in
Subsection 3.7.2.
3.7.1 Preliminaries
More precisely, let L = {z : 3w s.t. (x, w) E RL} be an AP language, described by a
polynomial-time computable relation R.L. Let p, q, £, c, s be parameters as follows: p, q, f are
integers and c, s are reals, s.t. 0 < s < c < 1 (informally, p is the size of the PCP string,
q is the number of queries allowed to the PCP string, f is the communzcation complexzty of
the interactive proof, c is the completeness parameter and s is the soundness parameter).
The reader should think of the parameters p, q, f, c, s as functions of the instance size n. An
interactive PCP with parameters (p, q, f, c, s) for membership in L is an interactive protocol
between an (efficient) prover P and an (efficient) verifier V.28 We assume that both the
prover and the verifier know the language L and get as input an instance x of size n. The
prover gets an additional input w (supposedly a witness for the membership x E L). In the
first round of the protocol, the prover generates a (PCP) string 7 of p bits (think of 7r as
an encoding of the witness w). The verifier is still not allowed to access 7. The prover and
28 0ne could also consider a model with a prover that is not necessarily efficient. Originally in [KR08]
interactive PCPs were defined with efficient provers, and we will also focus on efficient provers throughout
this work.
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the verifier then apply an interactive protocol, where the total number of bits communicated
is f. During the protocol, the verifier is allowed to access at most q bits of the string 7r. After
the interaction, the verifier decides whether to accept or reject the statement x E L.
Definition 3.7.1. [KR08] A pair (P, V) of probabilistic polynomial time interactive Turing
machines is an interactive PCP for L with parameters (p, q, £, c, s), if for every (x, w) E RL
the prover P(x, w) generates a bit string 7r (known as the PCP string) of size at most p(n)
(where n = Jxl), such that the following properties are satisfied.
* Completeness: For every (x, w) E lL,
Pr[(P(x, w), V'(x)) = 1] > c(n)
(where n = lxl, and the probability is over the random coin tosses of P and V).
* Soundness: For every x V L, every (unbounded) interactive Turing machine P, and
every string ir E {0, 1}*,
Pr[(P(x), V"(x))= 1] < s(n)
(where n = |xl, and the probability is over the random coin tosses of V).
* Complexity: The communication complexity of the protocol (P(x, w), V 1 (x)) is at
most £(n), and V reads at most q(n) bits of 7r.
Let L = {x : ]w s.t. (x,w) E RL} be any NP language. It was shown in [KR08],
that if RL can be computed by a constant depth Boolean circuit (over the basis A, V, -, e)
then L has an interactive PCP with the following parameters: the length of the PCP string
is polynomial in the witness size (i.e., p = poly(Iwl)), it makes only a single query to
the PCP oracle (i.e., q = 1), and it has poly-logarithmic communication complexity (i.e.,
£ = polylog(lxl)).
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3.7.2 New Improved Interactive PCPs
We extend the results of [KRO8]. We show that for every AnP language L = {x : w s.t. (x, w) E
RL}, if the relation RL can be computed by a polynomial size circuit of depth d, then L
has an interactive PCP with the following parameters: the length of the PCP is polynomial
in d and the witness size (i.e., p = poly(d, |w|)), it makes only a single query to the PCP
oracle (i.e., q = 1), and it has communication complexity f = poly(d, log jxj). In particular,
we match the parameters of [KR08] (up to polynomial factors) for any RL that can be com-
puted in NC (poly-logarithmic depth). Moreover, our interactive PCP has the additional
property that each message sent by the prover, during the interactive phase, depends only
on O(log xz) bits sent by the verifier (and on the input and the randomness of the prover).
This property (which previous interactive PCP's do not have) will be used in Section 3.8 to
construct "short" efficzent probabilistically checkable arguments.
Theorem 3.7.2. Let C : {0, 1}k {0, 1} be a Boolean circuit of size S and depth d.
Then, for any E > 1/S,29 the satisfiabzlity of C can be proven by an interactive PCP with
the following parameters: p = poly(k,d, logS, ), q = 1, f = poly(d, logS, ), c = 1 and
s < + O(E).
Moreover, the interactive PCP has the following two properties:
1. The PCP string 7r (generated by the prover in the first round of the protocol) depends
only on the witness w E {0, 1}k and the parameters S, d, E, and not on the circuit C.
2. The znteractive phase zs publzc coin, and each message sent by the prover depends only
on the precedng O(log S) bits sent by the verifier.
The following is an immediate corollary of Theorem 3.7.2:
Corollary 3.7.3. Let L = {x : 3w s.t. RL(x, w) = 1} be any ANP language. Let n = x
denote the instance size, let k = Iw denote the witness size, and let d denote the czrcuit
29We require E > 1/S in order to ensure that the prover runs in time poly(IC|). We could take 0 < e < 1/S
and then the prover's running time is polynomial in 1/E.
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depth of 7TL. Then, for any E > 1/n,30
L E IPCP(p, q, f, c, s),
with p = poly(k, d, ), q = 1, = poly(d, log n, ), c = 1, and s < + O(E). Moreover, this
interactive PCP has the two additional properties stated in Theorem 3.7.2.
Remark. Notice that if we allow "many" queries to the PCP string then we can reduce the
soundness to be any parameter s, as follows: First omit the parameter e in Theorem 3.7.2
by setting the soundness parameter to be a constant, and then improve the soundness pa-
rameter via parallel repetition. This will increase the query complexity to O(log 1) and will
increase the communication complexity f by a factor of O(log ().
Rather than proving Theorem 3.7.2 directly, as was done in [KR08], we prove a weaker
version (stated in Theorem 3.7.4), that allows "many" queries to the PCP string. In [KR08]
it was shown how to convert an interactive PCP with many queries into interactive PCP
with one query (and in particular, how to get Theorem 3.7.2 from Theorem 3.7.4). We note
that this weaker version (Theorem 3.7.4) is interesting on its own, and in particular it is this
weaker version that we use in order to construct "short" efficient probabilistically checkable
arguments in Section 3.8.
Theorem 3.7.4. Let C : {0, 1}k -+ {0, 1} be a Boolean circuit of size S and depth d. Then,
for any soundness parameter s > 2-S,31 the satisfiability of C can be proven by an interactive
PCP with the followzng parameters: p = poly(k, d, log S), q = poly(log d, log log S, log 1),
£ = poly(d, logS, log 1), completeness c = 1, and soundness s. Moreover, the interactive
PCP has the following two properties:
1. The PCP string 7r (generated by the prover in the first round of the protocol) depends
30Again, we require e > 1/n in order to ensure that the prover runs in polynomial time. We could take
0 < E < 1/n and then the prover's running time is polynomial in 1/E.
31We require s > 2- s in order to ensure that the prover and verifier run in time poly(IC|). We could take
0 < s < 2 - s and then the running time would be polynomial in log .
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only on the witness w E {0, 1}k and the parameters S, d, and not on the circuit C.
2. The interactive phase is publhc comn, and each message sent by the prover depends only
on the precedzng O(log S) bits sent by the verfier.
We now proceed with a proof of Theorem 3.7.4, starting with a high-level overview.
Suppose we want an interactive PCP for proving that there exists a sting w E {0, 1}k such
that C(w) = 0, where C: {0, 1}k -{0 0,1} is a circuit as in the theorem statement.
Proof Outline. Roughly speaking, the interactive PCP consists of the following steps:
1. The PCP string 7r is simply the low-degree extension of the witness w.
2. Verify that 7r is close to a low-degree polynomial, by running a low degree test of [MR08]
(described for completeness in Subsection 3.2.2).
3. Verify that the string w, encoded in the oracle 7r, satisfies w E {0, 1}k .
4. Verify that the string w, encoded in the oracle i7, satisfies C(w) = 0.
We use our delegation protocol to execute Steps (3) and (4).
Comparison with the scheme of [KR08]. The interactive PCP of [KR08] also follows
steps (1)-(4) as above. The main difference between our protocol and the one in [KR08] is
in the execution of Steps (3) and (4): More specifically, we reduce the task of verifying that
w E {0, I}k to the task of verifying that g(w) = 0, where g is some arithmetic circuit of
size poly(k) and depth polylog(k). Then we prove that g(w) = 0 and that C(w) = 0 using
our delegation protocol.
On the other hand, in [KR08], they first use a linear error-correcting-code to reduce the
task of verifying that w G {0, 1}k to the task of verifying that g(w) = 0, where g is some
arithmetic formula of size poly(k), constant depth, and constant degree. Then they use a
method due to Razborov and Smolenski to convert (the constant depth Boolean circuit) C
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into an arithmetic formula f of degree d = polylog(k). Finally, they use an "efficient sum-
check protocol" for proving that g(w) = 0 and for proving that f(w) = 0. We note that the
communication complexity of their sum-check protocol depends polynomially on the degree
d, whereas in our delegation protocol the communication complexity depends polynomially
on the depth d. This is why we can get an interactive PCP for all of NC (with polylog(k)
communication complexity) while [KR08] cannot go beyond ACO.
Proof of Theorem 3.7.4. In what follows, we prove Theorem 3.7.4 with soundness pa-
rameter s = . This suffices since for any s > 0, by repeating the interactive phase O(log 1)
times we get an interactive PCP with the desired parameters and soundness s. We assume
k > log S. This is without loss of generality since we could always increase k to be log S by
adding dummy variables. Note that this does not change the guarantees in the statement
of Theorem 3.7.4. Consider the following interactive PCP protocol (P, V) for proving the
satisfiability of C: {0, 1}k {0, 1}.
Parameters:
1. k, S, d, where
k, d < S 2 k
2. Parameters H, F, m, m', that together with k, S, d, are valid parameters for the
bare-bones protocol given is Section 3.3.2. In particular, H is an extension field
of GF[2], F is an extension field of H, and m, m' are integers, such that
d < |H < poly(d, log S),
S < Hlm < poly(S),
k < IHIm' < poly(d, k),
143
and
JF < poly(|H|).
Moreover, the parameters H, F, m, m' should satisfy the following additional prop-
erties:
(a) m' > 3.
(b) |F| > m'(IHI - 1).
(c) 2 1 0 m' 8 (m') 2 (H-1) <IF - 12
These properties guarantee that we can apply Lemma 3.2.3 with respect to F, m',
and d = m'(IHI - 1), and get E < 1
Input:
Both the prover and the verifier take as input a Boolean circuit
C : {0, 1}k {-- 0 , 1}
of size S and depth d. The prover takes an additional input
W = (WO, Wl...
, 
Wk-1) E {0, 1}k ,
such that C(w) = 0.
The protocol (P(C, w), V7(C)).
1. Computing the PCP string 7r.
The PCP string 7r is the low-degree-extension of w w.r.t. the parameters I, F, m'.
Namely,
def
7def = LDEu,,m,(wo, W..., Wk- 1 ).
The verifier is given oracle access to 7r. Note that 7r : F"' - F is a multivariate
polynomial of degree IH - 1 in each variable, and thus is of total degree < m' n (IHI - 1).
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2. Running the low degree test on w.
The verifier V checks that i7 is close to an m'-variate polynomial f : Fm' -+ F that has
total degree < m'.( HI-1). This is done by running the low degree test (PLDT(), VLDT)
described in Subsection 3.2.2. If the test fails then the verifier rejects.
Note that so far the protocol depends only on w and on the parameters S, d, and does
not depend on the circuit C.
3. Proving that C(w) = 0.
Interpret C as a layered arithmetic circuit (of fan-in 2 over F). Let F = {add, mult,1)e[d]
be a set of functions corresponding to C (as defined in Subsection 3.3.1), such that
for every i E [d], add, is the unique low degree extension of add,, and mult, is the
unique low degree extension of mult,. Note that both the prover and the verifier of
the interactive PCP protocol can compute the functions in F on their own (in time
poly(S)).
The prover and the verifier run the bare-bones protocol (Pl(w), V(w)) described in
Section 3.3.2 for proving that C(w) = 0 (with respect to 6 = |H| - 1). The prover
P(C, w) (of the interactive PCP system) emulates P(w) by computing the functions
in F on his own (and thus simulating the oracle F). The verifier V'(C) (of the
interactive PCP system) emulates VT(w) by computing the functions in F on his own,
and using his oracle 7r instead of w.
Recall that according to the third (additional) property of Theorem 3.3.1, the verifier
V1 can run the bare-bones protocol, even if he is not given w as input, but is only given
oracle access to the low degree extension of w (with respect to H, F, m'). In this case,
V1 queries the low degree extension of w at a single random point corresponding to a
field element, or alternatively, at O(log d+ log log S) bit points (since each element in F
can be represented by O(log d + log log S) bits). Since with high probability (assuming
the low degree test passes), the oracle i7 of the interactive PCP is close to the low
degree extension of w (with respect to H, F, m'), the verifier can use the oracle 7r of the
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interactive PCP as an oracle to the low degree extension of w.
If the verifier Vf(w) of the bare-bones protocol rejects then the verifier V"(C) of the
interactive PCP protocol also rejects.
4. Restricting all satisfying assignments to bit strings.
In order to ensure soundness, the verifier should verify that w E {0, 1}k. To this end,
consider the function I : Fk -+ F, defined as follows:
AP (tl,...,tk)c H -H H (t Z
EF\{o} \ z=1 'yEIF\{o,1)
Note that XP(tl,..., tk) = 0 if and only if t 1,..., tk E {0, 1}. Moreover, I can be
implemented by a layered arithmetic circuit of fan-in 2 (over F), of size poly(k, FI) <
poly(k, d) and of depth < poly(log IF, log k) < poly(log k, log d). For the simplicity of
the analysis (and without loss of generality), we assume that I is of size < S.
The prover will prove that T(w) = 0, as was done in Step 3.
Analysis of the protocol (P(C, w), V(C)). The fact that 7 = LDEHi,m,(w) implies that
the PCP string is of size p = |Fm' - (log IF|) < poly(k, d). Theorem 3.3.1 and Lemma 3.2.3
imply that the protocol (P(C, w), Vr(C)) has communication complexity £ = poly(d, logS)
and completeness c = 1. Note that our protocol queries ir at three points (each corresponding
to a field element): Once during the run of the low degree test (in Step 2), and once during
each run of the delegation protocol (in Step 3 and Step 4). Thus, the query complexity is
q = O(log IF) = O(log d, log log S). We next prove that its soundness is s < .
- 12 "
Fix any C : {0, 1}k --+ {0, 1}, of size S and depth d, which is not satisfiable. Fix any
unbounded (cheating) prover P, and any function -k : Fm' - F. Let E denote the event that
(P, V')(C) = 1, and let
def
s Pr[E].
Assume for the sake of contradiction that s > 1. According to Lemma 3.2.3, there exists
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an m'-variate polynomial f : F' --+ F of degree < m' - (IHI - 1) such that
Pr [r(z)= f(z)] > s - E,
ZERIFm
where E is defined in Lemma 3.2.3. Let
d Pr [i(z) f(z)] 1 - (s - ).
ZERFm
Our contradiction assumption (that s > 1), together with our assumption that Es <
implies that
17< - (3.8)
6
Define (zo, t 1,..., Wk-1) E Fk by
1 f f(a-l(i)),
where a : ]Hm' {0, 1,..., k' - 1} (k' Hdf I lm') is the lexicographic order of Hm '.
Recall that both times when emulating the verifier V1 of the bare-bones protocol, the
verifier V queries the oracle at a single random point (corresponding to a field element). Let
B denote the event that on these two points & is consistent with f. Note that
Pr[--B] < 27 < -3
Let A denote the event that w0 , 1, .. , , k-1 E {0O, 1}. Theorem 3.3.1 implies that
1
Pr[EIA A B] < 1
- 100
and
1
Pr[EI-A A B] < 100
100
(3.9)
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using some basic facts from probability theory, we conclude that
s = Pr[E] < Pr[EIB] + Pr[-B] <
Pr[EIA A B] + Pr[E lA A B] + Pr[-B] <
1 1 1 5
100 100 3 12'
contradicting our assumption that s > 11
- 12
It remains to show that the two additional properties, required by the statement in
Theorem 3.7.2, are attained.
1. The fact that r depends only on the witness w = (wo, w1,..., Wk-1) and on the parame-
ters S and d, follows immediately from the definition of zr = LDEH,F,m'(WO, ., , wk-1),
and from the fact that the parameters H, F, m' depend only on the parameters S, k, d.
2. Recall that the interactive phase consists of a low degree test, and two runs of the
bare-bones protocol, one with circuit C and one with circuit I.
The fact that the interactive phase is public-coin follows from the fact that both the low
degree test, and the bare-bones protocol, are public coin. The fact that each message
sent by the prover depends only on the preceding O(log S) bits sent by the verifier,
follows from the fact that in the low degree test the verifier sends a total of at most
O(log S) bits, and in the bare-bones protocol each message of the prover depends only
on the preceding O(log S) bits sent by the verifier.
3.8 A Probabilistically Checkable Argument
In this section, we give an efficient and short probabilistically checkable argument (PCA)
system for many nAP languages. To this end, we use our interactive PCP system described
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in Section 3.7, together with a general method given in [KR09], for converting interactive
PCP systems into PCA systems.
A probabilistically checkable argument (PCA), a notion introduced in [KRO9], is a relax-
ation of the notion of probabilistically checkable proof (PCP). It is defined analogously to
PCP, with two differences: (1) the verifier first specifies a challenge to the prover, and the
proof (PCA) is tailored to this verifier challenge. The soundness property is required to hold
only computatzonally, i.e. against bounded malicious provers. Other than these differences,
the setting is the same as that of PCPs: after specifying the challenge and receiving the
proof, the probabilistic polynomial time verifier only reads a few bits of the proof string in
order to verify. A PCA is said to be efficient if the honest prover, given a witness, runs in
time poly(n).
More specifically, each PCA system is associated with three algorithms: a challenge
generation algorithm G, a proof generation algorithm P, and a vermfication algorithm V. It
is also associated with five parameters t, p, q, c, s, where t, p, q are integers and c, s are reals,
s.t. 0 < s < c < 1. (Informally, t is the security parameter, p is the size of the PCA, q
is the number of queries allowed to the PCA, c is the completeness parameter and s is the
soundness parameter). We think of the parameters t, p, q, c, s as functions of the instance
size n.
Let L be an KAP language, defined by L = {x : ]w s.t. (x, w) E RL}. Suppose that
Alice wishes to prove to Bob that x E L. Assume that Bob applied in the past the challenge
generation algorithm G, and thus is associated with a pair of secret key and public challenge
(SK, PK) <-- G(lt). Bob's public challenge, PK, is sent to Alice. We assume that both
Alice and Bob know L and that both get as input an instance x of size n. Alice gets an
additional input w (supposedly a witness for the membership of x E L). A PCA system
allows Alice to generate a string i <-- P(x, w, PK) of p bits. Bob is allowed to access at
most q bits of the string r, and based on these bits he decides whether to accept or reject
the statement x E L.
Definition 3.8.1. [KR09] A triplet (9, P, V) of probabilistic Turing machines is a PCA
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system for L with parameters (t, p, q, c, s), if the following holds:
* g is a probabilistic Turing machine that runs in time poly(t), and V is a probabilistic
oracle machine that runs in time poly(t, n).
* For every (x, w) E RL (where x = n) and every (SK, PK) +- G(lt(n)), the algorithm
P(x, w, PK) generates a bit string 7r of size at most p(n), and the oracle machine
V'(x, SK, PK) reads at most q(n) bits of r.
* Completeness: For every (x, w) E RL (where Ix = n),
Pr[V'(x, SK, PK) = 1] > c(n)
(where the probability is over (SK, PK) - G(lt(n)), over 7r +- P(x, w, PK), and over
the randomness of V).
* Soundness: For every x 0' L (where jx = n), and every cheating prover P of size
< 2t(n)
Pr[V(x, SK, PK) = 1] < s(n)
(where -k = P(PK), and the probability is over (SK, PK) <- g(t(n)) and over the
randomness of V).
Remark. Note that in Definition 3.8.1 we did not specify the complexity of P. We say
that a PCA system (9, P, V) is efficient if P runs in time poly(t, n).
It was shown in [KR09], that any interactive PCP system (with certain properties) can
be transformed into a PCA system.
Theorem 3.8.2. [KR09] Assume the existence of a (uniform) poly-logarithmzc PIR scheme.32
Assume that there exists an znteractive PCP system (P, V) with parameters (p, q, f, c, s) for
some .VP language L, with the following properties:
32The definition of a (uniform) poly-logarithmic PIR scheme can be found in Section 3.2.4.
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1. for every input x E L, every auxiliary input w E {0, 1}*,33 and for every i E [e],
the message sent by the (honest) prover P(x, w) in the i'th round of the protocol
(P(x, w), V(x)) depends only on the message sent by V in the i 'th round of the protocol
(and on x, w and the random coin tosses of p), 34 and does not depend on the messages
sent by V before the i 'th round.
2. Each message sent by the verifier rn this phase depends only on the verifier's random
coin tosses (and is independent of the interacton, the PCP string 7r, and the input x),
and can be computed in time < poly(f).
Then, for any security parameter t > max{f, log n} there exists a PCA system (!', P', V')
with parameters (t,p',q',c', s') for the language L, where p' = poly(p, t), q' = poly(q, t),
c' > c - 2
t 2, and s' < s + 2- t 2. The prover P' runs in time < poly(t,n, 2A), where A zs
the length of the longest message sent from V to P in the interactive phase of the interactive
PCP system (P, V).
Applying Theorem 3.8.2 to our interactive PCP system, results with a PCA system that
is both efficient and short for many nlP languages, as stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 3.8.3. Assume the existence of a (uniform) poly-logarithmic PIR scheme. Fix
any A/P language L = {x : 3w s.t. (x, w) E R)L}. Let n = IxI denote the instance size, let
k = IwI denote the witness szze, and let d denote the depth of RL. Then for any soundness
parameter s > 2-  and for any security parameter t > poly(d, log n, log 7) there exists a PCA
system for L with parameters (t, p', q', c', s'), where p' = poly(k, t), q' < poly(t), c' > 1- 2- t 2
and s' < s + 2 - t 2 . Moreover, the prover of this PCA system runs in time < poly(n, t).
Remark. Applying Theorem 3.8.2 to the interactive PCP systems given in [KR08], re-
sults with inefficient PCA systems; i.e., with PCA systems where the prover runs in super
33As is common, we allow the prover in the interactive proof system to use an auxiliary input, supposedly
a witness for x C L.
34We think of each round as consisting of a message sent by the verifier V followed by a message sent by
the prover P.
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polynomial time. This follows from the fact that in these systems, the length of the longest
message sent from the verifier to the prover is of size polylog(n).
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Chapter 4
Verifying Interactive Proofs in
Constant Depth
In this section we explore the power of interactive proofs with constant depth verifiers, see
Section 1.2 for an overview.
Organization. In Section 4.1 we give some general preliminaries and specific background
about interactive proofs. Section 4.2 shows how to transform general proof systems to ones
with verifiers in A/Co. In Section 4.3 we present our negative results.
4.1 Preliminaries and main tools
4.1.1 Interactive Proofs: New Definitions
We proceed with new definitions and terminology that that will be useful for us later. We
first formally define the notion of AR/C (or constant parallel time) verifiers.
Definition 4.1.1. We say that round i of a proof system (with one or more provers) can be
computed in N/C if the computation of the verifier in this round can be performed by an
ANC circuit (that may depend on the round i) that is given the input x to the protocol, the
randomness r and the partial transcript from the previous i - 1 rounds.
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We assume that the circuit may depend on the number of the round because A/C circuits
cannot even increment an integer by 1.1
Definition 4.1.2. We say that a language can be verified (interactively) in constant parallel
time, if it has an interactive proof system (with one or more provers) with a constant number
of rounds, and the entire verifier's strategy can be implemented in A/NC, i.e. every round of
the interaction stage as well as the decision stage.
We define a special type of proof systems in which "most" of the verifier's computation is
pushed to the decision stage, keeping the computation during the interaction stage extremely
efficient.
Definition 4.1.3. We say that a proof system (with one or more provers) is szmple if in
every round of the interaction stage the verifier's computation can be performed by an ANCo
circuit.
A special case of simple proof systems is public-coin proof systems.
Definition 4.1.4. An interactive proof system is called publzc-coin, if at each round of the
interaction stage the verifier simply tosses new random coins and sends them to the prover
(while preforming no other computation).
Theorem 4.1.5. ([GS86]) For every k > 0, every language in IP(k) has a publhc-coin
interactive proof system with k + 2 rounds.
4.2 Verification in Constant Parallel Time
We start by showing how to transform any simple proof system into one in which the entire
strategy of the verifier (interaction and decision) is in A/C. This is the Result of Lemma
1.2.1 in Section 1.2. Here we give the proof intuition and then a proof.
1We could consider a model with the same NCo verifier in all rounds. The models are equivalent for
protocols with 0(1) communication rounds. For other protocols results carry through, except that we can
only bound the expected number of communication rounds when interacting with a malicious prover.
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Proof Intuition. We first notice that any simple proof system can be transformed into a
simple proof system (with one more round) in which the decision stage can be implemented in
ACo (this essentially boils down to evaluating a CNF formula via the Cook-Levin reduction)
and hence also in N/C1 . We now want to simulate this NAC 1 computation by an nAC verifier
with the help of the prover. Let L be the NAC-complete language given by Lemma 2.3.16
and let I be its randomized image. The verifier creates a uniformly distributed £-tuple of
instances cl,... ,c where for each i, c, is either: (with probability 1/2) a solved instance
for which the verifier knows I(c,) (this can be done by using the solved instance generator
for I, see Definition 2.3.1), or (with probability 1/2) a randomized instance such that given
I(c,) the verifier can compute the output of the NC 1 computation of the original verifier
(this can be done using the random instance reduction from L to I and the fact that L is
NAC-complete).
The verifier asks the prover to provide the values I(cl),..., I(cf). It then checks for every
solved instance c, (for which it knows the value I(c,)) whether the prover answered correctly.
The verifier also checks that for the randomized instances the answers that the prover gave
all evaluate (via the evaluator) to the same answer for the original instance. If both of
these checks pass for all the c's, it is a good indication that the prover also provided the
correct answer for all the randomized instances. Here we use the fact that the prover cannot
distinguish between the two types of instances since they are all uniformly distributed. The
verifier can then extract the value of the ANC1 computation from any correct answer to a
randomized instance, and use it as its output. U
Full Proof of Lemma 1.2.1. We first consider the case of a single prover, i.e. p = 1. We
proceed by showing that any simple proof system can be transformed into a simple proof
system (with one more round) in which the decision stage can be implemented in ACo (this
essentially boils down to evaluating a CNF formula via the Cook-Levin reduction) and hence
also in N/C1 . Then we add one more round to enable the verification to be performed in
A/C. Details follow.
Let V' be the verifier and P' the honest prover in the original (simple) protocol and
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let V, P be these entities in the new protocol. By the definition of a simple proof system
(Definition 4.1.3), the computations of V' during the interaction stage are in ANC. Thus,
V and P run the first k rounds as in the original protocol, and we then add two rounds as
follows.
Round k + 1 In the original protocol, given the input x (of length n), the transcript t and
the verifier's random coins r, V' can decide in polynomial time whether to accept or reject.
Let I(x, t, r)l = m(n) = poly(n). This round is as follows: V sends all its random coins to P
and P sends back the tableau of the computation V'(x, t, r).
If V were an ACo circuit, it could at this stage verify that the tableau is correct and
deduce the output of V' (accept/reject). This is because checking the validity of the tableau
amounts to verifying that x, t, r is written in the first row, and that all the local transitions
are legal. However V is not an ACo circuit. So we proceed to the next round.
Round k + 2 Consider the language L associated with the above ACo computation. That
is, an instance contains a tableau T and x, t, r as above, and it belongs to L if the tableau T
is consistent with the computation V'(x, t, r), and if this computation accepts. In particular
L E NC 1 and therefore, by Lemma 2.3.16, it has a randomized image I.
Let f be an integer that will be determined later. Given an instance a = (T, x, t, r),
V does the following: for each i E [f] (in parallel and with independent random coins),
choose uniformly v, ER {0, 1}. If v, = 0, then V runs the A/NC solved instance generator
for I on input length m'(n), to obtain a pair (c1, y,). If v, = 1, then V runs on a the
ANCo random instance reduction from L to I, to obtain a pair (ce, T,). Here Icl = m'(n) =
poly(m(n)) = poly(n). V then sends to P the message (c, ... , ce), and P sends back answers
(blI,...,be) E {0, 1} .
Decision V accepts if and only if the following holds:
1. For every i E [f] for which v, = 0, y, = b,.
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2. For every i E [f] for which v, = 1, S(b,, ) = 1 (recall that 6 is the evaluator in the
random instance reduction from L to I).
Correctness Clearly, if f is a constant (independent of n) the entire strategy of V can be
implemented in ANCo. We proceed to prove completeness and soundness.
Claim 4.2.1. The protocol has completeness c.
Proof. The honest prover P plays the first k rounds like the honest prover P' of the original
protocol. It then sends the correct tableau, and the correct values bl,..., be, which are the
membership values (0/1) of the instances cl,..., cf in I. By the definition of solved instance
generator, this implies that with probability 1, the verifier passes the first test. By the
definition of random instance reduction, for every i E [f] for which v, = 1, $(b,, T ) = 1 if
and only if (T, x, t, r) E L. This happens exactly when the original verifier V' accepts the
original protocol, and the probability for that is at least c. U
Claim 4.2.2. The protocol has soundness s + 2 -
Proof. Let x be an instance not in the language. Consider the event:
A : e(b,, T,) = 1 for every i E [f] for which v, = 1
By the soundness of the original protocol and the definition of random instance reduction,
Pr[A] < s. If event A does not occur, the only way that a cheating prover, P*, can convince
V to accept is by cheating on c, for every i for which v, = 1. If the prover cheats on c3 where
v, = 0, then by the definition of solved instance generator, V will reject with probability 1.
In other words, in order to cheat and not get caught, P* must cheat on every i for which
v, = 1 and give the correct answer on every i for which v, = 0. By the definitions of solved
instance generator and random instance reduction, the v,'s are independent of (cl,..., ce).
Thus P* has to guess exactly the value of f independent unbiased coin tosses which he can
do with probability at most 2 - . We conclude that the probability that P* can convince V
to accept is bounded by s + 2 - t . *
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Let 6 > 0 be an arbitrarily small constant. By setting f = log(1/6) we conclude the proof
for single-prover systems. For multi-provers, the same arguments apply where the last two
rounds (k + 1, k + 2) are played only with the first prover P1 . That is, in round k + 1, V
sends to Pi its random coins as well as the transcripts of messages exchanged with all the
other provers, then P1 and V proceed as above. M
Remark 4.2.3. In the proof above, the "hardest" computation that the verifier is perform-
ing zs an AND of fan-in log(1/6). In terms of parallel computing time thzs amounts to
log log(1/6). Generalzzzng the argument to non-constant 6 we can obtain proof systems with
neglzgible soundness (e.g. n - logn) with a verifier that runs in O(loglogn) parallel time.
Remark 4.2.4. Vadhan [VadO6] has suggested an alternative implementation of round k+2:
the prover wants to convznce V' that V(x, t, r) = 1. Let b = V(x, t, r), and for c e {0, 1}
denote Ic = {z : I(z) = c}. The vermfier generates an instance y that is uniformly dzstributed
in Ib restricted to the relevant input length. It also generates an znstance y' that is uniformly
distributed in Io restricted to the same input length. The ability to sample such y, y' follows
dzrectly from the techniques used to prove the results in Section 2.3. The verifier then chooses
at random one of y and y' and the prover has to say whether it is from I1 or Io. Note that
this is very similar to the protocol for Graph Non-Isomorphism [GMW91].
4.2.1 General Proof Systems
Next we want to use Lemma 1.2.1 to obtain our results about general proof systems. For
proof systems with a single prover, we can first apply the transformation of Goldwasser and
Sipser [GS86] to obtain a public-coin protocol (which is clearly also a simple protocol). Then,
by applying Lemma 1.2.1 to the resulting protocol we obtain a general transformation from
any interactive single-prover proof system to a one in which the verifier is in AC with an
addition of 0(1) rounds. In particular, we obtain the following theorem and corollary:
Theorem 4.2.5. Every language in ZI(k) has an mnteractzve protocol wzth k + 4 rounds,
and soundness 6, where 6 > 0 is an arbitrarily small constant and the verifier is in N/C.
158
Proof. Let L E IP(k). By Theorem 4.1.5, L has a public-coin proof system with k + 2
rounds. We can amplify the completeness and soundness of the protocol to be 1 - 2-" and
2" respectively, while still having k + 2 rounds. By definition, a public-coin proof system is
simple, so we can apply Theorem 1.2.1 to obtain a proof system with an NCo verifier and
the stated parameters. U
As a consequence, we obtain the characterization of Corollary 1.2.2 (see Section 1.2)
Next we want to apply similar arguments to obtain XC verifiers for multi-prover proof
systems. Unfortunately, the concept of public-coins does not exist in this context, as clearly
the queries to the different provers depend on a common random string that the verifier
must hide from the provers. Thus we have to take a different approach.
Feige and Lovasz [FL92] showed how to transform any one-round proof system with
many provers (and exponentially small soundness) to a one-round proof system with two
provers (and exponentially small soundness). We show that a modification of their ideas can
transform any one-round, two-prover protocol to a three-round, two-prover simple protocol
(both having exponentially small soundness).
Lemma 4.2.6. Every language in MIPc,2 -n(2, 1), has a simple mult-prover proof system
with two provers, three rounds of interaction, completeness c and soundness 2- .
Proof. We use a modification of the transformation of [FL92]. Let L E MIPc,2 - (2, 1). Let
V', P', P' be the players in the original protocol and V, P1 , P2 be the players in the new
protocol. In the new protocol there are three threads of exchanges that take place at the
same time. For the convenience of the reader, we will state for each message which thread
it belongs to.
In the new protocol, V plays with P the original protocol, where P1 plays the role of P'
and P2. Exchanges that are part of the simulation of the original protocol belong to thread I.
Clearly, there is no reason that this protocol will be sound since P can correlate the answers
of the two provers. We therefore need to somehow force P1 to run independent strategies
and for that we will need P2. That is, we will run certain correlation tests between P1 and
P2 . Roughly speaking, the idea is that P1 will be so occupied with passing these tests, that it
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will be forced to play independent strategies for P' and P2. Exchanges that are part of these
tests belong to thread II. In addition, we will use P1 to help V perform its computations in
A/NC during the interaction stage. Exchanges that help achieve this goal belong to thread
III. The last thread helps V perform the computations for the other threads in ANC, thus
typically messages in this thread also have a role in either thread I or II.
Assume w.l.o.g. that every message exchanged in the original protocol is of the same
length f = £(n) > n (where n is the input length). Let F be a field of characteristic 2 of size
at least 29 (This size of the field is as required by [FL92]). We can assume that V and the
provers hold the same representation of this field. (One can use a canonic representation as
in [HV06] or use P1 to provide such a representation and at the decision stage prove that it
is indeed an irreducible polynomial (of the relevant degree) over GF(2).)
Let g : {0, 1} -4 F be a function that represents the optimal strategy for prover P'
(for j E {1, 2}). Let g, be the following unique multi-linear representation of g, over F': for
b E {0, 1} and a formal variable x let s(b, x) = x if b = 1 and s(b, x) = 1 - x if b = 0; then
define the f-variate multi-linear polynomial over F:
g3(U ,.., u) = g 3(bl, ... , b)II 1 s(b, u,)
bl,...,be {0,1}
We now describe the protocol on input x E {0, 1}":
Round 1:
V: Threads I & III - Toss coins r' for V' and sends them to P1 .
Thread II - choose uniformly and independently hi, h2 ER F and send them to P1. (The
A/Co verifier can choose random elements in the field since we assume it is of characteristic
2.)
P: Threads I & III - send ql, q2 E {0, 1}' (the queries V' generates on input x and randomness
r'), and al, a2 E {0, 1} (the answers that P', P2 provides on input x and queries qi, q2).
Thread II - send two univariate polynomials over F (represented by the list of coefficients),
fi, f2, each of degree f (these are the restrictions of g1, g2 to the lines dl = {qi + thl : t E F}
and d2 = {q2 + th 2 : t E F} respectively, where we view qi, q2 as points in Ff).
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Round 2:
V: Threads I & III - choose uniformly t1 , t 2 ER F and send them to P (indices of random
points on the lines).
PI: Threads I & III - send vi = di(ti) = ql + tlhl and v2 = d2 (t2 ) = q2 + t 2h 2 (the names in
Fe of the random points on the lines).
Round 3:
V: Thread II - send v1 , v2 to P2 -
P2: Thread II - send yl = gl(vl), y2 = (v2)-
Decision: V checks that the following holds:
1. qx, q2 are the queries that V' asks P', P2 given input x and randomness r' (threads I &
III).
2. V' accepts given x, r' and the transcripts ql, al, q2, a2 (thread I).
3. fl, f2 are univariate polynomials of degree £ over F (threads II & III).
4. fi(O) = ql and f2(0) = q2 (threads II & III).
5. The values for v1 , v2 E Fe that P, sent are indeed dl(tl) = ql+tlhl and d2(t2) = q2+t2 h2
respectively (threads II & III).
6. yi = f (tl) and y2 = f 2(t 2) (thread II).
Clearly, the proof system is simple. Completeness follows easily from [FL92]. We now
explain why it is sound. Note that all the above tests can be performed deterministically
and in polynomial time given the view of V (which includes x, its randomness and the
transcript). Thus, the tests themselves do not induce errors. The only errors can come from
errors made by the simulation of the original protocol (thread I), or by the consistency tests
between the restriction of the functions to the lines and the random points on the line (i.e.
thread II). Thus the analysis reduces (with some modifications, see below) to the analysis of
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Feige and Lovasz [FL92], who prove that the new protocol has completeness and soundness
as claimed.
There are two points in which our protocol differs from [FL92]. First, P1 receives right
at the beginning all the random coins of V'. To see why this is not a problem, consider the
following mental experiment. Look at the 3-provers protocol, in which V' plays with P' and
P' the original protocol, and with P3 plays the following protocol: V' sends to P' its random
coins r', and P' has to reply with ql, q2 , which are the queries V' asks P,, P' respectively
on randomness r'. V' accepts if the original protocol with P', P' accepts and P' sends the
correct queries. Clearly, this protocol has the same completeness and soundness because
V' can check the correctness of the answer sent by P'. Now the proof of [FL92] actually
shows how to transform a three (or in general polynomially many) provers protocol to a two
provers protocol, by letting P1 play all the provers and run the line vs. point test separately
on the simulation of each prover. The idea is that this test forces P1 to play an independent
strategy for each prover in the simulation. This means that the new protocol must be sound
because the original protocol is sound (against independent provers strategies). Now in our
mental experiment P' has only one possible strategy that he can play without being caught.
So he is already forced to play this (independent) strategy and we therefore do not need to
run the line vs. point test for P3, resulting in the protocol that we give above.
The second point in which our protocol differs from [FL92] is that P1 who provides the
restriction of g, to the line d3, knows on which (random) point on the line we are going
to query P2 . However this information is revealed to him only after he commits to some
low-degree polynomial. This prevents him from correlating the polynomial with the point
on the line. Given this, the analysis of [FL92] goes through. U
By Lemmas 1.2.1 and 4.2.6 we obtain,
Theorem 4.2.7. Every language n MIZP(2, 1) has a MIP(2, 5) protocol with an NCo
verifier and arbitrarily small constant soundness.
Combining this with Theorem 2.2.2 gives us the result of Theorem 1.2.3 (see Section 1.2).
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4.3 Negative Results
In this section we prove that the use of private coins in our protocol is inherent. We also
show that constant soundness is the best one can hope for in proof systems that have a
constant number of rounds and an A/Co verifier. These statements hold unless the language
is already in ArNC. We start with a more refined definition of ANCo:
Definition 4.3.1. For k E N, ArC° is the class of NAC circuits in which every output bit
depends on at most k input bits. We say that a language belongs to the class ANC ° if for
every n E N, there is an ACO circuit that decides L = L n {0, 1}.
Note that if a language is in A/Co then its characteristic function (at every input length)
is influenced by at most k variables.
Theorem 4.3.2. Let L C {0, 1}* be an arbitrary language, then L does not have a public-coin
mnteractzve protocol with an NCo verifier, unless L is in N/Co.
Proof. Suppose L is not in Ar/C for any constant k and yet it has a public-coin protocol
with an ArCo verifier. In particular, this means that the verifier decides whether to accept
its input using an NAC circuit that runs on its input, randomness and the transcript. The
number of input bits that influence the verifier's decision is constant. Let k be the overall
number of input bits that influence the verifier's decision bit. Let n be an input length for
which L does not have an AC circuit. Let xl, X2 E {0, 1}" be such that the k bits that the
verifier reads are the same in x, and X2, yet x1 E L and X2 ' L. By the fact that L does
not have an N/CO circuit (and hence its characteristic function is influenced by more than k
variables), such a pair of instances exist. Consider the dishonest prover P*, that on input
x2, for any verifier randomness, plays the strategy of the honest prover on input xl. Because
the protocol is public-coin, the verifier's view in both cases is exactly the same, i.e. for any
verifier randomness, the prover's messages on inputs x, and x2 are identical, and thus the bits
that the verifier uses to make its decision are also identical. By the protocol's completeness
on x 1, the soundness of the protocol on X2 is violated and we get a contradiction. M
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Next we state our negative result regarding sub-constant soundness.
Theorem 4.3.3. Let L C {0, 1}* be an arbitrary language, then L does not have a constant-
round znteractive protocol with sub-constant soundness and an N/Co verifier, unless L zs zn
ArCo.
Proof. (sketch) Suppose L is not in INC° for any constant k, and yet it has a constant-round
interactive protocol with an N/Co verifier and soundness s. We consider two cases. First
suppose that s = 0. Then the interactive protocol can be transformed into a public-coin
protocol as follows: the prover sends a sequence of random coins on which the original verifier
accepts, as well as the transcript of the entire original protocol, which deterministically
depends on these bits. The verifier then checks that the original verifier accepts the protocol
with these "random" bits. By the fact that s = 0, the prover cannot send a false proof.
Moreover, this proof system is trivially public-coin, and Theorem 4.3.2 says that there is no
public-coin proof system with N/Co verifiers for any language that is not already in ANC for
some constant k.
Next, suppose that s > 0. Let x 0 L be an instance that together with a fixed dishonest
prover strategy P* exhibits s > 0. Fix some randomness F for the verifier that causes it to
accept, and define a new statzc prover P** that sends the same messages as P* (x) does when
interacting with V(x, f), regardless of the verifier's actual messages.
Now consider the verifier's output bit: it depends on only a constant number of bits
from the input x, from the verifier's randomness and from the messages sent by P**. Note
that the decision bit may depend on messages that V itself sends in the protocol, but since
V is A/Co in every round of the protocol, each of the bits sent by V depends in turn only
on a constant number of bits from the input, the randomness, and messages sent in earlier
rounds. Thus, since there is only a constant number of rounds, the total number of random
bits that affect any V-message bit that affects the verifiers decision bit is constant (though
we note it is exponential in the number of rounds).
Let d be the number of randomness bits that influence the decision bit, and denote their
values in f by r, ,...
,
ri d. Then for every random string for which the bits at positions
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il,..-,id are r, 1,... ,r,d, it holds that the verifier accepts the protocol on x. We conclude
that the soundness on input x with this fixed strategy P** is at least 2 - d, which is a constant.
Discussion. At first glance, it may seem that the proof of Theorem 4.3.2 should also rule
out protocols with private coins (at least for constant-round protocols). We want to explain
why this is not the case. We believe that this explanation sheds some interesting light on
public versus private coins in the context of A/Co verifiers, and specifically on our protocol
(from Lemma 1.2.1). The idea in the proof of Theorem 4.3.2 is that we can let the prover
choose its strategy regardless of the input. And then we can argue that since the verifier
reads only a constant number of bits from the input before he makes his decision, we can
change one input with another without the verifier noticing the change. This cannot be
done when the verifier has private coins. Now the prover cannot decide on an arbitrary
strategy, because it does not know the private coins of the verifier (i.e. different inputs with
the same randomness will not give the same view anymore). This means that if we design
our protocol properly, we can force the prover's bits to depend on the entire input. In this
case, the decision bit also depends on the entire input via the prover's messages. I.e. even
though the decision bit depends on a constant number of prover's bits, each one of them
may depend on the entire input. We therefore cannot replace the input without the verifier's
noticing the change.
To see how this works in practice, consider the protocol we give in the proof of Lemma
1.2.1. The last message of the prover contains only a constant number of bits. Let i E []
be such that v, = 1, and consider the prover's bit b,. This bit depends on the entire input
via the instance c, that was generated by applying the random instance reduction on the
instance a = (T, x, t, r). The protocol, by using private coins, forces the prover to give the
correct answer on c,. The dependency of b, on the input is then revealed to the verifier by
computing S(b,, T,).
Moving to our result about sub-constant soundness, we want to point out that if we allow
a non-constant number of rounds, we can achieve sub-constant soundness. In fact with an
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addition of O(log n) rounds we can achieve the soundness of the original protocol (which can
be as small as 2 -"). This is because we can spread the ACo computation at the decision
stage of the simple proof system, over O(logn) rounds of the protocol. That is, consider
the NC1 circuit that computes this ACo computation. The ANC verifier computes at each
round another level of the jAC 1 circuit. it sends the prover the results of the computation.
The prover sends a dummy message, and the verifier continues the computation by reading
from the transcript the results from the previous layer of the circuit.
A key point in our results is that we only add a constant number of rounds to obtain an
NMCO verifier. This is what allows us to obtain constant parallel time proof systems for AM
and NAEXP.
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Chapter 5
Delegation in Program Checking
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter we put forth a methodology for constructing program checkers, testers, and
correctors which are provably more efficient in terms of their czrcuit depth (or alternatively
parallel computing time) than any algorithm that computes their function. The crux of the
new idea is to make these objects more efficient by systematically delegating some of their
work to the potentially faulty program being checked. Although our focus is on the circuit
depth of these objects, the general delegation methodology may, in principal, also be useful
for improving other complexity measures such as (sequential) time and space. We elaborate
on our choice of complexity measure in Section 5.1.4.
We use the methodology in two ways. First, to design highly efficient checkers, testers,
and correctors for entire classes of functions characterized by their structural complexity,
rather than by their algebraic or combinatorial properties. These classes include functions
such as graph connectivity, perfect matching, and bounded-degree graph isomorphism. Sec-
ond, to give an array of new checkers, correctors and testers for specific matrix functions,
giving the first known checkers for some functions, and significantly improving known check-
ers for others.
We believe that our results and techniques shed new light on important issues in the
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field of program checking, as discussed throughout this paper. To best state our results and
explain their significance, we first give a brief review of definitions and of the previous work
on program checking, as well as the impact it has had on complexity theory.
5.1.1 Program Checking and its Impact
In the mid-eighties, Blum and Kannan [BK95] proposed the methodology of program "result
checking" (or "instance checking"), which focuses on correctness of an algorithm per input
rather than full program verification. The methodology associates every function to be
computed with a new algorithm called the checker. Then, given any possibly buggy program
for the function and any input, the checker "checks" whether the program on this input
computes the function correctly.
The work of Blum, Luby, and Rubinfeld [BLR93] further introduced the notion of function
testers and correctors. A tester tests whether a given program for a function is correct on
random inputs (with relatively high probability). A corrector for a function is given an
input to the function and a program (for computing the function) which may be buggy,
but is guaranteed to compute the function correctly on random inputs (with relatively high
probability over the choice of inputs), and outputs a correct output on the given input with
high probability (over the randomness of the corrector).
While the notion of program checking (testing and correcting) may be motivated by
"real-life" applications, it has had a fundamental impact on theoretical computer science,
as it is related to basic questions regarding the nature of computation. The definition itself
captures many notions that are central in theoretical computer science, such as sub-linear
time algorithms (as the checker probes the truth table of the program in a few places),
and recovering from faulty data (in the case of correctors). It is therefore not surprising
that ideas and techniques that were developed in this field have been used extensively in
other areas. Indeed, several techniques from the early results on correctors and testers (in
particular for the integer multiplication function [BLR93] and for the matrix permanent
function by Lipton [Lip91]) were pivotal in showing the expressive power of IP and PCP
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proof systems, and the notion of testers in and of itself has evolved into the successful field
of property testing. In fact, the techniques that we develop in this paper have already born
fruit in work on interactive proofs and error-correcting codes [GGH+07]. Further applica-
tions of program checkers can be found in lower bounds proofs [SanO7], hierarchy theorems
[Bar02, FS04, FST05], de-randomization [BFNW93, IKWO2, GSTS03, SU07], average-case
complexity [TV07] and more. The common theme in all these applications is that often one
has a circuit that should compute some function, but no guarantee that it indeed does so.
For example, such a circuit may be chosen non-deterministically (e.g. as in [BFNW93]), or
it may belong to a collection of circuits, only an unknown one of which is correct (e.g. as in
[TV07]). This is where program checking comes into play; by running the circuit (on a given
input) through the checker, we are guaranteed (w.h.p.) to either get the correct answer or
to detect a problem.
The focus of the rich body of work in the result checking field has been the design of
efficient checkers (and testers/ correctors) for many specific functions, by exploiting either
their algebraic or combinatorial properties. Most notably, these functions include arithmetic
operations, matrix operations, and certain graph and group operations. By and large, these
are function families which possess random and downwards self-reducibility properties.
Interestingly, the connection between the complexity of a problem and its checkability is
not very clear. For example, the matrix permanent function, which is notoriously hard to
compute, was one of the first to be shown easy to self-correct [Lip91]. In contrast, the matrix
determinant function (which is efficiently computable) was not known to have a non-trivial
checker in the standard sense.1 An interesting open question is whether problems of related
complexity (say problem 7rl is reducible to problem 7r2 ) have related checkers (or even if
the existence of a checker for 7 2 implies a checker for 71). Beigel [BK95] shows that if two
decision problems are equivalent, then designing a checker for one would immediately provide
a checker for the other. However, we do not know how to use a checker for an easy problem
to construct a checker for a harder problem. In contrast with many other areas of complexity
theory, it is unclear how to leverage the existence of checkers for complete-problems toward
'A checker was known in the library model of [BLR93]. See section 5.1.2 for more details on the model.
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the design of checkers for other (not necessarily complete) problems.
Since a correct algorithm for a given function is also trivially a checker for the func-
tion, [BK95] required, in order to avoid triviality, that checkers will have the little-oh tzme
property: the running time of the checker must be little-oh of the running time of the most
efficient known program that computes the function. This ensures a quantifiable difference
between the checker and the programs it checks. An analogue lzttle-oh parallel time property
was considered by Rubinfeld [Rub96]: a checker's parallel running time should be little-oh of
the parallel running time of the most efficient known program that computes the function.2
(Throughout, the standard complexity measure of oracle algorithms is used, where the com-
plexity of the algorithm is measured without the complexity of the oracle's computations.)
An even more ambitious goal than constructing checkers that beat the best algorithm
known for the function, is to construct checkers that beat any algorithm for the function (or
alternatively the optimal algorithm). Currently no checkers are known to be more efficient
(in terms of sequential running time) than the optimal programs for the functions being
checked since no super-linear lower bounds are known for any explicit function.
The work of [Rub96] does exhibit constant-depth (i.e., ACo) checkers for (specific) functions
that have a super-constant lower bound on their circuit depth, thus provably separating the
complexity of checking and computing in terms of circuit depth.
The work presented here addresses and sheds light on several of the issues mentioned:
* Computzng versus Checking: can we relate the computational complexity of a function
and the complexity of checking it? Can we design checkers for functions classified by
their complexity, rather than by their algebraic and combinatorial properties?
* General Tools: give generally applicable systematic tools for designing and improving
the complexity of program checkers.
* How to Meaningfully Distinguzsh Checkers from Programs: is it a sufficient distinction
to assure quantifiable difference between the running time of a checker for a function
2More precisely if a program can be computed by p(n) processors in depth d(n), [Rub96] requires the
checker to run either in depth o(d(n)) or in depth O(d(n)) with o(p(n)) processors.
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and the running time of the optimal program for computing the function?
5.1.2 New Checkers, Testers & Correctors
Checkers for Complexity Classes. We construct checkers that are provably more efficient
than computing the functions they check (in terms of circuit depth) for entire complexity
classes, and not just specific functions with special algebraic or combinatorial properties.
See Theorem 1.3.2in Section 1.3 for a statement and discussion of this result, and Section
5.5 for a discussion and full proofs.
The requirement of being NC1-hard under NAC reductions may seem restrictive, but in
fact this is not the case. Barrington's [Bar89] characterization of NAC1 as languages that
have small width branching programs allows one to capture NAC1 computations by many
graph theoretic and algebraic functions. Examples of natural functions and languages that
satisfy the theorem requirements, and for which no provably better checkers were previously
known, include graph connectivity (in its many variants), deciding whether a given graph has
a prefect matching and bounded-degree graph isomorphzsm. Theorem 1.3.2 gives provably
better checkers for all these functions (see below). Other examples include computing the
determinant of a matrix, matrix exponentiation, and more.
Constant Depth Checkers for Matrix Problems. We also use the composition theorem
to construct checkers for matrix functions. See Section 1.3 and Theorem 1.3.3 for a statement
and overview of these results, and Section 5.3 for discussion and proofs.
5.1.3 New Techniques and Tools
Checker Composition and Delegating Computation. The guiding principle of this
work is to design checkers that work as little as possible. We observe that a checker has
access to a potentially powerful resource: the (allegedly correct) program it is checking,
which can often compute a complex function. Our goal is thus to delegate computations
3Note that [BK95] gave a checker for (unbounded degree) graph isomorphism, but this checker is not
known to be provably better, especially for the efficiently solvable case of bounded degree graphs.
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from the checker to the program being checked, all the while verifying that the results
returned for these delegated computations are correct. See the discussion in Section 1.3
for more details on this approach and the informal statement of the Checker Composition
Theorem (Theorem 1.3.1). See Section 5.3 for a formal statement of the theorem, the proof
and extensions, as well as an analogous composition theorem for testers and correctors. We
mention that a similar idea, albeit in a very specific setting, was used in the work of Arvind,
Subrahmanyam and Vinodchandran [ASV02].
Note that while the Composition Theorem as stated here only explicitly considers check-
ing languages (i.e. boolean functions), it extends naturally (and is used in this work) for
checkers of non-boolean functions. See Section 5.3 for a formal statement of the theorem, the
proof and extensions, as well as an analogous composition theorem for testers and correctors. 4
The composition methodology provides a simple way to design checkers that is very
similar to the top-down approach of algorithm design: first decompose the problem into
smaller (and easier) sub-problems, solve them and then combine these solutions to solve more
the complex problem, all the while ensuring errors are kept under control. This approach can
be used iteratively to get better and better checkers (for example see our checkers, testers
and correctors for matrix determinant in Section 5.6). Moreover, this approach enables us to
construct checkers for functions that do not necessarily have the type of self-reducibility or
completeness properties exploited in previous works of [BK95, BLR93, Lip91, Sha92, BFL91].
It is illuminating to compare Theorem 1.3.1, in this regard, to Beigel's Theorem [BK95]
that informally says that a checker for a decision problem 7r can be used to design a checker
for a decision problem 72, if 71r and 7r2 are "computationally equivalent" (reducible to each
other). The idea is that to design a checker for 7F2 , we can reduce any 7r2 instance to a 7r1
instance, run the checker for 71r on this instance, while translating 71 queries that this checker
makes to 7 2 instances and feeding them to the program being checked (which allegedly
computes 72). The conceptual difference in our approach is that instead of translating back
and forth between instances of the two "external" equivalent languages, we delegate the
4We mention that while the proof of the composition theorem for program checkers is reasonably straight-
forward, for testers and correctors the argument is more delicate and involved.
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computations of the checker itself to the program being checked. It turns out that this
simple idea is surprisingly powerful, both in the checking setting (as we show here) and in
other settings [GGH+07]. In particular it is this difference that allows one to use a checker
for an easy problem to construct a checker for a harder problem, as well as allowing the
whole top-down approach (which is impossible using Beigel's theorem, as the two languages
must be computationally equivalent). Finally, we want to point out that while Beigel's
theorem uses the checker for T7r as a black-box, our approach of decomposition is inherently
non-black-box.
Main Building Blocks: Checkers for Complete Languages. See Section 1.2.1 for
more details about technical building blocks and checkers for complete languages.
5.1.4 Other Contributions and Comments
See the discussion of further contributions in Section 1.3.1.
Provably Beating the Best Program without Knowing A Lower Bound for the
Function. The works of [BK95] and [Rub96] focus on designing checkers that are more
efficient than the best known program for the function, rather than the optimal program for
the function.5 As stated above, the first examples of checking that is provably easier than
computing are from [Rub96], which exhibits constant-depth (ACo) checkers for functions
(such as parity) that have a nearly logarithmic circuit depth lower bound (see [FSS84]). The
separation between checking and computing in [Rub96] is due to known lower bounds on the
parallel complexity of the function in question.
In fact, it is tempting to conjecture that proving the existence of a checker that is more
efficient than any program for the function requires presenting an explicit checker that beats
a specific and known lower bound for the function. This can be "hand waived" as follows: to
5To see the significance of this distinction, consider the matrix multiplication function. The best known
algorithm for it runs in time roughly n2 37 (for n x n matrices) [CW90]. While we do have a O(n2 ) time
checker for this function [Fre79], and while this checker satisfies the little-oh time property, it is not known to
run in little-oh time of all algorithms for matrix multiplication. It is possible that one day an O(n2 ) matrix
multiplication algorithm will be found, and Freivalds' checker (and all other known checkers for matrix
multiplication) will cease to satisfy the little-oh property.
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prove that a checker is faster than all programs for a function, we must both know a lower
bound on the complexity of computing the function, and then design a checker that beats
that lower bound (as in [Rub96]).
Theorem 1.3.2 shows that this "hand waiving" argument is misleading. It shows the
existence of checkers that are more efficient (in circuit depth) than any program for their
function, without proving that they beat any specific known lower bound. This is because it
uses the code of the optimal program (without necessarily knowing what it is) to construct
a more efficient checker. The complexity of these checkers varies with the complexity of the
optimal program.
5.1.5 Other Related Work
As discussed above, our work benefits from a long line of beautiful results on program
checking, interactive proofs and cryptography. See the related work and discussion in Section
1.2.1.
5.2 Definitions and Preliminaries
5.2.1 Definitions: Checkers, Testers and Correctors
Definition 5.2.1 (Checker). A checker for a function f with (one-sided) error parameter
0 < 6 < 1, is a probabilistic algorithm C with oracle access to a program oracle P that
supposedly computes f. A program checker gives the following guarantees for every instance
X:
1. (Completeness) If P computes f correctly (on every input), then Pr[CP(x) = f(x)] = 1.
2. (Soundness) For any P, Pr[CP(x) E {f(x), 1}] > 1 - 6, where I is a special error
symbol, and where the probability is over the internal coin tosses of the checker C.
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Throughout this work, the error parameter 6 is 1/3 unless we explicitly note otherwise.6
When considering distributions over instances of functions, it is convenient to consider
separately distributions on instances of the same description length. We define:
Definition 5.2.2 (Distribution over instances). A distribution D over instances from {0, 1}*,
is an ensemble of probability distributions D = {D}nN, such that D, is a distribution over
{0, 1}n.
Definition 5.2.3 (Average-case error). Let f be some function over {0, 1}*, P a pro-
gram, and D a distribution over instances from {0, 1}*. We define errf,p,D : N -* (0, 1)
as errf,P,D(n) = Pr-D [P(x) f(x)].
We say that P is 6-good for the function f with respect to D if errf,p,D(n) < 6 for every
n E N.
Definition 5.2.4 (Tester). Let 0 < ei < e2 < 1 and 0 < 6 < 1. An (e1,E2)-tester with error
6 for a function f with respect to a distribution D, is a probabilistic algorithm T that has
an oracle access to a program P, such that the following holds. If errf,p,D(n) < E1, TP(1n)
outputs "accept" with probability at least 1-6. If errf,P,D(n) > E2, TP(1) outputs "reject"
with probability at least 1 - 6. The default value of 6 is 1/6.
Definition 5.2.5 (Corrector). A corrector for a function f is a probabilistic algorithm Cor,
that has an oracle access to a program P. We say that,
1. P is correctable by Cor with error 6 (for some 0 < 6 < 1) if for every x E {0, 1}*,
Pr[CorP(x) = f(x)] > 1 - 6 (where the probability is over the randomness of Cor).
2. Cor is an e-corrector with respect to D and with error 6 (for some 0 < e < 1, 0 < 6 < 1),
if for every P for which errf,p,D < E, P is correctable with error 6.
The default value of 6 is 1/6.
6For A/c0 checkers this error parameter can be reduced to any desired constant. For all the other checkers
presented in this work (i.e. "ACO and up"), the soundness can be made exponentially small.
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Note that in all the definitions above, the error parameter 6 can be reduced to be an
arbitrarily small constant without increasing the depth of the checker/tester/corrector by
more than a constant factor, assuming that we start with a 6 that is bounded away from 1/2
by a constant. Typically, the desired distance parameters el, E2 from Definition 5.2.4 and E
from Definition 5.2.5 are constants that are bounded away from 0 and 1.
Definition 5.2.6 (Tester-Corrector Pair). A tester-corrector pair for f with threshold 6 > 0,
is a pair of probabilistic algorithms (T, Cor), such that there are constants 0 < E1 < E2 1,
0 < E < 1 and a distribution D, such that T is an (el, e2)-tester for f with respect to D, Cor
is an e-corrector for f with respect to D, and there is a promise that if the tester T accepts
a program P with probability at least 1 - 6 then P is correctable by Cor. The default value
of 6 is 1/3.
Remark 5.2.7. Note that the requirement in Definztzon 5.2.6 is that there exist some en-
semble of distributions for which T is a tester and Cor is a corrector. This ensemble may be
very unnatural or even not efficiently sampleable (although typically it will be). The mere ex-
istence of such an ensemble ensures that whenever T "thinks" that a program is good enough
for the corrector to correct, thzs is indeed the case. Thus if our goal zs ultimately to detect
(with the tester) which programs are correctable and then correct them (uszng the corrector),
we can construct testers and correctors that work properly with very peculzar distributions.
The poznt zs that once the tester decides that a program zs correctable, then the corrector
works properly on every input, regardless of the dzstrbution wzth respect to which the tester
came to this conclusion.
Remark 5.2.8. Also note that we set the default value of 6 zn Definton 5.2.6 to be 1/3
while in Definitzon 5.2.4 it is 1/6. Thzs gzves robustness to the notion of tester-corrector
pair: programs that are very close to the function should be accepted by the tester with very
high probability, however even programs that are accepted with a decent probabzlity (but not
as high as really good programs) are correctable. I.e. the corrector is able to correct programs
that the tester thinks are good but not with very high confidence. This robustness property is
both natural and essentzal for proving useful program checking results such as constructing a
176
program checker from a tester-corrector pair and provzng the compositzon theorem for testers
and correctors. Typically this property holds for natural testers and correctors.
5.3 Composing Checkers, Testers and Correctors
In the introduction we stated the composition theorem for checkers and described the main
ideas of the proof. In this section we prove that theorem and present the Composition
Theorems for program checkers, testers and correctors. These theorems serve as the primary
tools we use to improve the efficiency of these objects. The principle behind the Composition
Theorems is simple: if the checker contains some functionality that can be accessed through
the (potentially faulty) program's interface, and moreover this functionality is itself checkable
(by a "more efficient" checker), then computing the functionality is delegated from the
checker to the program. Every computation of the given functionality is replaced with a
call to the program (via some reduction), and the program's answers are run through the
simpler checker for this functionality. The same principle holds also for program testers and
correctors (though the analysis is more involved).
5.3.1 Composing Program Checkers
We now restate more formally and prove Theorem 1.3.1. In the statement below, unless we
state otherwise, the circuits involved are of bounded fan-in. So, for example, a reduction
computable in depth d refers to a reduction that can be computed by a family of circuits
(one for each input length) of depth d and bounded fan-in AND and OR gates. We will later
discuss extensions.
Theorem 5.3.1 (Composition Theorem for Program Checkers, Theorem 1.3.1 restated).
Let Lznternal and Lexternal be two languages that satisfy the following conditions:
1. Hardness of the external language for the internal language:
There exists an efficient constant-depth (Turing) reduction from L2nternal to Lexternal.
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2. The nternal language "helps" to check the external language:
Lexternal has an efficient checker of depth dexternal with access to oracle Linternal (note
that by definition it also has oracle access to a program that allegedly computes Lexternal.)
3. Checkablzty of the internal language:
Linternal has an efficient checker of depth dznternal.
Then there exists an efficient checker for Lexternal, of depth O(dexternal * dznternal), wzth a
single polynomial fan-zn AND gate at the top.
Proof. We construct a checker C for Lexternal
, 
starting from the checker Cexternal that uses
oracle gates to Lnternal, whose existence is guaranteed by Condition 2 of the theorem. We
assume Cexternal has success probability at least % (otherwise we amplify its success proba-
bility). Let Pexternal be the program that C (and Cexternal) checks. Our goal is to replace
every oracle call that Cexternal makes to Ltnternai with a (probabilistic) circuit B, of depth
O(dznternal), that computes the language Lnternal using oracle calls to Pexternal. We base B
on the program checker for Ltnternal (guaranteed by Condition 3). This checker expects to
have oracle access to a program that allegedly computes Lznternal (and not Lexternal). To that
end we define the program Pnternal as follows: on instance x of Lnternal run the reduction
from Ltnternal to Lexternal given in Condition 1 to produce a instances l,... , xq of Lextrenal.
Then run Pextrenal on X1 ,..., Xq, and return its answers to complete the computation of the
reduction.
Specifically, the circuit B is constructed as follows.
The circuit B: On input x (an instance of Lnternal), B runs Cinternal, the checker for
Ltnternal given in Condition 3, with oracle access to Pnternal. I.e. on every query y that
Cinternal makes to the program it checks, B runs the reduction from Lznternal to Lexternal, and
then runs Pexternal on the outputs of the reduction. The output of the reduction is then
returned to Cinternal as the answer to the query y. In this way B obtains the output of
Cinternal which gives a prediction regarding the membership of x in Lznternal. B then runs
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Pnternai on x and compares its output with the answer of Cinternal. If these two answers
agree, then B's answer is the same as them, otherwise B outputs I. The total depth of
B is indeed O(dmnternal) (since the reduction from Lmnternal to Lexternal can be computed in
constant depth).
The key properties of this construction are the following completeness and soundness.
* Completeness:
If Pexternal computes Lexternal correctly (on every input), then so does Pnternal. In this
case both Cinternal and Pnternal will agree on the correct answer (on every input) with
probability 1, and B will be correct on every input.
* Soundness:
- If Pnternal(X) = Lznternal(X) then B cannot output 1 - Lznternal(). This is because
it only gives a prediction regarding the membership of x if both Pnternal and
Cinternal agree on it (otherwise it returns I).
- If Pnterfnalt() # Linternal(x), the only event that will cause B to output 1-
Lnternal(x) is if Cinternal outputs 1 - Lznterna (x). But this happens with probability
at most 1/6 by the fact that intenal is a checker with this soundness (which we
assume w.l.o.g.).
Given the construction of this circuit B, the checker C runs as follows (checking a program
Pexternal):
1. Run the checker Cexternal, replacing every oracle call to Lznternal with a computation of
the circuit B.
2. If any of B's runs returned the symbol I, then output I. This step is implemented
using an AND gate of polynomial fan-in.
3. Otherwise, output the same answer as Cexternal-
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Thus C is of total depth O(dexternal " dinternal), with a single polynomial fan-in AND
gate. We now prove that C is indeed a program checker for the language Lexternal (given the
completeness and soundness properties of the circuit B).
Claim 5.3.2 (Completeness). If Pexternal computes Lexternal correctly (on every input), then
for every x, Pr[C(x) = Lexternal(X)] = 1.
Proof. When Pexternal computes Lexternal correctly, then by the completeness property of B, it
perfectly simulates the oracle for Lnternal and then by the fact that Cexternal is itself a program
checker (with oracle calls to Lnternal), we conclude that C correctly outputs Lexternal(X) on
its input x. 0
Claim 5.3.3 (Soundness). If Pexternal does not compute Lexternal correctly, then for every x,
Pr[C(x) = 1 - Lexternal()] < 1/3
Proof. We say that a program or a checker that attempts to decide a language L makes an
error on an instance x if it declares that x is in L when it is not or vice versa. If the program
outputs any other symbol (e.g. 1) we do not consider this as an error.
We know that for every x, the probability that Cexternal makes an error, is bounded by
1/6 when it is given oracle access to L,,t,rnal. C simulates Cexternal by replacing Lmnternal with
B. We want to bound the probability that B causes Cexternal to make an error that it would
not have made had he given access to Lnternal-
Fix random coins f for Cexternal on which it does not make an error (when given oracle
access to Lnternal). Look at the execution of Cexternal with these random coins. If during
the execution, for every query y that Cexternal makes to Lnternal, it holds that Pnternal(Y) =
Linternal(y), then by the first soundness property of B, replacing Lintrn,al with B never causes
Cexternal to make an error; At the very most it causes it to replace a correct answer with 1.
Otherwise, let y be the first query that Cexternal makes for which Pmnternai(y) $ Linternal(y).
By the second soundness property of B, with probability at least 5/6, B on input y, will
output 1, and thus will cause C to output 1, i.e. C will not make an error.
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We conclude, by the union bound over the errors of Cexternal and the errors of B, that C
makes an error with probability at most 1/3. U
U
5.3.2 Extensions
We now present some useful extensions of the Composition Theorem for program checkers.
In some of our applications, the checker for Lexternal has access to additional oracles (beyond
the program it checks and the oracle to Lnternal). We point out that the theorem holds even
with these additional oracle gates. More formally,
Lemma 5.3.4. Let Lznternal and Lexternal be two languages satisfying the conditions of Theo-
rem 5.3.1. Let G be the set of gates used by the program checkers involved and the reduction.
Then the program checker in the conclusion of the theorem has the same properties and it
uses gates from the set G.
This lemma allows us to iterate the Composition Theorem, by gradually removing oracles,
or alternatively replacing one oracle with another. This will prove itself to be a very useful
tool.
The additional unbounded fan-in AND gate at the top of the checker from Theorem 5.3.1,
prevents us from using this lemma to construct checkers in NVCo. We now show how it can
be removed.
Lemma 5.3.5. Let Lznternal and Lexternal be two languages satzsfying the condztzons of The-
orem 5.3.1, and furthermore, suppose there zs a constant-depth reduction from the Par-
ity function7 to Lexternal. Then there exists an efficient checker for Lexternal, of depth
O(dexternal " dznternal) (without the unbounded fan-in AND gate at the top).
Proof. By the proof of Theorem 5.3.1, all we need to show is how to remove the unbounded
fan-in AND gate. We do that by first replacing it with a constant number of unbounded
7Recall that the Parity function from {0, 1}* to {0, 1} is defined as Parity(bi,..., b) = 1_ b, with
addition over GF(2).
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fan-in Parity gates, and then use the Composition Theorem with Parity as the internal
function.
Consider the following randomized reduction from AND to Parity: on n bits input to
the AND function, (bl... bn), generate n uniformly random bits (rl,..., rn), and compute
Parity(r1i (1 - bl),... ,r, (1 - bn)) (where all operations are over GF(2)). If the AND
of the bits is 1 then this Parity is 0 with probability 1. On the other hand, if the AND
is 0 then the parity is a uniformly random bit. If we repeat this a constant number of
times, we can compute AND with an arbitrarily small constant probability of error by using
a constant number of Parity gates (and further notice that this reduction can be done in
constant depth).
So we have replaced the AND gate with a constant number of Parity gates without
increasing the depth of the checker C. Next, we want to remove these Parity gates, and
we do that by applying Theorem 5.3.1 on Lexternal as the external language and Parity as
the internal language. Condition 1 is given by the hypothesis of this lemma, Condition 2
holds by our construction, and Condition 3 is given by Lemma 5.4.2, where a constant depth
(i.e. ANCo) checker for the Parity function is presented. Note that here we composed only a
constant number of oracle gates, and thus there is no need for another AND gate of large
fan-in. 0
On Checking Functions versus Languages: Our Composition Theorem for checkers
(as well as the ones for testers and correctors, see below) only considered checking languages
(i.e. boolean functions). In many cases, and also within this work, we check, test and
correct non-boolean functions. The Composition Theorems hold also for checkers, testers
and correctors of non-boolean functions.
5.3.3 Composing Program Testers and Correctors
In this section we state and prove our composition theorem for testers and correctors. We
begin by considering reductions between language and their influence on the average success
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probability of programs computing these languages.
Definition 5.3.6 ((e, C2)-reduction). Let L 1 and L 2 be two languages, and let D 1 and D 2
be ensembles of distributions on instances of L 1 and L 2 (respectively).
We say that a reduction R is an (El, E2)-reduction from (L 1 , D 1) to (L 2 , D 2) if, when it is
given oracle access to an E2-good program P2 for L 2 with respect to D2 , RP2 is an E1-good
program for L 1 with respect to D 1.
Theorem 5.3.7. Composition Theorem for Testers/Correctors
Let Lznternal and Lexternal be two languages. Suppose that there exist parameters (which
may depend on the input length n) 0 < a 2,, 2, a,, 2, CE, < 1, such that the following
conditions hold:
1. Hardness of the external language for the internal language:
There exists a distribution ensemble D and an efficient constant-depth (a, /3)-reduction
R from Linternal w2th the uniform distributions to Lexternal with the distribution D.
2. The internal language "helps" to test/correct the external language:
Lexternal has an efficient (El, E2)-tester and E-corrector, both have depth at most dexternal,
and use oracle gates to Lnternal
3. Testability and Correctability of the internal language:
Lmnternal has an efficient (al, a2 )-tester and a-corrector, both have at most depth dznternal
and they form a tester-corrector pair (with default threshold 1/3).
Then Lexternal has a (.-min(El, /), + 2)-tester and (1.min(E, 3))-corrector with respect to
the distribution D' generated by sampling with probability 1 from D and 1 from the uniform
dzstribution. The tester and corrector can be implemented by depth O(dexternal - dznternal)
circuits. Finally, if the tester and corrector for Lexternal in condition 2 are a tester-corrector
8 For simplicity we assume in all there conditions of the theorem that the reduction, testers and correctors
are with respect to the uniform distribution. However, the proof can easily be carried through to general
distributions (and indeed the theorem is used later with distributions other than uniform).
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pair with threshold 6, then the new tester and corrector for Lexternal form a pair wzth threshold
11.6
12
The fan-in of the composed tester and corrector depends (logarithmically) on the number
of oracle calls that the external tester and corrector (in Condition 2) make to Linternal. Thus,
if the number of these oracle calls is constant, then the composed tester and corrector are of
bounded fan-in.9
We now give a proof sketch, followed by a full proof.
Proof Sketch. The basic idea is similar to the checker composition theorem, but the analysis
is more involved. We consider a distribution D' over the instances of Lexternal which is the
"average" (a convex combination) of the uniform distribution and the distribution D on
Lexternal instances from the reduction R.
The new corrector simulates the corrector for Lexternal that uses Lznternal as an oracle.
Whenever the corrector makes an oracle query x to Linternal
, 
we do the following: run the
corrector for Ltnternal on x. For every query y that this corrector makes to a program that
allegedly computes Lznternal (we do not have such a program), run the reduction R on y. Use
Pexternal, the real program being checked (a program for Lexternal), to answer the query y (to
Lexternal) made by the reduction. We think of this procedure of running R on an Lznternal
instance using Pxtcrnal as an oracle as a "virtual program", Pnternal, for Linternal.
Now, if Pexternal solves Lexternal correctly with high probability with respect to D', then it
follows that the virtual program Pznternal solves Ltnternal with high probability with respect
to the uniform distribution on Lznternal instances (this follows from the way we constructed
D', which guaranteed that Pexternal solves Lexternal correctly w.h.p. on in stances drawn from
D). This means that with high probability, the corrector for Linternal successfully corrects
Pnternal on all the queries made by the corrector for Lexternal. It follows that with high
probability, our new corrector is the same as running the old corrector for Lexternal with a
perfect oracle for Lnternal, which is a good corrector by Condition 2 of the theorem.
9We use this fact to get testers and correctors in NCo.
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Let us turn our attention to the tester for Lexternal. We could construct the new tester as
we did in the corrector case. I.e., simulate the old tester, obtaining the answers for Ltnternal-
queries via correcting the virtual program Pnternal (using the corrector for Lmnternat). When
Pexterna is good with respect to D' we will indeed accept it by an argument similar to the
corrector case. This, however, would not work if Pxternal is bad with respect to D'. In
this case we have no guarantee on the behavior of Pinternal and thus no guarantee on its
correctability. This means that potentially we are simulating the tester with a bad Lznternai-
oracle, in which case all bets are off, and the tester may accept the bad program Pexternal
(even though it should reject it). To address this problem, we add a test that checks Pinternal
(with respect to the uniform distribution), by running it through the tester for Ltnternat. If it
rejects, then it follows that Pxternal is bad with respect to D' and we correctly reject it. If it
accepts, then it follows by hypothesis that the corrector for Ltnternal indeed corrects Pnternal
and we obtain a simulation identical to running the old tester for Lexternal with a perfect
oracle for Lznternal, which is a good tester by Condition 2 of the theorem. M
Full proof of Theorem 5.3.7. The proof follows ideas similar to the ones introduced in the
proof of Theorem 5.3.1, but the analysis is different. To avoid separate notation for testers
and correctors we make (w.l.o.g) the simplifying assumption that ac = a1 and e = e1.
We construct a tester T and corrector Cor for Lexternal. Our starting point is (again)
the tester and corrector for Lexterna, whose existence is guaranteed by Condition 2 of the
Theorem. Let Pextreal be the program to be tested and corrected. Our goal is to replace
every oracle call to Lznternal with a circuit B that computes the language Linternat using
oracle calls to Pexterna , has depth O(dnternal), and has the property that if Pexternal is "good
enough" on the distribution D' (from the proof statement), then (simultaneously) all of B's
activations by T and Cor give the correct answers with probability at least 1.
The Circuit B. Let Corexternal and Texternal be the corrector and tester for Lexternal (Con-
dition 2), and Corinternal and Tinternal be the corrector and tester for Linternal (Condition 3).
Let p(n) < poly(n) be a bound on the number of oracle calls Corexternal and Texternal make to
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L nternal.
B simulates Corinteral O(log(p(n))) times in parallel, and outputs the majority of these
simulations' answers. Note that B cannot directly activate Corinternal because it requires
access to a program that allegedly computes Lnternal, whereas B only has access to Pexternal
(that allegedly computes Lexternal). Thus B simulates runs of Corexternal using the reduction
R from Ltnternal to Lexternal, whose existence is guaranteed by Condition 1 of the theorem.
During the simulation of Corinternal, whenever it makes a call to its program (i.e. queries
an instance of Lnternal), B runs R on that instance with Pexternal as its oracle, and answers
as R does. Thus the total depth of B is indeed O(dnternal), and it uses majority gates of
fan-in O(log(p(n))) = O(log n) (we note that actually B only needs to compute approximate
majority, see [AB84]). In the case that the external tester and corrector make only a constant
number of Lznternal oracle calls, these majorities are only on a constant number of items and
thus can be replaced by /Co circuits.
Next we argue that B computes Lznternal correctly with high probability.
Claim 5.3.8. If Pxternal is ( . min(c, 0))-good for Lexterna, wzth respect to the dzstributzon2
D' then for every x E {0, 1}n,
1
Pr[B(x) ' Linternal(X)] <
- 12.p(r)
Proof. B runs Corinternal which corrects programs that are al-good for Lntenal with respect
to the uniform distribution. B uses a "program" for Lntenrna that is obtained by running
the reduction R using Pexternal as its oracle . Since Pexternal is (• min(ei, 0))-good for
Lexternal with respect to the distribution D', it is also 3-good for Lexternat with respect to
the distribution D (by the construction of D'). We know that when R is run with a /3-good
program for Lerternal as its oracle , it gives an a 1 -good program for Lnternal with respect to
the uniform distribution.
By the fact that Corinternal corrects programs that are al-good with respect to the uniform
distribution, on every instance of Ltnterna, every execution of Corinternal by B gives a correct
answer with probability at least . By taking the majority of O(log(p(n))) executions of
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Corinternal, the probability that B errs is at most 1 . 0
The Corrector Cor. The corrector Cor runs the "old" corrector Corexternal, replacing
every oracle call to Lnternal with a call to the circuit B. Thus Cor has depth O(dexternal -
dnternat) and the only gates of unbounded fan-in are the majority gates used by B, which
have fan-in O(log(p(n))).
Claim 5.3.9. Cor is a ( -min(El, ))-corrector for Lexternal with respect to the distribution
D'.
Proof. Let Pexternal be ( - min(el, f))-good with respect to the distribution D'. By the
construction of D', it follows that Pext,rnal is E-good with respect to the uniform distribution
(recall that e = e1). This means that Corexternal computes every instance of Lexternal correctly
with probability at least 5 when given oracle access to Lmnternal and Pexternal. When Cor
simulates Corexternal, it replaces calls to Lnternal by an execution of B. By Claim 5.3.8, B
gives a correct answer with probability at least 1 - 12p() on every execution. Since Cor runs
B at most p(n) times, by union bound, B is correct on all the executions with probability
at least L. We conclude that for every instance of Lexternal, Cor computes it correctly with
probability at least g. U
The Tester T. Let Pxterna be the program to be tested. The tester T runs as follows:
1. Repeat the following c times (c is a constant that will be determined later): Run
the internal tester Tinternal, replacing each oracle call to its program, by executing the
reduction R on the Ltnternal instance, and using Pexternal as the oracle for the reduction.
If Tinternal rejects in more than a i-fraction of the c executions, reject immediately,
otherwise proceed to the next step.
2. Run the external tester Texternal, replacing every one of its oracle calls to Lznternal by
running the circuit B. Output whatever answer this simulation of Texternal gives.
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T has depth O(dexternal" dznternal) and the only gates of unbounded fan-in are the majority
gates used by B, which have fan-in O(log(p(n))). Next we prove that Tis a ( -min(ei, r
2)-tester for Lexternal with respect to the distribution D' (this is established in Claims 5.3.10
and 5.3.12 below) and that together with Cor it forms a tester-corrector pair, assuming the
original tester and corrector formed a pair (this is established in Claim 5.3.13).
Claim 5.3.10. T accepts programs that are (~ min(E1, 3))-good w.r.t. the distribution D',
with probablzty at least 2
Proof. Assume Pexternal is (1 min(ei, 0))-good w.r.t. the distribution D', thus it is also
/-good w.r.t. the distribution D. It follows that when Pexternal is used as the oracle of the
reduction R, we get a al-good program for Lnternal. So in the first step, in each execution,
Tinternal rejects with probability at most g. By the Chernoff bound, if we take c to be a large
enough constant, with probability at least 11, not more than 1 fraction of the c executions
will reject and we will proceed to the next step.
From the construction of D', it follows that Pextrenal is also E1-good with respect to
the uniform distribution on Lexternal instances. Texternal is an (l, E2 )-tester with success
probability , and thus when B gives correct answers in all its executions, Texterna accepts
with probability at least , even if we replace its Lnternal oracle with B. By Claim 5.3.8 and
the union bound, the probability that B indeed gives the correct answer in all its executions
(in the second step) is at least 1.
We conclude (by taking a union bound over the error probabilities) that T accepts Pexternal
with probability at least 2.
Claim 5.3.11. Let P' be a program (supposedly computing Lnternal) obtazned by running the
reduction R on instances of Ltnternal and taking Pexternal to be the oracle for the reduction.
If P' is not correctable by Corinternal, then T rejects in its first step with probability at least
11
12"
Proof. Tinternal and Corinternal are a tester-corrector pair with threshold 1/3 (the default value).
So if P' is not correctable by Corinternal it must hold that Tinternal rejects P' in each one of its
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executions (in the first step of T) with probability at least 1/3. By Chernoff bound, if we
take c to be a large enough constant, the probability that more than 1/4 of the executions
reject is at least L. I
Claim 5.3.12. T rejects programs that are not ( + -)-good w.r.t. the distribution D', with
probability at least 23.
Proof. First, if the internal corrector Corinternal, when it is run with the program (where
answers are computed via the reduction R), does not give a correct answer (on every input)
with high probability (say more than 5/6), then the program is rejected (in the first step)
with probability at least L (see Claim 5.3.11).
If Corinternal does compute Lznternal correctly with high probability, then with probability
11 all of B's executions in the second step give correct answers. Now observe that a program12
that is not (I + a)-good w.r.t the distribution D', is also not E2-good w.r.t. the uniform
distribution on Lexternal inputs. When B always gives correct answers, Texternal will reject
with probability at least . Taking a Union Bound over all error probabilities, we conclude
that a program that is not (I + L)-good w.r.t. D' is rejected with probability at least 2
Claim 5.3.13. If Texterna, and Corexternal form a tester-corrector pair with threshold 6 (for
some 0 < 6 < 1/2), then T and Cor form a pair with threshold 6' = 1.
Proof. If T accepts a program Pexternal with probability at least 1 - 6' > 1/12 then in
particular it passes the first step with this probability. This implies by Claim 5.3.11 that the
program P (for Lnternal) obtained by running the reduction R with Pexternal as its oracle ,
is correctable by Corinternal.
If the above program P is correctable by Corinternal, then with probability at least L1 all
of B's executions in the second step give correct answers. Condition on the event that all the
calls to B give correct answers. (Which means that the behavior of Texternal with oracle to
B is identical to its behavior with oracle to L,nternal.) The probability that T rejects in this
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conditional space is at most 2' = 6. By the fact that Texternal and Corexternal form a tester-
corrector pair with threshold 6 (when they are given oracle access to Linternai) it follows that
Pexternal is correctable by Corexternal when the latter is given oracle access to Lznternal. By
replacing oracle calls to Linternal with calls to B we increase the error probability of Corexternal
by at most 1. U
I
We now present a useful claim for quantifying the parameters of reductions between
language-distribution pairs.
Claim 5.3.14. Let L 1 and L 2 be two languages such that there exists a non-adaptive (Turing)
reduction R from L 1 to L 2 that makes at most q queries to L 2 . Then for any El and distrz-
button D 1 , there exists a distribution D 2 such that R is an (El, 1)-reduction from (L 1 , D1 )
to (L 2 , D 2).
Proof. The distribution D 2 is obtained by picking a random L 1 instance using D 1 , computing
R's q (non-adaptive) queries (these are L 2 instances), and outputting one of them uniformly
at random.
Consider each of the q distributions on the q queries that R makes when run on a random
sample from D 1 . Any program P that is h-good for L 2 with respect to D 2 is also >-good
on each of these distributions. Now if we run the reduction R on a random instance sampled
by D 1 , P answers each of R's queries correctly with probability at least 1 - . Taking a
Union Bound, the probability that P makes an error on at least one of the q queries made
by the reduction R is at most el. We conclude that if P is h-good for L 2 with respect to
D 2, then R using P as its oracle is E1-good for L 1 w.r.t. D 1 . U
Remark 5.3.15. The above claim implies that whenever the languages of the compostion
theorem have a reduction that only makes a constant number of oracle calls, the 3 parame-
ter in the composition theorem is constant, and so are the composed tester and corrector's
distance parameters.
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In most cases where we use the Composition Theorem this will be the case. In fact, when-
ever we refer to using the Tester/Corrector Composition Theorem rn this work we implzcitly
refer to using it with such reductions, using Claim 5.3.14. The only exceptions occur in
Sectzon 5.6, where we use the composztion theorem with languages between which there do
not appear to be reductions that only make a constant number of queries. In these cases
we construct amplified reductions for the specific pairs of languages at hand (see Claims
5.6.6, 5.6. 10).
Remark 5.3.16. When using Theorem 5.3.7 we often apply it recursively. Namely, we
compose some external language with an znternal one, and then use the external language
with its new tester/corrector, as an internal language to be composed with a tester/corrector
of an even more complex language (which now plays the role of the external language). We
therefore want to point out what happens to the parameters of the testers/correctors after the
composition, in order to make sure we can then use the new testers/correctors in the next
application of the theorem.
When all the parameters involved in the statement of Theorem 5.3.7 are constants (i.e.
the E 's, the a 's and p), and the distance parameters of the original testers/correctors (i.e.
the E's and the a 's) are bounded away from 0 and 1, then the distance parameters of the
composed tester/corrector are all constants that are bounded away from 0 and 1.
Also, we choose the threshold for the tester-corrector pair of the internal language to
be the default value 1/3. We would like to point out that any threshold that is bounded
away (from above) from 1/4 by a constant wll do. Also note that if the threshold for the
original tester-corrector pair of the external language is 6 then the threshold for the new pazr
is (1 - A) -6 with A = 1/12. We want to point out that A can be set to be an arbitrarily small
constant.
We conclude that if we apply Theorem 5.3.7 recursively a constant number of times (each
time using the external language from the previous round as an internal language), then
we end up with testers/correctors that have distance parameters that are bounded away by
constants from 0 and 1, assuming that the testers/correctors along the way have such distance
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parameters and that the reductions along the way use a constant number of queries.
5.4 Checkers, Testers and Correctors for Complete Lan-
guages
In this section we show several languages that are complete for certain complexity classes, and
have very efficient checkers, testers, and correctors. In particular we prove Theorem 1.3.4.
Before reading this section, the reader should be somewhat familiar with the definitions and
results of Section 2.3
5.4.1 From randomized self-images to program checkers
Next we prove that functions with efficient randomized self-images also have efficient check-
ers, testers and correctors.
Theorem 5.4.1. Let f be a functon with a solved instance generator that can be computed by
bounded fan-in circuits of depth d, and a random instance self-reduction where the randomszer
and evaluator can both be computed by bounded fan-in czrcuits of depth d.
Then f has a (1, ) -tester-corrector pair and a program checker, where all of them can
be implemented by bounded fan-in czrcuits of depth d - 0(1).
Proof. The tester runs the solved instance generator to generate a solved pair (x, y), where
x is uniformly distributed and f(x) = y. It then runs the program P on x and accepts if
and only if P(x) = y.
The corrector receives an input x and runs the randomizer to generate a pair (y, T) where
y is uniformly distributed. It then runs P on y, and uses the evaluator on input (P(y), T).
If P(y) = f(y) then this recovers f(x). The distance parameters and soundness of the tester
and corrector can be amplified by repeating the above procedures 0(1) times in parallel.
The program checker runs the tester 0(1) times in parallel and also runs the corrector
0(1) times in parallel on its input. If the tester rejects in even one of its runs it outputs
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BUG, otherwise it outputs the majority answer of the corrector's answers.
The correctness and soundness of the tester, corrector and checker follow directly from
the properties of solved instance generator and random instance self-reduction.
As with the Composition Theorems, if the solved instance generator or the random
instance self-reduction require additional gates (beyond bounded fan-in AND, OR and NOT
gates) then the Theorem still holds with checkers, testers, and correctors that use these
gates.
5.4.2 Checkers, testers and correctors for complete languages
We now apply Theorem 5.4.1 to obtain extremely efficient checkers, testers and correctors
for complete languages.
Lemma 5.4.2. The Pamty function has a (1, )-tester, 1-corrector and a program checker
all implementable in ArCo.
Proof. The proof is immediate from Theorem 5.4.1, as the parity language has an N/Co solved
instance generator and random instance self-reduction (see Corollary 2.3.6). U
Note that the parity function is a linear function, and in fact the results of [BLR93] give
an NCo tester and corrector for the parity function. Our tester and corrector make fewer
calls to the program being checked: they each only make a single query (as opposed to 3 and
2 respectively in the tester and corrector of [BLR93]). Next we prove the following lemma:
Lemma 5.4.3. There is an NC1 -complete language under ANCo reductions that has an A/C
program checker and an ACo ( , 2)-tester and k-corrector pair.
Proof. Applying Corollary 2.3.7 and Theorem 5.4.1 (with ACo gates), we obtain a checker,
tester and corrector that are implementable in ACo for the /C1-complete language Lss.
They contain unbounded fan-in AND gates which are used to sample uniform elements in
Ss, the rest of the computations can be done with bounded fan-in gates.
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In order to obtain checkers in A/Co, we use the Composition Theorem for checkers (The-
orem 5.3.1). We replace the AND and OR gates with Parity gates as it is done in the proof
of Lemma 5.3.5. We then use the Composition Theorem to remove the Parity gates (again,
we refer the reader to the proof of Lemma 5.3.5). 0
We now show checkers, testers and correctors for languages that are complete for classes
higher than NL (nondeterministic log-space). We start with the definitions of these classes
and the complete languages for them.
Definition 5.4.4. The class -L contains all the languages that are decidable by a nondeter-
ministic log-space Turing machine with the acceptance criteria that the number of accepting
paths is even.
Definition 5.4.5. The class modk-£ (for an integer k > 1) contains all the languages that
are decidable by a nondeterministic log-space Turing machine with the acceptance criteria
that the number of accepting paths is zero modulo k.
Definition 5.4.6. The language E-connectivity is the language of tuples (G, s, t), such that
G is a directed graph containing the vertices s and t, and the number of paths from s to t
is even.
Definition 5.4.7. The language modk-connectivity (for an integer k > 1) is the language
of tuples (G, s, t), such that G is a directed graph containing the vertices s and t, and the
number of paths from s to t is zero modulo k.
Theorem 5.4.8. e-£ and modk-L are complete for E-connectivty and modk-connectzvity
respectively under N/C reductions.
We proceed with presenting checkers, testers and correctors for these languages.
Corollary 5.4.9. @-connectivity has an NCO program checker, and an ACo (1, ) -tester and
1-corrector pair.
194
Proof. The work [IK02] shows that e-connectivity has a solved instance generator and ran-
dom instance self-reduction in A/Co []. This immediately gives a checker, tester and cor-
rector in ANC 0 [e] (by Theorem 5.4.1); i.e. they are in A/Co with unbounded fan-in parity
oracle gates. We will use the Composition Theorems to "collapse" the checker to A/Co and
the tester and corrector to ACo. Taking the e-connectivity language to be the "external"
language, and the parity language as the "internal" language, the three conditions of the
Composition Theorems (Theorems 5.3.1 and 5.3.7) hold:
1. Hardness of the external language for the internal language:
Clearly given an oracle to the e-connectivity language, one can compute parities of vec-
tors. The simple Karp reduction is in N/C(e.g. using the e-L2-machine for computing
the parity language).
2. The internal language helps to check/test/correct the external language:
This is simply because is was shown above how to construct a checker, tester and
corrector for -connectivity that are in A/C [e].
3. Check/test/correct-ability of the internal language:
By Lemma 5.4.2.
By the Composition Theorems (Theorems 5.3.1 and 5.3.7) we get a tester and a corrector
for -connectivity in ACo, and a program checker in A/C (note that for this we use the fact
that @-connectivity is hard for Parity under ANCo reductions, as required by Lemma 5.3.5).
Corollary 5.4.10. Let k be a prime. Then modk-connectivity has an A/Co program checker,
and an ACo (1, 2)-tester and k-corrector pair.
Proof. The work of [IK02] shows that modk-connectivity has a solved instance generator
and random instance self-reduction in ACo with oracle gates for multiplication over GF[k]
and for addition of n numbers over GF[k]. By Theorem 5.4.1 this gives a checker, tester,
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and corrector for modk-connectivity that are in ACo with oracle gates for multiplication over
GF[k] and for addition of n numbers over GF[k]. Note that the checker, tester and corrector
also need to generate (almost) random field elements, but this can be done in ACo.
We obtain a checker, tester, and corrector in ACo using the Composition Theorems (The-
orems 5.3.1 and 5.3.7). We first note that both multiplication over GF[k] and addition of n
numbers over GF[k] are reducible (under Ar/C reductions) to modk-connectivity . These two
functions are themselves both checkable in ACo: a checker/tester/corrector for multiplication
was given by [BLR93], the checker/tester/corrector for adding n numbers mod k is similar
to the one for Parity given in Lemma 5.4.2. All these checkers/testers/correctors need to be
able to add two numbers over GF[k] and to generate random field elements, both of these
can be done in ACo. This gives an ACo checker,tester, and corrector for modk-connectivity .
To further obtain a program checker in NAC, we use the checker Composition Theorem
(Theorem 5.3.1). This uses the fact that both AND and Parity are reducible to modk-
connectivity under N/Co reductions. 0
5.5 Checkers, Testers and Correctors for a Complexity
Class
In this section we use the Composition Theorems to prove Theorem 1.3.2. We begin with
a proof sketch for the theorem followed by a discussion. We then present and prove fully a
more general theorem and conclude with a proof of Theorem 1.3.2. The generalized theorem
(Theorem 5.5.1 in this section) uses the composition methodology to obtain checkers whose
depth is related to the depth of the circuits that compute the language being checked. As
with the Composition Theorems, all the circuits involved here contain only bounded fan-in
gates, unless stated otherwise.
Proof sketch for Theorem 1.3.2. Let L be a language in R.AC' that is fNC'-hard under NCO-
reductions. To build the RnZC' - 1 checker for L, we begin with the trivial checker for L, i.e.
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simply a (correct) RNC' circuit for L. We then decompose this circuit C into O(log - 1 n)
"layers" of depth log n each. Put another way, we view this checker as a circuit of depth
O(log?- 1 n) that has oracle gates for evaluating depth-log n sub-computations. (Specifically,
the oracle gates take as input a circuit D of depth log n and an input x to this circuit, and
output D(x).) Since this oracle computes an NAC1 language, we can replace it with an oracle
that computes the AC-complete language from Theorem 1.3.4 (without paying more then
a constant factor in depth). We now use the Composition Theorem to eliminate these oracle
gates. We take the A/C-complete language accepted by the oracle gates to be our internal
language Lrnternal, and take L to be Lextre,,nal. Clearly, all the conditions of the theorem hold:
(a) Ltnternal is in .NC1 , and therefore is reducible to L (which we assumed is NC 1-hard), (b)
Lextrenal has a checker of depth O(log' - 1 n) that uses oracle calls to Ltnternal, and (c) Lznternai
has a ANC checker (Theorem 1.3.4). We therefore conclude that L has an RNC'- 1 checker.
A similar approach (based on the Composition Theorem for testers/correctors) yields the
statement regarding testers and correctors. I
Using a Correct Program to Construct Checkers of Correctness. The idea used in
the proof of Theorem 1.3.2 is to build an efficient checker by starting with a correct program
for the function. At first, this may seem strange: if we have a correct program, what do we
need a checker for? The answer is that the checker will check all programs for this function,
including programs which may have more desirable features than the correct one we used
for the design of the checker. In fact, we find the idea of starting with a correct program for
the function as a way to design checkers is in itself interesting. In practice, testing software
for correctness is often done by comparing on well-chosen test cases to an existing correct
(although possibly very slow) program. What we show here is that the approach of starting
with a correct program is beneficial also for designing efficient checkers. Moreover, it provides
a first handle on the design of a checker for a function without "nice" structural properties
(i.e., for which all that is known is some program defining it).
Theorem 5.5.1 (Generalization of Theorem 1.3.2). Let L be a language computable by
circuits of depth d, and let dcollapse > 0 be some integer (that could be a function of the input
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length n). If there exists a language Lmnternal such that:
1. (L is "harder" than Linternal) There zs a constant depth reduction from Lnternal to L.
2. (Linternal zs complete for depth dcoulapse computations) There zs a constant depth reduc-
tion from any language computable by circuits of depth dcollapse to Ltnternal.
3. (Linternal is checkable) L,,ternal has a constant-depth checker/tester-corrector.
Then L has a depth O(d/dcollapse) checker with a single unbounded fan-zn AND gate at the
top, and depth O(d/dcollapse) tester-corrector with (possibly many) unbounded fan-in gates.
Proof. The proof follows from Theorems 5.3.1 (for programs checkers) and 5.3.7 (for program
testers and correctors). Details follow.
Program Checkers: Take L to be the "external" language, and Ltnternal to be the "in-
ternal" language. We show that the three conditions of Theorem 5.3.1 are satisfied:
* Hardness of the external language for the internal language:
This condition is immediately satisfied by Condition 1 of the theorem. Note that the
depth of this reduction is indeed constant.
* The internal language "helps" to check the external language:
To see this, observe that a trivial program checker for any language is the circuit
that correctly computes that language (and ignores the program oracle ). Starting
with such a circuit C for L, we can use oracle gates for Linternal, together with the
fact that L,,ntern, is hard for depth dcollapse circuits, to construct an efficient depth
O(d/dcollapse) checker for L that uses oracle gates to Linternal. This checker divides
the circuit C into O(d/dcollapse) layers, each of depth dcollapse. It then "collapses" each
such layer to constant depth with an oracle call to L,,ntenal (this can be done using the
constant-depth reduction from any depth-dcollaps computation to Lnternal guaranteed
by Condition 2 of the theorem).
198
The depth of this new checker is O(d/dcollapse). In the terms of Theorem 5.3.1, this is
the value dexternal.
* Checkability of the internal language:
This condition is immediately satisfied by Condition 3 of the theorem. The depth of
the checker for the internal language is constant, and thus in the terms of Theorem
5.3.1 dznternal 0 O(1).
Now we apply Theorem 5.3.1, and we conclude that L has a depth O(dexternal" dnternal) =
O(d/dcollapse) checker with a single unbounded fan-in AND gate at the top.
Testers and Checkers: Using a similar observation, that a circuit computing a language
also gives a trivial tester and corrector for that language, we conclude (similarly) by Theorem
5.3.7 that L has a tester and corrector of depth O(d/dcollapse). The distance parameters of the
tester and corrector are affected by success probability of the reduction from depth dcollapse
circuits to Ltnternal (or by its number of queries, see Claim 5.3.14). We note that if the
number of queries made by this reduction is constant, then so are the composed tester and
corrector's distance parameters. U
We can now prove Theorem 1.3.2.
Proof of Theorem 1.3.2. Let L be the language that is in R/C i , and is NfC1-hard under
NCo-reductions. We take the gnC 1 -complete language from Lemma 5.4.3 to be the internal
language. Since this language is hard for circuits of bounded fan-in and logarithmic depth
(the Karp reduction makes only a single query), and because it has a constant depth (ACO)
tester and corrector (by Lemma 5.4.3), we conclude (by Theorem 5.5.1) that L has a tester
and corrector of depth O(log-l(n)), that uses unbounded fan-in gates. In other words, L
has a tester and corrector in RAC - 1.
Note that since L (the external language here) is NC1 -hard under ANCo reductions, there
are AC reductions from the Parity function as well as the AND function to L. Also, the
internal language has an ANC program checker by Lemma 5.4.3. By using the Composition
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Theorem for program checkers (Theorem 5.3.1), and an argument similar to the one given
in the proof of Lemma 5.3.5, we conclude that L has a checker in 7 AC'- 1 (without the
additional unbounded fan-in AND gate). 0
5.6 Program Libraries Revisited: Checkers for Matrix
Functions
In this section we present new checkers, testers and correctors for the following matrix func-
tions: multiplication, inversion, determinant and rank. These constructions are provably
more efficient (in terms of circuit depth) than the optimal algorithms computing these func-
tions, and they are checker/tester/correctors in the standard sense, i.e. they do not use a
program library. We begin with an outline in Section 5.6.1, followed by detailed constructions
and analyses. A summary of the parameters that we achieve and comparison to previous
constructions appear in Table 5.1 below.
Depth Time Program Calls Previously Known
Multiplication over GF(2S), s = 0(1) N/C 0  O(n 2) O(1) ACo, O(log n) program calls [BLR93, Rut
Multiplication over any finite field ACo O(n 2) O(1) ACo, O(log n) program calls [BLR93, Rut
Inversion over GF(28 ), s = 0(1) NCo O(n 2 ) 0(1) Library only, poly depth [BLR93]
Inversion over any finite field ACO 0(n 2 ) O(1) Library only, poly depth [BLR93]
Determinant over any finite field ACo poly(n) poly(n) Library only, poly depth [BLR93]
Rank over poly(n) size fields ACo poly(n) poly(n) Library only, poly depth [BLR93]
Table 5.1: Complexity of Tester/Correctors (with constant error) for n x n Matrix Operations.
5.6.1 Outline
In this subsection we give an overview of some of the constructions and the ideas that are used
in the checkers, testers and correctors for the matrix functions. In subsequent subsections
we give the full details.
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A Checker for Matrix Multiplication. We now present a constant-depth checker for
matrix multiplication (over GF(2)). The starting point for our checker is Freivalds' checker
for this function [Fre79]. Its input is two n x n matrices A, B, and a confidence parameter
0, and it is given access to a program P that allegedly computes matrix multiplication. The
checker first runs P on input (A, B). It then chooses a random vector ' in {0, 1}', and
verifies that: A x (B x r) = P(A, B) x T. If not, the checker outputs I. This test is repeated
O(log(1/P)) times, and the checker accepts only if all tests pass. A simple analysis shows
that if A x B = P(A, B). the checker accepts with probability 1, otherwise it outputs I with
probability at least 1 - 3.
The advantage of this checker over the trivial checker that computes the multiplication
of A and B is that it runs in tzme O(n2 - log(1/0)), better than any known algorithm for
matrix multiplication (for, say, constant /3). We note however, that its parallel complexity
is high: it multiplies matrices with vectors, which requires logarithmic depth. That is, each
such operation (over GF(2)) consists of computing (in parallel) n inner products, which
in turn boils down to computing n parities of n-bit vectors, and each such parity requires
logarithmic depth [FSS84].
We now want to construct a constant depth checker based on Freivalds' checker, by using
the composition theorem (Theorem 1.3.1). We take Lnternal to be Parity, and Lexternal to be
matrix multiplication. We now observe that the conditions of Theorem 1.3.1 hold: (1) there
is a constant depth reduction from Parity to Matrix multiplication: let - be the vector of
bits whose parity we wish to compute; construct a matrix whose first row is - and multiply
it by the all-ones matrix; the top-left item in the result is the parity of U; (2) there is a
constant depth checker for matrix multiplication that uses an oracle to Parity; (3) Parity
has a constant depth checker (Theorem 1.3.4). Applying Theorem 1.3.1, we conclude that
matrix multiplication has a constant-depth checker.
A Checker for Matrix Inversion. Below we present a constant-depth checker for matrix
inversion (the function that, given a matrix, say it is singular or finds its inverse).
At first glance, constructing a constant-depth checker for matrix inversion seems chal-
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lenging. Indeed, we do not know how to verify correctness of a given inverse or apply any
form of random self-reduction on this function without using matrix multiplication (random
self-reduction is a common tool in checker design), and computing matrix multiplication is
too costly. The composition approach provides a way around this: first construct a non-
efficient checker that does use matrix multiplication, then use composition to "remove" the
matrix multiplication computations.
We now sketch the construction of an ACo checker for matrix inversion (over GF(2)).
The checker is given access to a potentially faulty program P for matrix inversion, and an
arbitrary n x n matrix M to invert (or to output "not invertible" if M is singular). In
addition we give the checker access to a matrix multiplication oracle. The checker proceeds
in two stages: first it tests the (faulty) inversion program P to make sure that it correctly
inverts random matrices with high probability. It then transforms the instance M into a
random instance M' (that is invertible if and only if M is) and from (M') -1 deduces M -1 .
Details follow.
The testzng stage. In the testing phase, the checker repeats the following several times
in parallel: (1) Generate a random matrix A and ask P to invert A. (2) If P returned a
matrix P(A), verify that P(A) x A = I. (3) If P(A) x A f I, output I.
Throughout, the checker keeps track of the fraction of queries that resulted in P(A)
returning a matrix (rather than "not invertible"). This fraction should be close to the
(constant) fraction of n x n matrices that are in fact invertible; if it is not, then the checker
should declare that P is buggy. The point is that the program P can never trick the checker
into believing that a non-invertible matrix is invertible, since the checker always verifies P's
response by multiplying P(A) and A. (Here one can already see how matrix multiplication
is useful for us: it allows us to check the answers of the program, and force it to have only
one-sided errors). The program must provide correct inverses for a fraction of matrices that
is very close to the expected fraction of invertible matrices! This mean that, with high
probability, any program that passes the test correctly inverts most invertible matrices.
Using random self-reduction. With this in mind, we continue to the second stage. The
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checker multiplies the instance M by a random matrix R, and asks P to invert M x R. With
constant probability, R is invertible, and thus if M is invertible then M x R is a random
invertible matrix; therefore, P will return (M x R)- 1 = R - 1 x M -1 w.h.p., and then the
checker can multiply this on the left by R and obtain M - 1. (Here the reader can observe
the second use we get from matrix multiplication: it gives a random self-reduction between
invertible matrices). The checker verifies that I = M x (R x P(M x R)) and if so outputs
the (always correct) inverse R x P(M x R). If, however, M is not invertible, then P can
never return a correct inverse of M. By repeating the above 0(1) times (in parallel), the
checker can be assured that it either has a correct inverse of M or that M is not invertible.
Removing the Multiplication Oracle. Up to this point, we have constructed a checker
for matrix inversion that uses matrix multiplication as a sub-routine. Multiplication is the
only non-ACo "sub-computation" performed by this checker, so we would like to remove it
to obtain an ACO checker. Above, we saw that matrix multiplication has an ACo checker.
So all we need to show, in order to apply the Composition Theorem and to obtain an ACo
checker for matrix inversion, is a constant depth reduction from multiplication to inversion.
Such a reduction follows from the identity:
In A 0 I, -A AxB
0 In B 0 I, -B
o o I, o 0 In
Checkers for Determinant and Rank. We also present checkers, testers and correctors
for the determinant and rank functions. These are significantly more involved, and require
several new ideas, as outlined below.
Amplified Reductions. A significant obstacle comes up when constructing the determinant
and rank testers/correctors. The problem is that we want these testers and correctors to
delegate internal sub-computations of matrix inversion to the program they check, using
a reduction from inversion to determinant or rank. However, these reductions involve a
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polynomial number of oracle calls. Even if we are given a program for determinant (or rank)
that works well on all but a small constant fraction of matrices, when we plug this program
into the reduction that uses it polynomially many times, the result may have errors with
very high (1 - 1/poly) probability. To overcome this problem, we present amplified reductions
from matrix inversion to determinant and rank, these reductions show that a program that
computes determinant or rank correctly on all but a small constant fraction of matrices can
be used to compute matrix inversions correctly on every matrix with high probability.
Dfferent Testers and Correctors. The library testers and correctors of [BLR93] use a pro-
cedure of Randall [Ran93] for generating random invertible matrices of known determinant.
This procedure is recursive (and thus highly sequential), and also is more complex than other
components of the testers/correctors. Since we want constant-depth testers and correctors,
we cannot rely on this procedure. Instead, when building the initial tester/correctors (even
before applying composition), we use different ideas from those of [BLR93]. The most signifi-
cant example is our tester for the determinant function. The tester of [BLR93] simply checks
that the program is correct on random matrices with known determinant (using [Ran93]).
Our tester, on the other hand, first checks that the program is close to computing some
homomorphism from the group of invertible n x n matrices over the finite field F to the
multiplicative group of F (using the homomorphism test of [BLR93, BCLR04]). In the sec-
ond stage, the tester verifies that the program is close to computing the one homomorphism
that we care about, namely the determinant. This is achieved by exploiting the fact that
the determinant is the only non-constant homomorphism that is multi-linear in the entries
of the matrix.
Repeated Composition. The constructions for determinant and rank exploit, more than any
other construction, the top-down approach that the Composition Theorem enables. In both
cases we start with checkers that use two oracles: one for matrix multiplication and one for
inversion. The Composition Theorem is then applied several times, gradually removing the
oracles (or replacing them by weaker ones), until we get standard and efficient (in terms of
circuit depth) testers and correctors (i.e. ones that do not use oracles to other functions).
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Removing Lbrartes vza Compostwon. In fact, the composition theorem is tailored to remov-
ing the need for program libraries when building checkers, testers and correctors. Simply
use the program for the function being checked to compute other functions in the library,
and use testers/correctors for these functions to check the correctness of these computations
and correct them (if necessary). The only requirement is that a tester/corrector for a library
function f only calls other library programs for functions that reduce to f.
5.6.2 Matrix Multiplication
We begin by using the Composition Theorem to simplify the tester and corrector for matrix
multiplication of [BLR93]. Similar techniques can be used (directly) to simplify Freivalds'
well known checker for matrix multiplication (see [Fre79]).
Lemma 5.6.1. The matrix multiplzcation function over any field whose size is a constant
power of 2 has an optimal tester and corrector (i.e. these run in linear-time, are in NCO,
and make 0(1) program oracle calls).
Over other (finite) fields, matrix multiplication has a tester and corrector that run in
linear time, are in ACo, and for constant-size fields they make only 0(1) program oracle
calls.
Proof. We examine matrix multiplication over a field F, and assume F's size is a constant
power of 2 so we can add, multiply, and sample random members of F using an A/NC circuit
(if F is of a different size, we get a tester and corrector in AC instead of ANC). Recall the
tester and corrector for matrix multiplication presented by [BLR93]. At the heart of their
constructions is Freivalds' checker for matrix multiplication [Fre79]. It takes as input three
n x n matrices A, B and C, and a confidence parameter /. If A x B = C the checker accepts
with probability 1, otherwise it rejects with probability at least 1 - P. The specification of
the checker is presented in Figure 5-1.
The advantage of this checker over the trivial checker that computes the multiplication
of A and B is that it runs in time O(n2 - log(1/P)), better than any known algorithm for
matrix multiplication. Note, however, that its parallel time complexity is high, as it needs to
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FREIVALDSCHECKER(n, A, B, 3)
1. C +P(A, B)
2. repeat O(log(1//3)) times:
(a) Pick a random column vector ' E {0, 1}"
(b) If A x (B x f) / C x ', then output I.
3. Output C.
Figure 5-1: Freivalds' Checker
compute multiplications of matrices over F with {0, 1}-vectors. This involves computing long
sums over the field (e.g. Parity in the case of GF(2)), and thus requires depth that is nearly
logarithmic in n. The tester and corrector for matrix multiplication given by [BLR93] (shown
in Figures 5-2 and 5-3), are based on Frievalds' checker, and thus they are not in constant
depth. We transform them to be of constant depth (while maintaining their running time
and number of program oracle calls) by using the Composition Theorem (Theorem 5.3.7).
MATRIX MULTIPLICATION CORRECTOR(A,B,3)
1. repeat O(log(1/3)) times in parallel:
(a) A1 , B 1 - random n x n matrices
(b) A 2  A - A1
(c) B 2 - B - B 1
(d) C -- P(A 1 , Bi) + P(A 1 , B 2 ) + P(A 2, B 1 ) + P(A 2, B 2 )
If Freivalds_Checker(A, B, C, ) accepts, then output C
2. If Freivalds_Checker never accepted, then output I
Figure 5-2: Matrix Multiplication Corrector
Our Matrix Multiplication Corrector and Tester: To apply Theorem 5.3.7, we take
matrix multiplication to be the external function, and matrix-row-sums to be the internal
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MATRIX MULTIPLICATION TESTER(3)
1. Repeat O(log(1/3)) times in parallel:
(a) Generate two random matrices A and B
(b) C - P(A, B)
(c) If Freivalds Checker(A, B, C, 2) accepts, then the answer from this step
is 0. Otherwise the answer is 1
2. If the fraction of steps answering 0 is at least 1, then accept. Otherwise,
reject.
Figure 5-3: Matrix Multiplication Tester
function. The matrix-row-sums function receives a matrix and returns the (column) vector
whose i-th entry is the sum (over F) of the i-th row of the matrix. We show that the
conditions of the theorem hold:
1. A reduction from the internal function to the external function:
The /C reduction from computing the sums of the rows of an n x n matrix to
multiplication of n x n matrices is simple: given a matrix A, multiply it with the all-i
n x n matrix, output the first column of the result.
2. The internal function "helps" to test/correct the external function:
An oracle that computes matrix-row-sums can be used to compute matrix-vector mul-
tiplications in A/C:
Ax =
al,1
a 2 ,1
... al,n
.. a2,n
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Zn=1 al,, * v
\ ~ ~a n ,z' ' v Z
This final vector can be computed (in N/Co) by computing matrix-row-sums on the
matrix whose (i, j)-th entry is a,, v3 (where all a,,3-s are field elements, and v,-s are
in {0, 1}).
Given this A/Co procedure to compute matrix-vector multiplications results in an ANC
tester and corrector for matrix multiplication (using an oracle to matrix-row-sums).
3. Testability and Correctability of the internal function:
The tester and corrector for the matrix-row-sums function are generalizations of the
tester and corrector for computing products over finite groups given by Claim 2.3.5
and Theorem 5.4.1 (both appear in Section 5.4. The tester and corrector work with
the additive group over F, and apply on each matrix row (independently) the ran-
domization technique given in the proof of Claim 2.3.5. This randomization technique
is then used, as in the proof of Theorem 5.4.1, to test and correct the program that
allegedly computes the matrzx-row-sums function.
We can now use the Composition Theorem to construct a standard constant-depth tester
and corrector for matrix multiplication (i.e., one that only uses a program oracle that al-
legedly computes matrix multiplication). Moreover, since (for a constant f3) the tester and
corrector that we start with (before applying the composition), as well as all reductions and
the matrzx-row-sums tester and corrector, all run in linear time and A/Co (and only make
a constant number of oracle calls), we conclude that the composed tester and corrector are
optimal: they only make a constant number of calls to the program they check, run in linear
time, and are in AC (for F of size a constant power of 2).
For other finite fields, addition, multiplication by 0 or 1, and generating (almost) random
field elements are all in ACo, and so are the composed tester and corrector (they still run in
linear time and make only a constant number of program oracle calls though). I
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5.6.3 Matrix Inversion
A tester and corrector for the function that computes whether a matrix is invertible or not
were given by [BLR93]. Their tester and corrector used the concept of a Library to get access
to a matrix-multiplication oracle . We present a standard tester and corrector (that do not
use a library) for the matrix inversion function.
Lemma 5.6.2. The matrix inversion function over any field whose size is a constant power
of 2 has an optimal tester and corrector (i.e. these run in lnear-time, are in NCo, and make
0(1) program oracle calls).
Over other (finite) fields, matrix inversion has a tester and corrector that run in linear
time, are zn ACo, and for constant-size fields they make only 0(1) program oracle calls.
Proof. We examine matrix inversion over a field F, and assume F's size is a constant power
of 2 (similarly to the case of matrix multiplication, for fields different size we get a tester and
corrector in ACo instead of ANCo). We begin by presenting the corrector (Figure 5-4) and
tester (Figure 5-5) as if they have access to a (correct) matrix multiplication oracle , we will
later remove this oracle using the Tester/Corrector Composition Theorem. Note that we
analyze the behavior of this tester and corrector on the uniform distribution over invertible
matrices with entries in the field F.10 We use P to denote the matrix inversion program
being checked, and Mult to denote the (always correct) matrix multiplication oracle .
Corrector Analysis: We begin by noting that when A is not invertible, this corrector
always outputs I (it outputs I unless it actually finds A's inverse), thus we restrict our
attention to the program's behavior for invertible As. With some constant probability the
random matrix R will be invertible (this probability grows with the size of the field F, but
even for GF(2) it is at least 1/4). In loop iterations when R is invertible, computing the
inverse of A x R using P is actually inverting a totally random invertible matrix. If this
inversion succeeds, the corrector always outputs the inverse of A. Thus if P is '-close to
10Recall that we are allowed to choose any distribution over the instances of the function, as long of course
that we prove the tester-corrector pair to be correct with respect to this distribution. See Remark 5.2.7.
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MATRIX INVERSION CORRECTOR(A,3)
1. repeat O(log(1//)) times in parallel:
(a) Generate a random matrix R
(b) R' +- Mult(A, R)
(c) Use P to try to invert R': R'Iv *- P(R').
If P cannot invert, proceed to the next loop iteration
(d) A' +- Mult(R, R'Inv)
(e) If I, = Mult(A, A') (where In is the identity matrix of dimension n),
then output A'
2. Output that A is not invertible.
Figure 5-4: Matrix Inversion Corrector
being correct (for a random invertible matrix), then in each loop iteration the probability
that both R is invertible (probability at least 1/4) and P succeeds (probability at least 1 - 1)
is greater than 0.1. The probability that in at least one of the O(log(1/)) loop iterations
this constant probability event occurs at least once is at least 1 - P. Note that this corrector
is constant-depth (using matrix multiplication oracles ).
Tester Analysis: Let y be the probability that a random matrix over F is invertible (can
be hard-wired into the tester, y is at least 1/4). Note that the errors of the program can
only be "one-sided", in the sense that in any iteration of the tester, if the random matrix
A is not invertible, then the answer from that iteration is always 1. Thus the probability
that the answer from any iteration is 1 is at least 1 - '. If the program is at least h-close
to being correct (on the invertible matrices), then the probability that the answer from the
iteration is 0 is at least 3, and the probability that the fraction of O(log(1/0)) independent
iterations that give 0 answers is i-distant from 7y is at most 3 (by a Chernoff Bound). If
the program is at least !-far from being correct (on a random invertible matrix), then the
probability that the answer from the iteration is 0 is at most 7, and the probability that
the fraction of O(log(1/P)) independent iterations that give 0 answers is -- distant from 7Y is
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MATRIX INVERSION TESTER(3)
1. Let y be the probability that a random matrix over F is invertible (can be
hard-wired into the tester)
2. repeat O(log(1/P)) times in parallel:
(a) Generate a random matrix A
(b) Compute A,, +-- P(A)
(c) If I, = Mult(A, A,,) then the answer from this step is 0, otherwise the
answer is 1
3. Let r be the fraction of 0-answers in the loop. If r1 - 7|- < , then accept.
Otherwise reject.
Figure 5-5: Matrix Inversion Tester
at least 1 - p (again by a Chernoff Bound). Note that this tester is constant depth (again,
with matrix multiplication oracle gates).
Tester-Corrector Pair: The tester and corrector are a tester-corrector pair because the
tester accepts i-good programs w.h.p., and rejects programs that are not i-good w.h.p.
The corrector corrects using any program that is at least !-good.
The Final Tester and Corrector: We have presented a constant depth tester and cor-
rector using oracle gates to the matrix multiplication function. We note that for a constant
0 and F whose size is a constant power of 2 the tester and corrector are in A/Co. We now
want to use these, together with the Composition Theorem (Theorem 5.3.7), to construct a
constant-depth tester and corrector in the standard sense (i.e. without oracle gates to the
matrix multiplication function). To do this, we need to show that the conditions of the
Composition Theorem hold when the external function is matrix inversion, and the internal
function is matrix multiplication. Condition 2 (the "internal" language helps check the "ex-
ternal" function) is satisfied by the construction of a tester and corrector above. Condition
3 (testability and correctability of the internal language) is satisfied by the constant-depth
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(NCo for the proper 0 and field size) tester and corrector for matrix multiplication given in
Section 5.6.2.
To show Condition 1 (hardness of the external language for the internal language), we
need a reduction from the internal language to the external language. To see this reduction,
observe that when computing the matrix multiplication A x B, it suffices to examine the
block matrix:
In A 0
M= 0 I B
And observe that:
In -A AxB
M-1 - 0 I, 
-B
0 0 In
Now the upper-right block of M - 1 is the multiplication of A and B. Thus to multiply two
n x n matrices, it suffices to compute a single inversion of a 3n x 3n matrix. Alternatively,
this can be done with 27 non-adaptive inversions of n x n matrices by breaking A and B to
3 x 3 block matrices, where each block is of dimension n/3, and then applying the reduction
to the blocks.
Now using the Composition Theorem, we can remove the matrix multiplication oracle
gates. The resulting tester and corrector are a tester-corrector pair, and do not require using
a library. Moreover, since (for a constant 0) the checker and corrector that we start with
(before applying the composition), as well as all reductions and the matrix multiplication
tester and corrector, all run in linear time and A/C (and only make a constant number of
oracle calls), we conclude that the composed tester and corrector are optimal: they only
make a constant number of calls to the program they check, run in linear time, and are in
A/Co (for F of size a constant power of 2).
Similarly to the case of matrix multiplication, for other fields the composed tester and
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corrector run in ACo, linear time, and make only 0(1) program oracle calls. 0
Finally, we note that the Composition Theorem also gives a (standard) tester and cor-
rector for the (boolean) function that checks whether a matrix is invertible or not over
polynomial-size fields. The tester and corrector run in ACo, but require polynomial time
and make polynomially many oracle calls.
5.6.4 Matrix Determinant
A tester and corrector for matrix determinant were given by [BLR93]. They used a library
with matrix-multiplication and matrix-inversion functions. In this section we construct a
standard constant-depth tester and corrector for matrix determinant, i.e. ones that do not
use a program library (we do note, however, that the number of parallel calls to the program
being checked is larger than in the library tester and corrector of [BLR93]). Our corrector
is based on the construction of [BLR93], however our tester is different. Unlike [BLR93], we
avoid the use of Randall's [Ran93] (sequential) procedure for generating random invertible
matrices with known determinant.
In this section and in the next, we use a procedure that generates (w.h.p.) a random
invertible matrix over a finite field F, given an oracle Inv that correctly inverts any invertible
matrix (and returns I for non-invertible matrices). A description of such a procedure appears
in Figure 5-6.
Random - Invertible(n, 3)
1. For i going from 1 to O(log(1//)) do the following in parallel:
(a) Choose a random n x n matrix A, with entries in F.
(b) Let A 1 -- Inv(A,).
2. If for every i, A ' =I, output i. Otherwise, output A, for the minimal i for
which it is not i.
Figure 5-6: Generating a random invertible matrix
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Claim 5.6.3. The procedure in Figure 5-6 outputs I wzth probability at most 0. Further-
more, conditioned on the event that it does not output I, its output is uniformly distrbuted
over invertible matrces with entries mn the field F. If 0 is a constant and the szze of F
zs a constant power of 2, the procedure can be implemented rn A/C, otherwise it can be
implemented in ACo.
Proof. A random matrix is invertible with (at least) constant probability bounded away
from 0. By running the loop in the procedure for O(log(1/3)) iterations, with probability at
least 0 one of the iterations will generate an invertible matrix. Whenever this event occurs,
the procedure outputs the first invertible matrix it generated, which is indeed a random
invertible matrix. 0
We now turn to the problem of testing and correcting programs for matrix determinant.
Lemma 5.6.4. The matrx determinant functwon over a finite field F has an ACo tester and
corrector.
Proof. The corrector (Figure 5-7) and tester (Figure 5-8) are presented as if they have access
to a (correct) oracle for matrix multiplication and matrix inversion. The oracles will later be
removed using the Tester/Corrector Composition Theorem (Theorem 5.3.7). We denote by
P the matrix determinant program being checked, and by Mult and Inv the (always correct)
matrix multiplication and inversion oracles (respectively). The behavior of the oracle tester
and oracle corrector is analyzed with respect to the uniform distribution over invertible
matrices with entries in the field F.
Corrector Analysis: We begin by observing that the corrector always outputs 0 on non-
invertible matrices (by using its oracle Inv to the inversion function). It remains to analyze
its behavior on invertible matrices. Assume P is a 1-good program for matrix determinant
w.r.t the uniform distribution on invertible matrices. By Claim 5.6.3, the probability that
Random - Invertible fails in any iteration is at most 1. When this doesn't happen, R is a
random invertible matrix. The corrector multiplies A and R to get the matrix R', which
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MATRIX DETERMINANT CORRECTOR(A,/)
1. If I= Inv(A) then output 0 and exit.
2. Otherwise, repeat O(log(1/3)) times in parallel:
(a) Generate a random invertible matrix R using Random - Invertible(n, -)
(see Figure 5-6). If it fails the answer from this iteration is 0.
(b) R' - Mult(A, R).
(c) dR * P(R).
(d) If dR = 0 skip this iteration.
(e) dR', - P(R').
(f) The answer from this iteration is dR,/dR.
And output the majority among the answers for all iterations.
Figure 5-7: Matrix Determinant Corrector
is again a uniformly random invertible matrix. The probability that P errs on a uniformly
random matrix such as R or R' is at most -L. By taking a union bound over the events
that Random - Invertible returns 1, and the determinants of R or R' are not computed
correctly, we conclude that the correct determinant of A is computed in each loop iteration
with probability at least '. After computing the approximate majority of all loop iterations
answers, the total error probability of the corrector is at most P (by a Chernoff bound).
Tester Analysis: The first loop tests that the program P computes a function that is close
(with respect to the uniform distribution on invertible matrices) to a homomorphism from
the (non-abelian) group of invertible matrices over F (denoted GL,(F)) to the (abelian)
multiplicative group over the elements of F (denoted F*). Note that the determinant is such
a homomorphism. We use the generic homomorphism tester of [BLR93] (with its analysis
for non-Abelian groups given in [BCLR04]) to analyze the tester.
If the program is -- good on a random invertible matrix, then in particular it is close to
a homomorphism from GL,(F) to F* (the determinant is such a homomorphism), and we
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MATRIX DETERMINANT TESTER(n, )
1. Repeat O(log(1/0)) times in parallel:
(a) Run twice Random - Invertible(n, y5) to generate two matrices R 1 and
R 2. If either execution outputs 1, then the answer from this iteration is
0.
(b) If P(Ri) -P(R 2) / P(Mult(Ri -R 2)) then the answer from this iteration
is 0, otherwise the answer is 1.
If the fraction of 0-answers (out of the iterations that we didn't skip) is at
least 1 then reject.
2. Otherwise, repeat O(log(1/0)) times zn parallel:
(a) Run Random - Invertzble(n, )-) to generate a matrix R. If the execution
outputs I, then the answer from this iteration is 0.
(b) Choose a uniformly distributed non-zero element c in F.
(c) Let R' be the matrix R with every entry in the first row multiplied by c.
If c - P(R) 7 P(R') then the answer from this iteration is 0, otherwise
the answer is 1.
If the fraction of 0-answers is at least ! then reject, otherwise accept.
Figure 5-8: Matrix Determinant Tester
can proceed by following the analysis of [BLR93]. The probability that the program does
not compute the homomorphism correctly on even one of the random (but not independent)
matrices R 1 , R 2, R 1 x R 2 is at most 2-. The probability that Random - Invertible fails in
one of its two activations is at most 1. Taking a union bound, the total probability of the
answer in each iteration being 0 is less than -. Thus, the program is rejected after the loop
with probability at most .'
Now consider the case that the program is -k-far from computing any homomorphism
from GL,(F) to F*. The probability that Random - Invertble fails in one of its two activa-
tions is at most 1. When this does not happen R 1 and R2 are random invertible matrices,
and the probability that P(R 1) x P(R 2) $ P(R 1 x R 2 ) is at least 1 (see [BCLR04]). Taking
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a union bound, the probability of the answer in each iteration being 0 is at least . Thus
the program is rejected after the loop with probability at least 1 -
The second loop distinguishes between the determinant function and other homomor-
phisms from GL,(F) to F*. To analyze it we need the following claim.
Claim 5.6.5. For every homomorphism h : GL,(F) -- F*, there exists an integer 0 < k <
IF - 1, such that for every M E GLn(F), h(M) = det(M)k.
Proof. Consider the group G of diagonal matrices that have an arbitrary elements of F*
along the diagonal. G is clearly isomorphic to (F*)" = F* x F* x ... x F* (n times).
Next, consider the restriction h : G -* F*. This is a homomorphism from (F*)" to F*,
and such homomorphisms are easily seen to all be of the form h(M) = a .2 a k- (for
0 < k1,... k,  IF - 1), where the a,'s are the diagonal entries of M. This follows from
the fact that F* is cyclic and homomorphisms of product groups are just products of the
homomorphisms on each component.
Now we want to show that kl = k2 =...= kn = k to prove that h(M) = det(M)k for
these specific matrices. Let S be a permutation matrix that swaps rows i and j upon left
multiplication and swaps columns i and j upon right multiplication. Clearly, S2 = I, SO
h(S) 2 = 1. Thus h(SMS) = h(S)h(M)h(S) = h(M) and so k, = k3, since SMS just swaps
a, and a. and the function remains unchanged. This is true for any i and j, so all the k's
must be the same.
Now consider the row/column-operation matrices, i.e. matrices with l's on the diagonal,
a single 1 elsewhere, and O's everywhere else. These, together with the elements of G generate
all of GLn(F), since Gaussian elimination allows us to transform any non-singular matrix to
the identity, and moreover, when the matrix is non-singular one can do Gaussian elimination
without any swaps, so these operations do indeed suffice. Conveniently, h(M) = 1 for
all of these matrices; indeed, let p be the characteristic of F, then for any row/column
operation matrix M, we have M P = I (note how we use here the fact that F is finite) and
so h(M)P = h(MP) = h(I) = 1 and so h(M) = 1 = 1k = det(M)k.
So to conclude, we exhibited a set of generators of GL(F) such that every matrix T
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in this set has h(T) = det(T)k for some global, fixed k, and therefore h(M) = det(M)k for
every matrix in GL,(F). 0
We now proceed with the analysis of the tester. In each iteration of the second loop,
unless the Random - Invertible call fails (probability at most ), the matrices R and R' are
uniformly distributed in GLn(F) (though not independent). If the program is i-close to
the determinant function (with respect to the uniform distribution on invertible matrices),
then with probability at least the program agrees with the determinant on both matrices.
Taking a union bound, the answer from each iteration will be 0 with probability at most 1-
By the Chernoff bound, the program is accepted in Step 2 with probability at least 1 - .
On the other hand, if the program is i1-close to some other homomorphism h : GL,(F) -
F*, then by Claim 5.6.5, h(M) = det(M)k for some fixed 0 < k < IF - 1 (k f 1). With
probability at least 7, the program evaluated on both R and R' agrees with h. In this case
we will have, c - P(R) = c. h(R) = c - det(R)k, and on the other hand P(R') = det(R')k
ck -det(R)k . With probability at least 1/2 over the choice of c, c f ck (since k Z 1). Taking
a union bound over the probability that Random - Invertible fails, we conclude that the
answer from each iteration is 0 with probability at least '. Therefore, by the Chernoff
bound the program will be rejected with probability at least 1 - .
In conclusion, if the program is 2 6-good on invertible matrices, it is rejected in any of
the two steps with probability at most -. The total rejection probability is at most 0. If the
program is not l-good, then either it is not 1 close to any homomorphism, and rejected
in the first loop with probability at least 1 - 2, or it is -6-close to some homomorphism
h f det, and then it is rejected with probability at least 1 - - in the second loop. Thus the
probability that the tester rejects a '-far program is at least than 1 - 3.
Tester-Corrector Pair: The (oracle) tester and corrector are a tester-corrector pair be-
cause the tester rejects any program that is not l-good w.h.p, and the corrector corrects
T-good programs.
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Composing the Tester and Corrector: The tester and corrector presented above are
constant depth using oracle gates to the matrix multiplication and inversion functions.1 1
We want to use the Composition Theorem (Theorem 5.3.7), with matrix determinant as an
external function, and inversion as the internal function, to construct a constant-depth tester
and corrector for the determinant function that does need the inversion oracle. To do this,
we need to show that the conditions of the theorem hold. By the above, Condition 2 (the
internal language "helps" to check the external language) holds. Condition 3 (testability
and correctability of the internal language) holds by Claim 5.6.2.
Condition 1, hardness of the external language for the internal language, also holds.
Indeed, Cramer's rule states that each coordinate of the inverse is the corresponding cofactor
(the signed determinant of the corresponding minor) divided by the determinant of the
matrix. For a matrix A, denote by M , , (A) the (i, j)-th minor of A (i.e. A with the i-th row
and j-th column removed). Cramer's rule states that:
det (M,, (A))
(A-1),3 = (-1)+3. det(A)
Thus we can use the determinant program oracle to compute the inverse. While this suffices
for applying the Composition Theorem, it is somewhat unsatisfying because the reduction
from inversion to determinant needs to compute the entzre inverse of a matrix, and thus
makes O(n 2 ) program oracle queries (one call per matrix entry to get det(Ms,3(A)), plus
another "global" call for getting det(A)). This implies that when we apply the Composition
Theorem it will give a composed tester and corrector with only polynomially small distance
parameters (see Claim 5.3.14). Roughly speaking, the reason is that in the composition
step, we want the reduction from the internal language to the external language, to succeed
with high probability when its oracle is the program being tested and corrected. For this to
happen we want that with high probability, simultaneously all the oracle calls are correct.
We therefore require that the success probability of each call (or in other words, the distance
"Note that multiplication and division of field elements over large fields cannot be done in ACo. They
are, however, easily doable in ACo with an oracle to matrix multiplication.
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of the program from the function it allegedly computes) is smaller than inverse the number
of oracle calls the reduction makes (so that we can apply a union bound over the oracle
calls).
In what follows this obstacle is overcome. We show how to amplify the success probability
of each oracle call to the program being tested and corrected, so that it works even with
programs that are only constant close to the function. This results in an amplified reduction
from matrix inversion to determinant, that uses a program for determinant that is Q(1)-
good to get a program for inversion that is Q(1)-good. We use this amplified reduction in
the Composition Theorem to get a corrector and tester with constant distance parameters
(that still make polynomially many calls to the program oracle ).
Claim 5.6.6. For any constant E, there exists a constant depth (E, 1 )-reductzon from matrix
nversion on any distribution D 1 to matrzx determznant on the unzform distributzon. The
reductzon uses oracle gates to matrix multzplzcation.
Proof. We begin with the standard reduction that uses Cramer's rule. As a simplification
first step, suppose that the reduction could generate random invertible matrices in constant
depth. I.e suppose the reduction has access to an oracle that outputs random invertible
matrices. Now observe that the standard reduction using Cramer's Rule makes many oracle
calls to determinant only on invertzble matrices. On singular matrices the reduction makes
only one call (because if the determinant is 0 we already know that there is no inverse).
To amplify the success probability of the reduction when computing determinants of
znvertible matrices, we will use the following modification of the corrector for the matrix
determinant function given in Figure 5-7: first, start the execution of the corrector from step
2 in Figure 5-7 (step 1 is not necessary since we know that the matrix is invertible). Second,
we will use our oracle that generates random invertible matrices instead of the procedure
Random - Invertzble. Note that this modified corrector does not use an oracle to inversion,
but its correction properties (for invertible matrices) remain the same.
We now use this corrector to amplify the success probability of each call that the standard
(Cramer's Rule) reduction makes to compute the determinant of an invertible matrix. Every
220
time the reduction wants to call the program on some matrix A, it will instead run the
corrector on A with the same program, setting / (the confidence parameter) to be O(1/n 2).
If the program for determinant is h-good on random matrices, then it is at least i-good
on random invertible matrices, and with high probability (more than 1 - 1/n 2 ) det(A) will
be computed correctly by the corrector. Thus with high (constant) probability the whole
inverse matrix is computed correctly.
Finally, the reduction still needs a method for generating random invertible matrices.
To overcome this difficulty, observe that if the program oracle zs a i-good program for
computing determinant on random matrices, then it can compute almost random invertible
matrices in constant depth. To do this, generate (in parallel) several (0(1)) random matrices,
use the determinant program oracle to check whether or not their determinant is zero, and
output the first matrix whose determinant (according to the program oracle ) is non-zero.
The output of this procedure is an almost random invertible matrix (the statistical distance
between the output and the distribution of random invertible matrices is less than 1).
The determinant corrector, as it is used in the amplified reduction above, works even when
activated with such almost-random invertible matrices.
This reduction works with high probability for computing the inverse of any matrix, and
thus in particular it works for any distribution on matrices. U
The amplified reduction (which uses only the determinant program oracle and an oracle
to matrix multiplication) can be used in the Composition Theorem to get a constant-depth
tester and corrector for matrix determinant, using an oracle for matrix multiplication.
Corollary 5.6.7. The matrix determinant function has an ACo tester and corrector, using
an oracle to matrix multzplication.
Proof. Use the Composition Theorem with inversion as the internal language, determinant
as the external language and the amplified reduction from Claim 5.6.6. M
Proposition 5.6.1. The matrix determinant function has an ACo tester and corrector with-
out any additional oracles (i.e. a tester and corrector in the standard sense).
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Proof. By Corollary 5.6.7 the determinant function has a constant-depth tester and corrector
using a matrix multiplication oracle. While it was already shown above that good programs
for determinant can compute inversions, and thus also multiplications (see the proof of Claim
5.6.2), again the Composition Theorem cannot be directly applied because the reduction
from matrix multiplication to determinant makes too many oracle calls. Moreover, the
"amplified" reduction from inversion to determinant won't help because it itself uses a matrix
multiplication oracle.
To overcome these obstacles, observe that one can replace the matrix multiplication oracle
with a vector-sum oracle while maintaining constant depth (computing all the entries of a
matrix multiplication in parallel). The vector-sum function over F has a constant depth
tester and corrector (similar to the tester and corrector for the parity function in Lemma
5.4.2 and the matrix-row-sums tester and corrector in the proof of Claim 5.6.1). Moreover,
there is a one-to-one N/C reduction from vector-sum to determinant. The reduction on a
vector V = (1, X2,... ,Xn) proceeds as follows:
X 1 -X 2 X3 ... -n .X n
1 1 0...
0 1 1 0
E x, = det
0 0 ... 1 1
Applying the Composition Theorem (Theorem 5.3.7), we get a constant-depth tester and
corrector for matrix determinant without any additional oracle gates. U
U
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5.6.5 Matrix Rank
A tester and corrector for matrix rank were given by [BLR93]. They used a library with
matrix-multiplication and matrix-inversion functions. In this section, we eliminate the need
for a library, using the Composition Theorem to give a standard constant-depth tester and
corrector for matrix rank over fields of polynomial size (we do note, however, that the number
of parallel calls to the rank program oracle made by our tester and corrector is larger than
in the library tester and corrector of [BLR93]).
Lemma 5.6.8. The matrix rank function over a przme field F of polynomial size (mn the
dimension of the matrx), has an ACo tester and corrector.
Proof. The corrector (Figure 5-9) and tester (Figure 5-10) are similar to the ones given by
[BLR93], but they are presented as if they have access to (always correct) matrix multiplica-
tion and matrix inversion oracles . We follow the notation of [BLR93], using I× n to denote
the n x n matrix that is all zero, except for r l's in the first r entries of the main diagonal.
We use P to denote the matrix rank program being checked, and Mult and Inv to denote
the (always correct) matrix multiplication and inversion oracles (respectively). The behavior
of the tester and corrector is analyzed on the distribution on 2n x 2n matrices generated by
uniformly choosing a random rank r in {0... 2n} and then generating a random 2n x 2n
matrix of rank r.
Corrector Analysis: The analysis follows that of [BLR93]. The matrix A1 (of size 2n x 2n)
is of rank rank(A) + t, and thus A3 = Q x A1 x R is a random matrix of rank rank(A) + t.
This fact is stated in the following claim:
Claim 5.6.9. Let A be a 2n x 2n matmx of rank r, and let R, Q be random invertible matrces
of size 2n x 2n, where all matrices are over F. Then the matrix Q x A x R is a random
uniformly distributed matrix of rank r over F.
Proof. There is a bijection from the set of pairs of invertible matrices that take any A to Ir,
to the set that takes Ir to itself. E
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MATRIX RANK CORRECTOR(A,3)
1. Repeat O(log(1/0)) times in parallel:
(a) Use Random - Invertible(2n, O(0)) to generate two random 2n x 2n
invertible matrices R and Q. If Random - Invertible returns I, the
answer from this iteration is I.
(b) Choose a random t E {0 ... n}
(c) At o-- A  Onxn
On×n Int×,
(d) A 2 +- Mult(A1 , R)
(e) A 3 +- Mult(Q, A 2)
(f) The answer from this iteration is P(A 3 ) - t
2. Output the majority among the answers for all iterations.
Figure 5-9: Matrix Rank Corrector
MATRIX RANK TESTER(3)
1. Repeat O(log(1/0)) times zn parallel:
(a) Use Random - Invertble(2n, O(0)) to generate two random 2n x 2n
invertible matrices R and Q. If Random - Invertible returns I, the
answer from this iteration is 0.
(b) Choose a random r E {0... 2n}
(c) A t Inx2n
(d) A 2 -- Mult(A1, R)
(e) A 3 <- Mult(Q, A 2 )
(f) If P(A 3 ) = r the the answer from this iteration is 1, otherwise the answer
is 0.
2. If the fraction of 0-answers is at most , then accept. Otherwise reject.
Figure 5-10: Matrix Rank Tester
Tester Analysis: The analysis follows that of [BLR93]. The matrix A1 (of size 2n x 2n)
is of rank r, and thus A3 = R - 1 x A 1 x R is a random matrix of rank r. The tester tests
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whether the program correctly computes ranks for a random matrices of randomly selected
rank.
Composing the Tester and Corrector: First, note that the (perfect) matrix multi-
plication and inversion oracles that the tester and corrector use can both be replaced by
a (perfect) oracle to determinant, while maintaining the (constant) depth of the tester and
corrector. 12 We now use the Composition Theorem (Theorem 5.3.7), to construct a constant-
depth tester and corrector in the standard sense (i.e. without oracle gates). To do this, we
need to show that the conditions of the theorem hold when the external function is matrix
rank, and the internal function is matrix determinant. Condition 2 (the internal function
"helps" test/correct the external function) is satisfied by the construction of a tester and
corrector we just presented. Condition 3 (testability and correctability of the internal lan-
guage) is satisfied by the constant-depth tester and corrector for matrix determinant given
in Claim 5.6.4.
Condition 1 (hardness of the external language for the internal language) requires more
work, and in fact we only know of a reduction from determinant to rank for fields of poly-
nomial size (polynomial in the matrix size n). The reduction uses the fact that computing
whether the determinant of a matrix over F = GF(k) (for a prime k) is equal to some
value a or not is in the complexity class modk - L (see e.g. [BDHM91]). Furthermore, any
boolean modk - L computation on a polynomial size input can be transformed (in N/C)
into a polynomial size nc x nc matrix whose rank is full if and only if the the result of the
computation is 1. This leads to a reduction from matrix determinant to matrix rank over
GF(k). For a matrix A:
1. For a +- o... k - 1, do the following in parallel:
Construct the matrix Da whose rank is full if and only if the determinant of A equals
a. Use the matrix rank oracle to determine whether the rank of Da is full.
12Recall that the matrix rank tester and corrector work for fields of polynomial size, and thus multiplication
and division of field elements can be done in ACO.
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2. Return the a for which the determinant of Da was non-zero.
Note that while this reduction is constant depth, its size and number of oracle calls are
polynomial in the field size k. For small constant field sizes the reduction makes a constant
number of oracle queries, and we can immediately use the Composition Theorem to obtain a
constant-depth tester and corrector for matrix rank with constant distance parameters. For
polynomial field sizes, however, the reduction makes a polynomial number of oracle calls and
the distance parameters become polynomially small (as was the case when composing the
matrix determinant tester and corrector). However, as was the case for matrix determinant,
we can again do better by "amplifying" the reduction.
Claim 5.6.10. For any E > 0, there exists a constant depth (E, 1)-reduction from matrMx
determnant of n x n matrices on any distribution, to matrix rank on the distribution on nc x
nc matrices obtained by choosing at random a rank r between 0 and nc , and then generating
a random matrx of that rank. The reduction uses an oracle for matrix multiplzcatzon.
Proof. The problem again with the basic reduction outlined above is that even if the program
oracle for matrix rank is reasonably good on average (i.e. a constant distance from perfectly
correct), it could always be bad for at least one of the matrices Da used in the reduction, and
the reduction would fail with very high probability. To overcome this difficulty (using only an
oracle for matrix multiplication), we amplify the success probability in each computation of
rank(Da). This is done, similarly to the amplified reduction from inversion to determinant
of Claim 5.6.6, using the matrix rank corrector. The amplified reduction computes the
rank of each Da by running the corrector, using two completely random matrices R and Q
(this is because unlike the corrector outlined above, we cannot assume the reduction has
access to Random - Invertible). If R and Q were random invertible matrices, then after
taking the majority of many such calls, the reduction computes the rank of a correctly with
all but polynomially small error probability. But now observe that if the field size is at
least large enough constant (recall that for small constant size fields we can directly apply
the composition theorem with the "simple" unamplified reduction), then with very high
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probability the random matrices R and Q are, in fact, invertible! The computation of each
Da's rank is successful with all but polynomially small probability, and the computation of
A's determinant is correct w.h.p. Thus, if the rank program is a small enough (constant)
distance from being correct, then the amplified reduction succeeds with all but an arbitrarily
(polynomially) small error probability. The reduction computes the determinant of any
matrix correctly with high probability, and thus it works for any distribution on matrices.
U
Applying the Composition Theorem, this gives a constant-depth tester and corrector for
matrix rank using matrix multiplication oracles .
Corollary 5.6.11. The matrix rank function over prime fields of polynomial size has an
ACo tester and corrector with a matrix multiplication oracle .
Proposition 5.6.2. The matrix rank function over prime fields of polynomial size has an
ACo tester and corrector (ones that do not use any non standard oracle calls).
By Corollary 5.6.11 we get a constant depth tester and corrector that use an oracle
for matrix multiplication. Again, the matrix multiplication oracles are easily replaced by
vector-sum oracles (maintaining constant depth, as in Proposition 5.6.1). Furthermore,
these vector-sum oracles can be replaced (while maintaining constant depth) by oracles to
the (boolean) vector-sum-equal function. This function, on input a vector - = (vl,..., vn)
and a field element a, outputs 1 if the sum of V's entries is exactly a. To replace a vector-sum
oracle with an oracle to vector-sum-equal, simply call vector-sum-equal (in parallel) with all
possible values a, and output the one correct a for which vector-sum-equal's output is 1. The
number of calls to to vector-sum-equal required to replace each vector-sum oracle is linear in
the field size (and thus polynomial in n).
We now apply the Composition Theorem with vector-sum-equal as the internal func-
tion and matrix rank as the external function. Condition 2 (the internal function "helps"
test/correct the external function) is satisfied by the construction above.
Condition 1 (hardness of the external language for the internal language) is satisfied by
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the following (constant depth) reduction.
(in GF(k)), construct the (n + 1) x (n +
Ma-
For a vector - = (v, ... , v,) and a field element a
1) matrix Ma as follows:
100...0
1 0 0 ... O
0 1 0 ... 0
0 0 0 ... I1
1 1 1 ... 1 a
It is not hard to verify that the rank of Mfa is not full if and only if the sum of 's entries is
a.
Condition 3 (testability and correctability of the internal language) is satisfied by the
construction of a constant-depth tester and corrector for the vector-sum-equal function. Ap-
plying the Composition Theorem results in a (standard) constant-depth tester and corrector
for matrix rank. M
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Chapter 6
Delegation in Error Correcting Codes
6.1 Introduction
Background. We study the complexity of locally decoding and locally list decoding codes,
we consider both the binary case (i.e. where the code's alphabet is {0, 1})1 and the non-
binary case.
Let us proceed more formally. Let C : "M --- N be the encoding function of an error-
correcting code.2 A local list-decoder D for a code C gets oracle access to a corrupted
codeword, and outputs a "list" of f local-decoding circuits D 1,...,Dj. Each Da is itself
a probabilistic circuit with oracle access to the corrupted codeword. On input an index
j E [M], a circuit Da from the list tries to output the j-th symbol of the message. We
say that the decoder is a (6, f)-local-list-decoder, if for every y E {0, 1}N and m E {0, 1}M,
such that the fractional Hamming distance between C(m) and y is at most 6, with high
probability at least one of the Da's successfully decodes every symbol of the message y.3
1Binary locally list decodable codes are of particular interest for their applications to hardness amplifi-
cation.
2Formally, we consider a family of codes one for each message length M. The parameters listed above
and below, e.g. N, e, f, should all be thought of as functions of M. For the exact definition of locally
list-decodable codes see Definition 6.2.1.
3We would like to point out that for binary codes we use (1/2 - E, f) to denote the relative distance and
list size, whereas previous work (e.g. [STV01]) used (e, f) to denote the same quantities (again, for binary
codes). We find this notation more useful, especially when we work with non-binary codes.
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When the list size f equals 1, i.e. there is a single decoding algorithm that is guaranteed to
decode every bit of the message (w.h.p.), we say that the code is locally decodable (without
a list). The quantity N/M which measures the amount of redundancy in the code is called
the rate of the code.
Throughout this paper, when we speak of locally list decodable codes (rather than just
locally decodable codes), we think of a local list-decoder as receiving an "advice" index
a E [f], running D to output Da, and then running Da to retrieve the j-th message symbol.
Note that by giving both D and the Da's oracle access to the received word, and requiring
them to decode individual symbols, we can hope for decoders whose size is much smaller
than N (in particular we can hope for size that is poly-logarithmic in N). See section 6.2.1
for formal definitions of locally decodable and locally list decodable codes.
6.1.1 This Work
This work studies the complexity of local and local-list decoders. Specifically, we ask whether
it is possible to decode in constant depth. We answer this question in the affirmative,
presenting transformations that reduce the depth of decoders and obtaining explicit locally
decodable and locally list-decodable codes with constant-depth decoders.
Our approach. See Section 1.4.1 for an overview of our approach to constructing more
efficient decoders.
Explicit Constructions. Using the above transformations, we obtain explicit codes that
can be decoded very efficiently. Of course, to apply the transformations we need to begin
with a decoder whose computations are in /VC1! We design such codes, and in particular we
obtain a binary locally decodable code, and both binary and non-binart locally list-decodable
codes. These are described in Theorems 1.4.3 and 1.4.4 in Section 1.4, and the following
non-binary construction:
Theorem 6.1.1 (Locally list-decodable non-binary code). For every E > 0, there is an
explicit code C : {0, 1}M - EN that is locally list-decodable by probablzstic ACo circuits of
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size poly(log M/e) from agreement E and with list szze poly(1/e). Where E I = 2POly(1/E), and
N = Mply(1/e).
Lower Bounds. Finally, we characterize the complexity of locally list-decoding binary
codes. We show that the codes of Theorem 1.4.4 are essentially optimal. See Theorem 1.4.6
in Section 1.4 for an informal statement, the proof is in Section 6.5.
From Theorems 1.4.4 and 1.4.6 we conclude that computing the majority function on
E(1/e) bits is essentially equivalent to (1/2 - E, poly(1/e))-local-list-decoding binary codes:
any circuit for a local-decoder of such a code can be used to construct a circuit of roughly the
same size and depth that computes majority on E(1/e) bits. In the other direction, there is
an explicit (1/2 - e, poly(1/E))-locally-list-decodable code with a very efficient (in terms of
size and depth) local-decoder that uses majority gates of fan-in E(1/E).
By known lower bounds on the size of constant-depth circuits that compute majority
[Raz87, Smo87], we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 6.1.2 (Informal). Any constant-depth (1/2 - e, poly(1/e))-local list decoder for
a binary code, must have size almost exponential in 1/E. This holds even if the decoder is
allowed mod q gates, where q is an arbitrary prime number.
In particular, we get an exact characterization of what is possible with constant-depth
decoders: up to radius 1/2 - 1/poly log log M locally-list-decodable codes with constant-
depth decoders and good parameters exist, and beyond this radius they do not. We note
that in fact we prove a stronger result in terms of the list size. We show that (1/2 - E, f)-
local-list-decoding with a decoder of size s and depth d, implies a circuit of size poly(s, £)
and depth d that computes majority on O(1/e) bits. This means that even if the list size is
sub-exponential in 1/E, the size of the decoder still must be nearly exponential in 1/e (even
if the decoder is allowed mod q gates).
Hardness amplification. Hardness amplification is the task of obtaining from a Boolean
function f that is somewhat hard on the average, a Boolean function f' that is very hard on
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the average. By a beautiful sequence of works [STV01, TV07, Tre03, Vio05], it is well known
that there is a tight connection between binary locally (list) decodable codes and hardness
amplification. Using this connection, we obtain both new positive and negative (in the spirit
of Corollary 6.1.2) results on (black-box) hardness amplification procedures. We defer the
statement of these results and a discussion to Section 6.6.
6.1.2 Related Work
As discussed above, our work benefits from a long line of beautiful results on program
checking, interactive proofs and cryptography. See the related work and discussion in Section
1.2.1.
Local Decoding. It is well known that for every (non-trivial) (1/2 - E, )-locally-list-
decodable code, it must hold that £ = Q(1/e 2 ) [Bli86, GV05] (in fact this bound holds even
for standard, non-local, list decoding). Thus, aiming to stay within polynomial factors of
the best possible information theoretic parameters, our primary goal is to understand the
complexity of decoding (1/2 - E, poly(1/E))-locally-list-decodable binary codes that have
polynomial rate (i.e. where N(M) = poly(M)). We consider such codes to have "good"
parameters (we elaborate on this choice below).
An explicit code with good parameters was given by Sudan, Trevisan and Vadhan
[STV01]. The local-decoder for this code (namely the algorithm D as well as the circuits
Da) is in the complexity class NC 2 (i.e. its depth is poly-logarithmic in its input length).
Explicit codes with local-decoders in the (strictly lower) class ACo (i.e. constant depth un-
bounded fan-in decoders) are also known [GL89]. However, these codes do not have good
parameters. 4 Specifically the Hadamard code has such a decoder [GL89], but its rate is
exponential in M.
4We note that for non-binary codes, i.e. codes with large alphabets, one can construct codes with
constant-depth local list-decoders and "good" parameters, see [GGH+07].
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Lower Bounds for Local List-Decoding. The question of lower bounding the complex-
ity of local-list-decoders was raised by Viola [Vio06]. He conjectured that (1/2 - E, £)-locally-
list-decodable codes require computing majority over O(1/E) bits,5 even when the list size f
is exponential in 1/E. Note that while exponential lists are not commonly considered in the
coding setting (the focus instead is on polynomial or even optimal list sizes), they do remain
interesting for applications to (non-uniform) worst-case to average-case hardness reductions.
In particular, lower bounds for local-list-decoding with exponential lists, imply impossibility
results for non-unzform black-box worst-case to average-case hardness reductions (see Section
6.6). In this paper we prove the conjecture for the case of sub-exponential size lists. While a
proof of the full-blown conjecture remains elusive, there are results for other (incomparable)
special cases:
Viola [Vio06] gave a proof (which he attributed to Madhu Sudan) of the conjecture for
the special case of the standard non-local list-decoding setting. It is shown that a list-
decoder from distance 1/2 - E can be used to compute majority on O(1/E) bits, with only
a small blow-up in the size and depth of the decoder. This result rules out, for example,
constant-depth list-decoders whose size is poly(1/e). Note, however, that in the non-local
list decoding setting the size of the decoder is at least N (the codeword length) because it
takes as input the entire (corrupted) codeword. This means that the bound on the size of
constant-depth decoders does not have consequences for fairly large values of e. For example,
when E > 1/ log N, the only implication that we get from [Vio06], is that there is a constant-
depth circuit of size at least N > 21/e that computes majority on instances of size 1/E.
But this is trivially true, and thus we do not get any contradiction. In the local-decoding
setting the decoders' circuits are much smaller and thus we can obtain limitations for much
larger e's. Indeed in this paper we rule out constant-depth decoders for (1/2 - e, poly(1/E))-
local-list-decoders for any E smaller than 1/poly log log N (and recall that this matches the
construction of [GGH+07]).
Viola [Vio06] also proved that there are no constant-depth decoders (with polynomial-
5By "require" we mean that the decoding circuit can be used to construct a circuit of comparable size
and depth that computes the majority function on O(1/) bits.
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size lists) for specific codes, such as the Hadamard and Reed-Muller codes. We, on the other
hand, show that there are no such decoders for any code (regardless of the code's rate, and
even with sub-exponential list size).
Recently (independently of our work), Shaltiel and Viola [SV08] gave a beautiful proof
of the conjecture for the local-decoding setting, with £ exponential in 1/E, but for the special
case that the decoder is restricted to have non-adaptve access to the received word. (Ie.,
they give a lower bound for decoders that make all their queries to the received word si-
multanuously.) Our result is incomparable to [SV08]: we prove Viola's conjecture only for
the case that f is sub-exponential in 1/e, but do so for any decoder, even an adaptive one.
We emphasize that for important ranges of parameters the best codes known to be decod-
able in constant depth use adaptzve decoders. In particular, the constant depth decoder of
[GGH+07], as well as its improvement in this work, are adaptive. In light of this, it is even
more important to show lower bounds for adaptive decoders.
6.1.3 On the Choice of Parameters
In this work binary codes with polynomial-rate are considered to have "good" parameters.
Usually in the standard coding-theory literature, "good" codes are required to have constant
rate.6 We note that, as far as we know, there are no known locally-decodable codes (both
in the unique and list decoding settings) with constant rate (let alone codes that have both
constant rate and have decoders that are in the low-level complexity classes that we consider
here). The best binary locally decodable codes known have polynomial rate [STV01]. It
is an interesting open question to find explicit codes with constant or even polylogarithmic
rate.
Finally, we note that in this work we do not (explicitly) consider the query complexity
of the decoder. The only bound on the number of queries the decoder makes to the received
word comes from the bound on the size of the decoding circuit. The reason is that known
codes with much smaller query complexity than the decoder size (in particular constant
6We do remark that for applications such as worst-case to average-case reductions, polynomial or even
quasi-polynomial rates suffice.
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query complexity) have a very poor rate (see e.g. [Yek08]). Furthermore, there are negative
results that suggest that local-decoding with small query complexity may require large rate
[KTOO, DJK+02, Oba02, KdWO4, WdWO05, GKSTO6].
6.2 Preliminaries
6.2.1 Locally Decodable and Locally List-Decodable Codes
The definition of locally list-decodable codes follows the formulation of Sudan, Trevisan and
Vadhan [STV01] (with some small modifications). (Uniquely) locally decodable codes are
defined as a special case (with list size 1).
Definition 6.2.1 (Locally decodable and locally list-decodable codes). Let F be a finite
alphabet. An ensemble of functions {CM : {0, 1}M --+ FN(M)}MN is a (6(M), f(M))-locally-
list-decodable code, if there is an oracle Turing machine D[.,-, -, -] that takes as input an index
i E [M], an "advice" string a E [f(M)] and two random strings rl, r 2,7 and the following
holds: for every y E FN(") and x E {0, 1}M such that Ar(CM(x), y) < 6(M),
Pr [a E [f] s.t. Vi E [M] Pr[DY(a, i, rl, r 2) = x[i]] > 3/4 > 3/4 (6.1)
rl r2
If IFl = 2 we say that the code is binary. If £ = 1 we say that the code is a (uniquely)
locally decodable code. We say that the code is explicit if CM can be computed in time
poly(N(M)).
Remark 6.2.2. One should think of the decoder's procedure as having two stages: first
it tosses coins r i and generates a sequence of £ circuits {Fa(', )}a[e], where Fa(i, r 2) =
D(a, i, ri, r 2). In the second stage, zt uses the advice a to pick the probabzlistic circuzt Fa
and use it (with randomness rl) to decode the message symbol at index i. In [STV01] the
7The length of these random strings lower-bounds D's running time. Later in this work, when we consider
D's with bounded running time, the length of these random strings will also be bounded.
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two-stage process zs part of the definition, for us zt zs useful to encapsulate it mn one machne
(D).
In the sequel it will be convenient to simplify thzngs by ignoring the first stage, and
consider D as a probabzlistic czrcuzt (taking randomness r2) wzth two inputs: the advce a and
the ndex to decode i, with the property that (always) for at least one a E [f], D(a, -) decodes
correctly every bit of the message (wzth hzgh probability over r 2). Indeed if we hardwire any
"good" rl (chosen in the first stage) znto D then we are zn this situation. Thzs happens wzth
probability at least 99/100. Thus in our proofs we wzll assume that thzs is the case, whzle
(implicitly) addzng 1/100 to the bound on the overall probability that the decoder errs. This
simplification makes our proofs much clearer (since we do not have to deal with the extra
randomness rl).
Remark 6.2.3 (Complexity of decoding). We often restrzct the complexzty of D. When
we say, for example, that C zs locally list-decodable (wzth the speczfied parameters) by ACo
circuits, we mean that D (and all of the circuits {Fa}) are probabihstic ACo circuzts of size
poly(log(N)/E).
As a stepping stone in our constructions we will also use a relaxed variant: approximate
locally-decodable codes, see Trevisan [Tre03].
Definition 6.2.4. [approximate locally list-decodable codes [Tre03]] Let F be a finite alpha-
bet. We say that a code {CM : {0, 1}M" - FN(M)}M is 6-approximate (d, f)-locally-list-
decodable, if it is the same as in Definition 6.2.1 with the following relaxation of (6.2.1):
Pr [a e [f] s.t. Pr [ Dy(a i,r1, 2) = x[i]] > 9/10 > 1 - 6] > 99/100
Less formally, in approximate codes the requirement is that for at least one advice string,
the decoder decodes at least a 1 - 6 fraction of the bits of the message (but not necessarily
all the bits of the message as in Definition 6.2.1). In our description of the decoders, we will
use the two-stage process view of this definition as discussed in Remark 6.2.2.
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6.2.2 Majority and Related Functions
We frequently use the two following results of Ajtai [Ajt93] (which are based on [AB84]).
Lemma 6.2.5. For all constants c > O, there is a family of ACo czrcuits that approximates
the weight of x to within a factor of 1 + 1/logc(n): i.e., given x E {0, 1}n , output a value 6
such that if the fractwon of 1's in x is 6', then (1 - 1/ logc(n))6 ' < 6 < (1 + 1/ logc(n))6' .
In particular,
Lemma 6.2.6. For all constants c > 0, there is a family of ACo circuits that computes
the following approximate majority promise problem: given x E {0, 1} n , decide whether the
fraction of 1's sn x zs greater than 1/2 + 1/logc(n) or less than 1/2 - 1/logc(n) (and give
arbitrary answer if none of the two is the case).
We use the promise problem II, defined in [Vio06] as follows:
IIyes = {x : x E {0, 1}2k for some k E N and weight(x) < k - 1}
IINo = {x :x E {0, 1}2k for some k E N and weight(x) = k}
where weight(x) is the number of bits in x which are 1.
We will extensively use the fact, proven in [Vio06], that computing the promise problem
II on 2k bit inputs is (informally) "as hard" (in terms of circuit depth) as computing majority
of 2k bits. This is stated formally in the claim below:
Claim 6.2.7 ([Vio06]). Let {C}MEN be a circuit family of size S(M) and depth d(M) that
solves the promise problem I on inputs of size M. Then, for every M e N, there exists a
circuit BM of size poly(S(M)) and depth O(d(M)) that computes majority on M bits. The
types of gates used by the BM circuit are identical to those used by CM. E.g., if CM is an
ACo[q] circuit, then so is BM.
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6.3 Transformations: Reducing the Complexity of De-
coding
In this section we show how to transform locally decodable and locally list-decodable codes
with expensive decoding (say in NAC 1 ), into ones that have constant depth ACo decoders.
6.3.1 Unique Local Decoding
We first prove Theorem 1.4.1 (see Section 1.4), showing how to transform a locally (and
uniquely) decodable bmnary code that has an NAC1 decoder to a locally decodable code (with
almost the same parameters) that has an ACo decoder. See the next section for transforma-
tions on (uniquely and list) locally decodable codes over general alphabets.
Proof Intution for Theorem 1.4. 1. This application of our general approach is the simplest
one. The idea is that the new encoding of x e {0, 1}M has two (equally long) parts appended
together. The first part is the original encoding of x and the second part is the truth-table
of the randomized image I of the AC'-complete language L (given by Lemma 2.3.16) on
instances of length log N. Given a word that is close enough to a codeword in the new code,
we know that both parts are close to what they should be. We then simulate in ACo the
original AC 1 decoder (on the first half of the received word) as follows: every time we need
to compute something (in A/C1 ) that we cannot do in ACo, we reduce this computation to
an instance y of the language L. We then use the random instance reduction from L to I
(computable in NAC) to compute this y by querying the truth-table of I (i.e. the second half
of the received word) at a random location. Since the second half is a string that is close
to the truth-table of I, with relatively high probability we compute L(y) correctly. We can
increase the success probability (in ACo) by repeating many times in parallel and taking the
approximate majority of the answers (this can be done in ACo by [AB84, Ajt93]). Thus with
high probability, the new ACo decoder decodes the first half exactly as the old AC 1 decoder
does.
A subtle issue that we need to deal with is the fact that the I-instances we reduce to
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need to be of length exactly log N (so that the two parts of the code are equally long). To
that end we use the strong downwards self reducibility property of L (see Definition 2.3.14
and Lemma 2.3.16) to adjust the lengths of the instances we work with. M
Proof. (of Theorem 1.4.1) Let L be the AC1l-complete language from Lemma 2.3.16, and let
I be its randomized image. Let x E {0, 1}M. We define:
C'(x), = C(x), if 1 < i < N
and
C'(x) = I(i - N) if N < i < 2N
That is, half of the codeword is the original codeword and the other half is the truth-
table of I for input length t = log N (we assume w.l.o.g. that N is a power of 2). The
approach to decoding C' is to use the random instance reduction from L to I to correct the
I-half of C'(x), and then to use the corrected I-half to help in decoding the half of C'(x)
corresponding to C(x). Details follow.
We explain how to "compile" the NC 1 decoder D for C, to create the ACo decoder D' for
C' that has the same output as D (w.h.p.). The key component in D' is a probabilistic ACo
procedure A, that tries to predict whether a given instance is in L or not, by querying the
(possibly corrupted) codeword y. Let (Z, S) be the random instance reduction from L to
I. Recall from Definition 2.3.2, that R is the randomizer that maps L-instances to random
I-instances, and E is the evaluator that computes the membership status of an L-instance
given the membership status of the random I-instance it was mapped to (by 7). Let t' = ta
(for some constant a > 0) be such that 7 maps instances of length t' to instances of length
t. We now describe the algorithm A:
Input : aE {0, 1 }t
Output : A prediction for L(a).
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The algorithm:
1. Run IR on a, d = E(log N) times in parallel and with independent random coins
to obtain (cl, T),... (Cd,  d), where c, E {0, 1} t and 7, E {0, 1}.
2. Query (in parallel) y at locations cl + N, ... , Cd + N (where we view c, as a
binary representation of an instance in [N]) to obtain the bits bl,..., bd. For each
1 < j < d, let w, = S(b3, T3).
3. Run the ACo procedure from Lemma 6.2.6 that computes the approximate ma-
jority on w 1l,..., Wd and output the outcome of the procedure.
Claim 6.3.1. If y is at dzstance at most 6/2 from a codeword in C' (where 6 < 1/4), then
for every a E {0, 1 }t', the probability that A predzcts correctly the membership of a in L is at
least 1 - 1/N.
Proof. Since y is at distance at most 6/2 from a codeword in C', then if we consider only the
I-half of y, it must be correct on at least a 1 - 6 > 3/4 of the entries. By the properties of
the random instance reduction, cl,..., Cd are uniformly and independently distributed in the
I-half of y. So for each j E [d], Pr[b, = I(c 3 )] > 3/4. When b3 = I(c,), w, = L(a) (again by
the properties of random instance reduction). By Chernoff bound, with probability at least
1/N at least 2/3 of the w3 's hold the correct prediction for L(a). And then the approximate
majority procedure gives the correct answer. 0
Before describing D', let us consider the computation of D (given oracle access to a word
y' E {0, 1}N). Let s = poly log(N) be the size of D as an N.C 1 circuit. We can divide D's
computation as follows: first in parallel it computes the (bits of the) positions it is going
to query y', and then given the values of y' in these locations it computes the output bit.
Thus the execution of D amounts to running at most s different M/C1 circuits, each of size
at most s. Let el,..., ek be the AnC1 computations that compute the query locations, and
ek+1 computes the output bit. By the fact that L is C-complete under ANC reductions
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and it is strongly downwards self-reducible, we can solve every e, by a constant depth circuit
making queries to instances of L of length (log N)' = t'.
We are now ready to describe D'. It is given randomness for the circuit D (and additional
auxiliary randomness), as well as oracle access to a word y E {0, 1}2N. It then simulates
the execution of D when it is given oracle access to the first half of y (which we should
think about as the original received word). As explained above, this computation can be
divided to the J/C 1 computations el,..., ek+1. In parallel for each e, (1 < i < k) D' runs
the constant-depth circuit that computes e, by making queries to instances of L of length t'.
This circuit makes poly log(N) queries to L on instances of length t'. On each one of these
queries, run the procedure A and use its answer as the oracle answer in the strong downwards
self-reducibility circuit. If A does not make mistakes, then D' holds at this stage the query
positions that D would have made to the original word in {0, 1}N. So D' makes the queries
in the same locations D makes them (in the first half of y). After making all these queries,
D' holds the answers that D would have read from the original word. Given these values
and the randomness, D' can compute ek+1 in the same way it computed el,..., ek. If A does
not make a mistake, then D' holds at this stage the output of D which we also define to be
the output of D'.
We conclude that D' does exactly the same as D as long as A does not make any mistake
during the execution. By claim 6.3.1, A makes a mistake with probability at most 1/N.
Since D' runs A at most poly log(N) times, by the union bound, with probability almost 1,
D' outputs the same output as D. Now, since y is at most 6/2-far from a codeword in C',
its first half is at most 6-far from a codeword in C. Therefore with high probability D, and
hence D', retrieves the correct value of the message in the given location. By construction
D' is an ACo circuit of size polylog(N). M
6.3.2 Local List Decoding
In this section we prove Theorem 1.4.2, showing how to transform a locally list-decodable
code that has an NAC 1 decoder to a locally list-decodable code that has an ACO decoder. In
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particular, this theorem also implies a similar transformation for (uniquely) locally decodable
codes with non-binary alphabets.
Proof Intuition for Theorem 1.4.2. The approach that we used to prove Theorem 1.4.1 can-
not be used to recover from distance more than 1/4 (even if we start with a code that can
be list-decoded from a large distance), because we need the truth-table part of the word
to be more than 1/2-close to the respective half in the codeword. One thing we can do
to improve the distance that we can recover from, at the price of doubling the alphabet
size, is to append the truth-table component-wise. That is, we append to each bit of the
original codeword an entry of the truth-table (recall that they are of the same length). This
allows us to list-decode from distance 1/2 - 1/log log(N) (assuming the original code has
a locally list-decoder in NC1), and the alphabet size is 4 (two bits per symbol). However,
to recover from distance more than 1/2 requires a different technique. The idea now is to
append (again, componentwise) the dzrect-product of I's truth table (I is, as before, the
randomized image of the NC-complete language L from Lemma 2.3.16). That is, every
symbol in the new encoding contains a symbol from the old encoding concatenated with the
binary string I(ix), . . ., I(is), where (ix, . . . , is) is a tuple of binary strings of some length
that is determined in the proof. For every possible tuple we will have a different entry in
the codeword.
As in the proof of Theorem 1.4.1, the new decoder simulates the old decoder. When it
needs to compute some NC1 computation, it creates a uniformly distributed s-tuple where
in each entry it either (with probability 1/2) puts a random instance for which it knows
its correct membership status in I (this can be done by using the solved instance generator
for I, see Definition 2.3.1), or (with probability 1/2) puts a random instance from which it
can conclude the value of the AC 1 computation given the correct membership status of that
instance in I (this can be done using the random instance reduction from L to I and the fact
that L is NC1 -complete). The new decoder now reads from the corresponding location in the
received word the (possibly corrupted) membership status of every instance in the s-tuple.
It then checks whether on the entries for which it knows the correct answer, the received
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word is correct, and that all the other (randomized) instances evaluate back to the same
answer. If not, it declares this location in the received word to be corrupted. Otherwise it is
a good indication that the symbol is not corrupted. The decoder assumes that the values it
reads from it are all correct and infers from them the correct value of the NVC 1 computation.
Given this procedure we can continue the simulation as in the proof of Theorem 1.4.1.
A subtle issue is the fact that the length of the original codeword and the length of the
extra information we append to it (i.e. the number of s-tuples) are not necessarily the same.
To solve this, we write many copies of the original codeword in the new one, so that the
repeated original codeword is of the same length as the number of s-tuples. We proceed with
the proof. M
Proof. (Of Theorem 1.4.2) We start by describing the code. Let s = s(N, e) and t = t(N, E)
be two integers that will be determined later. Consider all the s-tuples (ix,...,is,) where
i3 E {0, 1}t (for every 1 < j < s). We can assume, and will indeed make sure by our choice
of s and t, that 2st/N is an integer (and we assume without loss of generality that N is
a power of 2). Let L be the NC1 -complete language from Lemma 2.3.16 and let I be its
randomized image. Let t' = poly(t) be such that the random instance reduction from L to
I on L-instances of length t' generates I-instances of length t.
Let x E E", and let us define the codeword C'(x). Every entry in this codeword is
indexed by a different s-tuple as above. Thus the length N' of C'(x) is 2st . Let F be a
(natural) bijection from s-tuples to [2st]. Let (il,. . . , is) be an s-tuple and k = (F(il, ... , is)
mod N). The entry in C'(x) indexed by (i,... , is) is defined to be:
C(1),...,s = C(X)k o (I(i), . . . , 1(is))
where o denotes concatenation of strings. That is, every entry contains two parts, one is
an entry in the original encoding of z, and one is the s-bit characteristic vector of i1,..., is
as instances of the language I. The original encoding is repeated 2st/N times in the new
encoding. It is easy to see that if C is explicit then so is C'. Also note that every symbol in
243
F is composed of a symbol from E and s bits. Thus IF = IE l 2s.
We now describe the decoder D' for C'. More specifically, we describe how to "compile"
the ANC 1 decoder D for C, to create the ACo decoder D' that has the same output as
D. Namely, it outputs the NC 1 circuits M1,.. . ,Mt. Then each of the M,'s needs to be
"compiled" to an ACo circuit, but this can be done (in ACo) in the same way we transform
D to D'.
The key component in D' is a probabilistic ACo procedure that tries to learn whether
a given instance is in L or not, by querying the (possibly corrupted) word y. We start
by describing a procedure A1 that makes one query to the codeword and has a very low
probability of success, we later show how to amplify its success probability. A1 either outputs
a prediction regarding the membership of the given instance in L or declares the location in
which it queries the codeword to be corrupted:
Input : aE {0, 1}t
Output : A prediction for L(a) or "corrupted".
The algorithm:
1. For each i E [s] (in parallel and with independent random coins), do the following:
Choose uniformly v, ER {0, 1}. If v, = 0, run the A/Co solved instance generator
for I on input length t, to obtain a pair (c., y,) where y, E {0, 1} and c, E {0, 1}t
If v, = 1, run on a the N/Co random instance reduction from L to I, to obtain a
pair (c, - ) where -, E {0, 1} and c, E {0, 1}t.
2. Query the codeword y at the position indexed by the s-tuple (cl,..., cs), to re-
trieve the symbol a o (bl,... ,b,) (where a E E and b3 E {0, 1}).
3. For every i E [s] for which v, = 0, check that b, = y,. If this equality does not
hold (for at least one of these i's) declare the position indexed by (cl,... ,c ) to
be corrupted and abort.
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4. For every i E [s] for which v, = 1, compute the value w, = S(b,, -r) (recall that S
is the evaluator in the random instance reduction from L to I), and check that
for all these i's the w,'s are equal. If they are, set w = w,. Otherwise, declare the
position indexed by (cl,... ,c ) to be corrupted and abort.
5. Output w.
It is easy to verify that A1 is in ACo. We now give bounds on the probabilities that it
gives correct and wrong predictions.
Claim 6.3.2. If y is E-close to a codeword in C', then for every a E {0, 1} t ' , the probability
that A 1 predicts correctly the membership of a in L is at least E - 2-".
Proof. By the definitions of solved instance generator and random instance reduction, cl,..., c,
are independently and uniformly distributed. Thus we query y at a random location (uni-
formly distributed). Since y is E-close to a codeword, with probability at least E we query
a non-corrupted location. When this happens, we get the correct prediction as long as not
all the v,'s are 0 (which happens with probability 2-S). The reason is that bl,..., b, are the
true (0/1) membership values of the instances cl,...,, c in I. By the definition of solved
instance generator, this implies that with probability 1, for every i for which v, = 0, b, = y,.
And by the definition of random instance reduction, for every i for which v, = 1, w, = L(a).
Claim 6.3.3. For every a E {0, 1 }t' (and every y), the probability that A1 gives the wrong
prediction regarding the membership of a in L (i.e. says that it is in L when it is not or vice
versa) is at most 2- .
Proof. By the definitions of solved instance generator and random instance reduction, cl, ... , c,
are independently and uniformly distributed, and they are independent of the v,'s. Now sup-
pose A1 does not declare location (cl,..., c8 ) to be corrupted while giving a wrong prediction
regarding the membership of a in L. This can only happen if b, = yi = I(c,) for every i for
which v, = 0 (by the definition of solved instance generator), and b, # I(c) for every i for
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which v, = 1 (for otherwise, by the definition of random instance reduction, w, will be equal
to L(a) for at least one of these i's). In other words, location (cl,..., cs) must be corrupted
in such a way that exactly the bits indexed by i's for which v, = 1 are flipped while the rest
stay intact. Or, equivalently, every corruption pattern has exactly one choice of v,'s that will
cause A1 to give the wrong prediction (and not to detect the corruption). Since the v,'s are
independent of (cl,..., cs), we conclude that the probability that this event happens is 2-.
U
We now amplify the success probability of A1. Consider the following ACo procedure A2:
Input : aE {0, 1}t'
Output : A prediction for L(a).
The algorithm:
1. Run d/E times in parallel and with independent random coins the algorithm A1
on input a (d will be determined later).
2. Look at the string of length d/e over {0, 1, *} of the answers A1 gives in the
previous step (where * stands for "corrupted"). Run the procedure from Lemma
6.2.5 on that string, to estimate the number of O's and 1's in the string. I.e. first
change every * to 1 and estimate the number of O's and then change every * to 0
and estimate the number of l's.
3. Output the value that gets the higher estimate.
Next we want to prove that A 2 gives the correct prediction with very high probabil-
ity. This is true if we can ensure that (with high probability) the ratio between right and
wrong predictions of A1 is large (and then the procedure from Lemma 6.2.5 gives the right
prediction). To that end we set s to be log(1/e) + 2, and prove:
Claim 6.3.4. If y is E-close to a codeword in C', then for every a E {0, 1 }t', the probability
that A 2 predicts correctly the membership of a mn L is at least 1 - 2- Q(d)
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Proof. Let z be the string of length d/E over {0, 1, *} of Al's answers. Assume w.l.o.g. that
a E L (otherwise replace l's with O's in the argument below). By Claims 6.3.2, 6.3.3 and
our choice of s, the expected number of l's in z is at least (d/E)(E - 2-S) = 3d/4, and the
expected number of O's is at most (d/l)2- = d/4. By Chenoff bound, with probability at
least 2 -i(d), the actual number of l's will be at least 2d/3 while the number of O's at most
d/3. The ACo procedure from Lemma 6.2.5 estimates the number of l's and O's upto 0.01
(multiplicative) precision. This is enough for A 2 to conclude correctly that a E L. M
Before we describe D', let us consider the computation of D (given oracle access to a
word y E EN). Let w = poly(log(N)/e) be the size of D as an ANC 1 circuit. As in the proof
of Theorem 1.4.1, we can divide D's computation to the A/C1 computations, el,..., eK, that
compute the query locations. And the )AC computations, eK+1,..., ew, that compute the
output bits (unlike the proof of Theorem 1.4.1, now D outputs many bits which are the
descriptions of the M,'s). Each e, is of size at most w. By the fact that L is ANC-complete
and it is strongly downwards self-reducible, we can solve every e, by a constant depth circuit
making queries to instances of L of length (log(N)/E) for an arbitrarily small constant
a > 0. We set t' to be (log(N)/E), and set a such that t = (log(N)/E)6 (log(1/E) + 2)- 1
where 6 is the arbitrarily small constant from the statement of the theorem. Recall that
t and t' are polynomially related, so there is a setting of the parameters that achieve this.
Also in our choice of parameters, we make sure that 2st/N is an integer (we have enough
freedom in our choice of t to do this).
We are now ready to describe D'. It is given randomness for the circuit D (and additional
auxiliary randomness). Then in parallel for each e, (1 < i < K) it runs the constant-
depth circuit that computes L at length w by querying on instances of length t' (via strong
downwards self-reducibility). This circuit makes poly(log(N)/E) queries to L on smaller
instances. On each one of these queries, run the procedure A 2 and use its answer as the
oracle answer. If A 2 does not make mistakes, then D' holds at this stage the query positions
that D would have made to the original codeword in EN. For each such position, D' makes
the query in a random copy of the original codeword. That is, it chooses p ER [2st/N]
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and queries y in the position p plus the address computed for the original codeword. After
making all these queries, D' holds the list of E-symbols that D would have read from the
original codeword (At this stage D' ignores the s bits appended to each E-symbol). Given
these values and the randomness, D' can compute eK+1, -. et in the same way it computed
el,..., eK. If A 2 does not make mistakes, then D' holds at this stage the output of D which
we also define to be the output of D'.
We conclude that D' does exactly the same as D as long as A 2 does not make any mistake
during the execution. The number of times we invoke A 2 is f = poly(log(N)/E). We set d
(the parameter from the description of A 2 ) to be O(log(log(N)/e)) with a leading constant
that ensures that the probability (specified in Claim 6.3.3) that A 2 makes an error is at
most f- 1/100. So the probability that D' fails to decode correctly is bounded by the error
probability of D (at most 1/4), plus the probability that A 2 makes an error (at most 1/100
by union bound). By running D' twice with independent random coins we can drive the
error down to below 1/4. If the code was uniquely decodable it remains uniquely decodable.
If it was locally list-decodable (with f > 1) then this incurs a price of doubling the list size.
It is easy to verify that D' can be implemented by ACo circuits of size poly(log(N)/E).
Going back to the parameters of the code we see that the length N' of a codeword is
2s t = 21og(1/E+2)(log(N)/E)6(log(1/e)+2)- 1 = 2(log(N)/e)
and the size of the alphabet F is E| - 28 = E - O(1/E). U
6.4 Explicit Constructions
In this section we apply our general theorems from the previous sections to construct codes
with ACo local-decoders. We do that by first constructing codes with ANC 1 decoders and
then applying the general transformations to them. Previous locally-decodable codes with
the parameters that we need are not known to be in N.C 1 (in particular decoding the code
given in [STV01] involves solving a system of linear equations). We therefore construct new
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explicit codes with N/C1 decoders, and then apply our transformations to them.
6.4.1 A (Uniquely) Locally Decodable Binary Code
We prove theorem 1.4.3, constructing a binary code that can be (uniquely) locally-decoded
from a constant distance.
Proof of Theorem 1.4.3. In order to apply Theorem 1.4.1 we need to show an explicit code
that can be non-adaptively locally decoded from distance 2/25 by A/C 1 circuits of polylog-
arithmic size. To the best of our knowledge the only known locally-decodable code with
the parameters that we need is the so called low-degree extension code concatenated with
Hadamard [STV01]. Unfortunately we do not know how to implement the decoder for this
code in N/C1 . The reason is that it involves decoding the Reed-Solomon code which is done
via solving a system of linear equations. We therefore use a combination of known construc-
tions and techniques to construct a new code that does have an NlC1 local decoder (and
which avoids decoding the Reed-Solomon code). Our construction has three stages.
Stage 1 - Decoding the low-degree extension from small distances. The first stage
shows how to decode the low-degree extension code from a very small (sub-constant) relative
distance.
Given a string x E {0, 1}M we associate with it a multi-variate polynomial over a finite
field F as follows: fix F to be a field of cardinality (log M) 2 . Fix a subset H of the field of
cardinality log M. Let m be (log M)/(log IHI). Let b: [M] - H m be an injective map. To
encode x, we find the unique m-variate polynomial t : Fm - IF of degree at most |HI - 1
in each of the m variables, such that for every i E [M], T(b(i)) = x,. Such a polynomial
can be efficiently found by means of (multi-variate) interpolation. The encoding of x is the
evaluation of t on every point in Fm . Let us call this code C1 and it maps {0, 1}M to IFN1,
where N1 = 1FIm. Note that N1 = M 2 , this is because,
(log M) (log IF|)log N1 = m log (logM)(log FF) - 2log Mlog H
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We now explain how to locally-decode C1 from distance 61 = 1/(10 IFI) = 1/(10(log M)2 ).
We are given a string y E F" such that there exist a string x E {0, 1}) that satisfies
A(Cl(x),y) < 1/(101FI), and an index i E [M]. We associate i (via b) with a point in
H m C Fm on which we want to evaluate the polynomial 2. We choose a random line in
Fm that passes through b(i) (i.e. for h ER F m , we look at the line {b(i) + hz : z E F}),
and we read from y the F-values associated with the locations of all the |FI points on that
line. By pairwise independence, every point on the line in itself is uniformly distributed
(independent of b(i)), so by the union bound, with probability at least 9/10, all the values
that we read agree with t restricted to the line. Note that the restriction to the line is a
univariate polynomial over F of degree
m( H - 1) < (log M) 2/ log log M < IFI
So by interpolation we can retrieve 2(b(i)). By using Lagrange's formula and [HV06], this
non-adaptive decoder can be implemented by N/C 1 circuits of size polyF I = poly(log M).
Stage 2 - Boosting the distance with expanders. We now show how to obtain from
C1 a code with large alphabet that can be decoded from a constant distance. To that end
we use the expanders based technique of [ABN+92]. Specifically, let G = (L, R, E) be a d-
regular bipartite graph where ILI = IR , = N1  and G has the property that for every B C R
with IBI < 2N 1/5, there are at most 61N 1 vertices v E L, such IF(v) n BI > d/2 (where F(v)
is the set of neighbors of v).
Claim 6.4.1. There exist a family of graphs G with the speczfied parameters, where d =
poly(1/61), and given a name of a vertex v in G, the list of its d nezghbors can be computed
by NC 1 circuits of size poly(log N, 1/61).
Proof. Let H be the regular constant-degree Gabber-Galil expander on N, nodes [GG81]. We
take G to be the bipartite clog(1/61)-th power of H for some constant c that will be chosen
later: specifically, we join x E L and y E R by an edge for each walk of length c log(1/6 1 ) from
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x to y in H. Since H has constant degree, the degree of G is d = O(l)c 1o g(1/61) = (1/61)o(c).
Moreover, it has been shown [GG81] that H has (normalized) second-largest eigenvalue
A = 1 - Q(1) and it is well known that A(Hk) = A(H)k for regular undirected graphs H.
Therefore, our graph G has A(G) = (1 - Q(1))lo g (1/61) = 6e(c)
We now prove that G has the required decoding property. Fix a subset B C R with
IBI < 2N 1/5 and let A be the set of vertices v E L, such that IrF(v) n BI > d/2 (where F(v)
is the set of neighbors of v). We wish to show that IAl < 61N 1. By the expander mixing
lemma (cf. [ASO0]), we have:
E(A,B) - d IBII <dA AI IBI.
By the definition of A and B, E(A, B) > _ AI, and so we have:
d - d - I dAvA - B
2 NI -
which implies that Al < A2 - IBI/(1/2-IBI/N) 2 < 40-A2 .N1 (where the last inequality follows
from the assumption that IBI K 2N 1/5). Since A = 6o(c), we have JAl < O(6l(c))N 1  5 1N 1
by an appropriate choice of the constant c.
Furthermore, it has been shown [GV04] that walks of length £ on the N-node Gabber-
Galil expander can be computed by ACo circuits of size poly(log N, 2k), so the neighbors of
a given node in G can actually be computed by ACo circuits of size poly(log N 1, 1/61) (and
therefore, by /VC1 circuits of the same size). I
We define the following code C2 : IFN1 , (Fd)Nl:
C2 (X)Z = Xrl(F)Z) XF2) " ... " XrW()
where F, (i) is the j'th neighbor of vertex i E R.
We present a local-decoder D 2 for 02 that given a string y E (Fd)Nl for which there exist
x E FN1 that satisfies A(y, C2 (x)) < 2N 1/5, the decoder computes every entry in x correctly
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except for a 51 fraction of the entries. The decoder is as follows: Given oracle access to y as
above and an index i E Ni, we think of i as a left vertex in G. The decoder computes the list
of right neighbors jl,..., jd of i. It then query y in positions jl,..., jd, to retrieve d d-tuples
of F-symbols. Each such tuple contains a prediction of x,. That is, if i is the k'th neighbor
of jl then the k'th entry in the d-tuple that we read from location jl in y is x, (supposedly, if
j is not a corrupted location). The decoder takes x, to be the prediction that appears more
often than others in the d queries (in fact taking the majority is enough). Note that D 2 can
be implemented by ANC1 circuits of size poly(log N 1 , d) = poly(log N 1, 1/61), this is because
the neighbors in G can be computed in NC 1 by Claim 6.4.1, and computing the plurality
amounts to comparing in parallel all the d predictions and counting (in NC1 ) which one
appears most often. We now prove correctness.
Claim 6.4.2. Pr [D'(i) = X1 > 1 - 61
Proof. Let B C R be the set of right vertices that are associated with the corrupted locations
in y. By the hypothesis, |BI < 2N 1 /5. Let A C L be the set of vertices v E L such that
F(v) n B I > d/2. By the properties of G, JAl < 61N1 . For every i V A, the majority of
YFr(Z), ... , Yrd(,) are not corrupted, and therefore will give the right prediction for x,. M
Combining the codes C1 and C2, we get a code C' : {0, 1 }M + (Fd)N that can be non-
adaptively locally-decoded from a constant distance by N/C1 circuits. On index i E [M], the
decoder D' for C', first runs the decoder D 1 for C1 to produce the query locations. These
locations are then passed to the decoder D2 for C2. D2 retrieves the values in the requested
locations and passes them back to D 1 , who then computes the i'th bit of the message. D'
is in AC 1 because D 1 and D 2 are (and all the queries are done in parallel). Informally, it
corrects from distance 2/5 because D 2 corrects all but 61 fraction of errors, and D 1 corrects
the remaining 61.
Stage 3 - Back to binary code. The code C' can be locally-decoded from a con-
stant distance, however the alphabet of the code is not binary but rather contains F|d =
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(log M)Polylog M symbols. To get back to a binary code we use the technique of concatenat-
ing codes. More precisely, note that every symbol in Fd has a description (by bits) of size
poly log M. We encode every symbol separately by a binary code of polynomial rate. Thus
the size of the new codeword grows only by a polylogarithmic factor. The code that we are
going to use is the low-degree extension code concatenated with Hadamard [STV01]. Recall
that previously we said that we do not know of an A/C 1 decoder for this code, however now
we need to encode and decode strings of exponentially smaller length (i.e. instead of length
M, length poly log M), and this can easily be done by NC 1 circuits of size poly log M.
Let M' = dlog IFl, consider the binary code C3 : {0,1}M' _+{0, 1}N' given in [STVO1]
(i.e. the low-degree extension code concatenated with Hadamard), that has N' = poly(M')
and can be decoded from distance 1/5 (here we do not even need the code to be locally-
decodable, i.e. the circuit of size poly log M can read the whole (poly log M)-bit codeword).
Claim 6.4.3. C3 can be decoded from distance 1/5 by NC 1 czrcuits of size poly log(M) .
We define the concatenated code C : {0, 1}M + {0, 1}IN' .  as follows. Let f : [N'.N1 ]
[N'] x [Ni] be a bijection. Let i E [N' . N 1], and f(i) = (j, k). We define,
C(x), = C3('()k)
Note that N' = poly(dlog IFI) = polylog M, and N 1 = M 2 . So C maps M bits to
poly(M) bits. We now describe the local decoder D for C. Given oracle access to a string y
that is 2/25 close to a codeword, and i E [M], we first run the decoder D' for C' to compute
the query locations. For every such query, we read the N' bits that encodes (via C3) the
relevant symbol in the code C'. We run the decoder D3 for C3 to retrieve the symbol in the
code C'. We then pass these symbols to D' who returns the i'th bit of the message. Clearly,
D can be implemented by NAC1 circuits of size poly log M, because D' and D3 can (and all
the queries are done in parallel). We now prove correctness.
Claim 6.4.4. D decodes C from distance 2/25.
Proof. Let y E {0, 1}N'N be a string such that there is x E {0, 1}M satisfying A(y, C(x)) <
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2/25. We think of the locations of bits in y as indexed by (j, k) E [N'] x [N1] (as in the
definition of C). Let B C [N1] be such that for every k E B,
Pr [Yjk is corrupted] > 1/5
3JER[N']
By Markov inequality,
Pr [k E B] < 2/5
kER[N1]
Since the decoder D3 for C3 decodes from distance 1/5, it can decode correctly at least 3/5
of the symbols (those that their indices are not in B) to obtain a string y' E (Fd)N1 satisfying
A(C'(x), y') < 2/5. The decoder D' for C' can decode from distance 2/5, and therefore can
retrieve (w.h.p.) every bit in the message x. 0
Finally, we apply on the code C the transformation given in Theorem 1.4.1, to obtain
an explicit binary code that maps M bits to poly(M) bits, and can be locally-decoded from
distance 1/25 by probabilistic ACo circuits of size poly(log M). I
6.4.2 A List-Locally Decodable Non-Binary Code
Next we prove Theorem 6.1.1, showing how to explicitly construct a code with large alphabet
that can be locally list decoded from very large distances by ACo circuits. This code was
originally presented in [GGH+07].
Proof of Theorem 6.1.1. As in the proof of Theorem 1.4.3, we first show a code with similar
parameters that can be locally list-decoded by an A/C1 decoder, and then we apply Theorem
1.4.2. Our code is given by applying the "direct product" construction of Impagliazzo et. al.
[IJKO6] on the code from Theorem 1.4.3. We start with some definitions. Recall the defini-
tion of an approximate locally list-decodable code [Tre03] (Definition 6.2.4). The following
definition appears in [IJKO6]:
Definition 6.4.5. [direct product codes] Let C : {0, 1}"M {0, 1}N be a code. The k-direct-
product of C is the code C k" {0, 1}Mi" ({0, 1}k)Nk, defined as follows (for x E {0, 1}M and
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il , ik E [N]),
Ck(X 
--, ,Zk = C(W) ) ,
So far, to keep the statements and proofs simple, we only considered non-adaptive de-
coders. In order to use [IJKO6] we need to consider adaptive decoders.
Definition 6.4.6. We say that a decoder is k-adaptive (or has adaptivity k), if the queries
that it makes to the received word can be partitioned into k sets (layers) where all the queries
in layer i can be done simultaneously (given the answers to the queries from layers j < i).
It is not difficult to see that Theorems 1.4.1 and 1.4.2 can be generalized to decoders
with constant adaptivity. This is done by applying the same arguments, from one layer to
the next. Since the number of layers is constant, the new decoder is still in ACO.
The following is implicit in [IJKO6].
Lemma 6.4.7. Let C : {0,1}M - {0, 1}N be an arbitrary code. Then for any E
Q(poly(1/k)): the k-direct-product of C is (1/25)-approxzimate locally and list-decodable from
agreement e with list szze poly(1/e) by constant-adaptivity probabilistic N/C circuits of size
poly(log(N)/E).
Claim 6.4.8. Let C : {0, 1}M - {0, 1}pOly(M) be the code from Theorem 1.4.3. For E > 0,
let k = poly(1/E) satisfy the conditzon of Lemma 6.4. 7. Then Ck, the k-direct-product of C,
is an explicit code that is locally list-decodable with constant adaptivity by probabilistic N/C1
circuits of size poly(log(M)/E) from agreement E and with list size £ = poly(1/E).
Proof. Let x E {0, 1}M, and let N = poly(M) be the length of a codeword in C. Given
oracle access to a string y E ({0, 1}k)Nk satisfying A(y, Ck(x)) < 1 - E, the decoder Dk
for C k , runs the (1/25)-approximate local and list decoder for C k . By Lemma 6.4.7, this
produces a list, M 1, .. ., M , of machines such that at least one of them, M,, computes C(x)
correctly on at least a 24/25 fraction of entries. We combine each M, with the decoder for
C. By Theorem 1.4.3, the latter can locally decode C from distance 1/25. So together with
M? it computes x correctly on every entry. The decoder and the M,'s are in NAC1 because
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so are the approximate decoder for C k (by Lemma 6.4.7) and the decoder for C (Theorem
1.4.3). 0
Finally, we apply Theorem 1.4.2 (generalized to decoders with constant adaptivity) on C k
to obtain a code with the specified parameters that is locally list-decodable by probabilistic
ACo circuits of size poly(log(M)/E). U
6.4.3 A Locally List-Decodable Binary Code
We now prove Theorem 1.4.4, giving a construction of locally list-decodable binary codes with
efficient decoders. We obtain an essentially optimal (up to polynomial factors) construction,
see Section 6.5 for the matching lower bounds.
Remark 6.4.9. The construction of Theorem 1.4.4 only applies for E > 2 -e(0 ) . Thus
we fall slightly short of covering the whole possible range (sznce one can hope to get such
codes for E = 1/Mc for a small constant c). We note, however, that the range of E which
is most nteresting for us is between 1/poly log M and 1/poly log log M (see the discussion
in the introduction) which we do cover. We also mention that if one insists on codes with
E = 1/M, then we can construct such codes with quasi-polynomial rate.
To prove Theorem 1.4.4, we concatenate three codes. The first is the binary locally-
decodable code constructed in Section 6.4.1 that can be uniquely decoded from a constant
relative distance. I.e., the code of Theorem 1.4.3: {CM : {0, 1}M -, {0, 1}POly(M) }MN that
can be locally decoded (uniquely, i.e. with list size 1) from distance 1/25 by probabilistic
ACocircuits of size poly(log M).
The second code that we need is a non-binary approximate locally-list-decodable code.
Recall the definition of approximate locally list-decodable codes (Definition 6.2.4). We con-
struct an approximate locally list-decodable code: a modification of the code of [IJKW08],
that allows local decoding in ACo.
Theorem 6.4.10. For every 6 = 0(1) and every 2- (~0l ) < = e(M) < 6, there exists
a 6-approximate (E, poly(1/E))-locally-list-decodable code {CM : {0,1}M - FPOly(M)MEN .
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Where IF| = poly(1/). The code has a local decoder that can be implemented by constant
depth czrcuts of size poly(logM, 1/e).
Proof. The code of [IJKW08] is a concatenation of two approximate locally list-decodable
codes. The "outer" code Cout, maps {0, 1}M to EpOly(M), where IEI = 2 poly(1/ E) . To reduce the
alphabet size, each poly(1/E)-bit symbol of this code is then itself encoded by an "inner" code
Cmn, mapping {0, 1}POly (1/E) to N' where F is as stated in the theorem (of size poly(1/e)),
and N' = (poly(1/e))0 g(l/). We note that for the range of e that we consider we get that
N' < poly(M). Thus the concatenated code maps {0, 1}M to Fpoly(M), and by [IJKWO8], its
approximate list-decoding parameters are as stated.
In terms of complexity, the decoder for C,, can be implemented in ACo (this is shown
in [IJKW08]). We do not, however, know how to implement the decoder for Cout in ACO.
Therefore, to get a code decodable in ACo, we modify their outer code (we abuse notation
and still call the modified code Cout) and present an ACo decoder for the modified code. The
main reason we need to modify their code is that we don't know of a concise and unique
representation of low-degree affine sub-spaces that can be computed and manipulated in
ACo. We instead represent such subspace using some basis vectors and a shift vector (a
concise, but not unique representation). This changes the code and allows decoding in ACO.
Modified Outer Code. Let k = log |EI. We associate the set of message indices [M] with
a m-dimensional vector-space over a finite field Fq, where qm = M, and qs = k = log Ej =
poly(1/e). The codeword is indexed by tuples of 9 vectors in Yqm, and thus each codeword
is of length O(IFqm 9 ) = O(M 9 ) = poly(M).
Take msg E {0, 1 }M . Its encoding is defined as follows. Let (v, ... , ) be an index
into the codeword (i.e. v-,...,v, E Y m). Consider the affine subspace B spanned by
vl,..., v8 and shifted by s
B = {alv + + asv + : al,... ,as E .Fq
Recalling that entries in the message are associated with vectors in Fqm (using some canonical
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ordering), we take the (vi,..., Uv, s)-th codeword entry to be all the message bits whose
indices are in the affine subspace B (in some order). I.e.,
Cnt(msg)[vJ, .. .,v8, s= {msg[u] : u E B}
Each alphabet symbol's length is the size of the 8-dimensional subspace which is qs =
poly(1/e), and thus the alphabet size is exponential in 1/E, as claimed above. We think of
each (9-vector) index in the codeword as an 8-dimensional affine subspace of -qr, where the
first 8 vectors in the index are basis vectors and the last one is a shift vector. First, note that
each such affine subspace appears multiple times with different representations. Also note
that not every index represents an 8-dimensional subspace (since the first 8 vectors may be
linearly dependent). However, the next claim says that the number of indices that do not
represent 8-dimensional subspaces is very small.
Claim 6.4.11. Let v~, . . vs be chosen uniformly and zndependently from jnq. The proba-
bilhty that they are hnearly dependent ts at most - < 1/ V .
Proof. Examine the process of iteratively choosing 8 uniformly random vectors. After choos-
ing the first i > 0 vectors, and assuming they are independent, they span a subspace of size
q. The i + 1-th vector is in the subspace they span only with probability k, and otherwise
the i + 1 vectors are linearly independent. Taking a Union Bound, the total probability the
vectors are dependent is at most . 0
Note that in our range of parameters, 1/V-M << E. So we can ignore the locations that
are indexed by subspaces that are not 8-dimensional, this will not have a meaningful effect
on the success probability of decoding or on Hamming distances between received words and
codewords (since we only care about received words that have agreement at least E with
codewords).
We now describe the local decoder D for this code (viewed as a two-stage process as
discussed in Remark 6.2.2). Given access to a string y that has Hamming distance at most
E from some codeword Cot(msg), D produces O(1/E2) probabilistic circuits such that at
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least one of them decodes at least 1 - 6 fraction of the bits in msg (with high probability
over the random coins of the circuit). Each one of the circuits in the list is generated
independently as follows: D chooses uniformly at random 9 vectors v',v , , E .q. By
Claim 6.4.11, with high probability these vectors represent an 8-dimensional affine subspace
B (otherwise consider this a failure). D then chooses a random 4-dimensional affine subspace
A C B. Next, D reads the received word y in the entry indexed by (v, ... , v-, s). (For an
uncorrupted location this should give the message values at all indices in the subspace B.)
Let v be the values in this entry that are associated with the subspace A. D generates the
circuit CA,v that does the following: on input j E [M], CA,v checks whether j E A (where
we think of j as a vector in Frm). If so, then CA,v outputs the bit in v that is associated
with the vector j. Otherwise, CA,v repeatedly (in parallel) for O( 'og/) iterations does the
following: chooses (tJ1,..., us, t that are randomly distributed under the constraint that
they span an 8-dimensional affine subspace B, such that A U {j} C B. It then reads y at
index (iy,... , is, t), and compares the bits in v with the bits in this location associated
with the elements of A. If for none of the iterations there is a full agreement between v and
the bits associated with A, then CA,v outputs some error message. Otherwise, it takes the
first iteration in which there is an agreement and outputs the bit in this location associated
with j.
The proof that this decoder has the desired list-decoding properties follows exactly the
proof of [IJKW08]. (Ignoring the tiny fraction of indices that are not 8-dimensional sub-
spaces, our code is their code with the only difference that each bit in the codeword is
repeated many times, as many as the number of representations of an 8-dimensional affine
subspace.) We only need to verify that the complexity of the decoder is as stated, which
amounts to verifying the following three easy claims. Note throughout that addition and
multiplication over Fq can be done by ACo circuits of size poly(q) = poly(1/E).
Claim 6.4.12. Given an 8-dimensional affine subspace B C F, represented by (v, V8, S, s
A probabzlistic ACo circuit of size poly(log M, 1/e) can sample a uniformly distributed 4-
dimensional subspace A C B.
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Proof. Every 4-dimensional subspace in B is spanned by 4 linearly independent vectors, and
all these sub-spaces are of equal size. Thus, to sample the subspace A we first sample 4
random vectors (i- 1 ,..., ad4) in B, by taking random linear combinations of vi,..., v. With
high probability (more than say 1/2), these vectors will be linearly independent. This can
be verified in ACo by enumerating all q4 = poly(1/E) linear combinations, and thus the
success probability can be amplified (in parallel time) to 1 - 1/poly(M, 1/E). This gives us
a random basis for the 4-dimensional subspace A. Now, to choose the shift vector t we just
choose another random vector in B (linearly independent or not) and obtain the random
4-dimensional subspace A spanned by (u 1, ... , t?4) and shifted by t. All of these operations
can be done by an ACo circuit of size poly(log M, 1/E). U
Claim 6.4.13. Given a 4-dimensional affine subspace A C Fm, represented by (v1,..., lv, s)
and a vector E Jq. An ACo circuit of size O(log 1/e) can check whether j E A.
Proof. Again, this is easily done by enumerating all q4 = poly(1/E) possible linear combina-
tions of (vJ,..., v-), and checking whether any of them give the vector j - '. U
Claim 6.4.14. Given a 4-dmensional affine subspace A C .- m, represented by (v,..., , s)
and a vector E f7m \ A, a probabzlistic ACo ctrcuit of size poly(log M, 1/E) can sample
vectors (u71,..., Wt, t that are uniform under the condition that they span an 8-dimensional
subspace B, such that A U {J} C B.
Proof. First, we take a fifth basis vector, which is j - S, to get the (unique) 5-dimensional
subspace A' that contains A and {j}. Now, we want to choose a random 8-dimensional
subspace that contains A', and to do this we choose 3 more uniformly random vectors that
are independent of (vI,..., v4, j- s (as above, this can be done in ACO).
We now have 8 basis vector and the shift vector g. These define the 8-dimensional
subspace B. Note that this representation of B depends on the representation of A (e.g. in
particular the shift vector is still s), while we need to choose an independent representation
of B. To solve this, we "randomize" the basis vectors by choosing a new basis consisting of
8 random linearly independent linear combinations of the basis vectors (this randomizes the
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basis vectors but doesn't change the subspace), and then choosing a random vector in the
subspace as the new shift. All of this is easily done in ACo, and we indeed obtain a random
representation of a random subspace containing A'. U
The third code in our construction is the well known Hadamard code with its local
list-decoder given by Goldreich and Levin [GL89].
Theorem 6.4.15. For every 0 < E(m) < 1/2, The Hadamard code, Had : {0, 1} m
{0, 1}2  s a (1/2 - e, -) -local-list-decodable-code. The decoder can be implemented by an
ACo circuit of size poly(m, 1/E) that uses mayorty gates of fan-in E(1/e).
We can now put everything together and prove Theorem 1.4.4.
Proof of Theorem 1.4-4. Fix e(M) = E in the specified range. Our code C is a combination
of the codes in Theorem 6.1.1 (we denote it here by C1), the code in Theorem 6.4.10 (we
denote it here by C2) with E2 = E3/2 and 6 = 1/25, and the code in Theorem 6.4.15 (C3 ),
with E = E/2. Given a message x E {0, 1}M, we first encode it using Ci to obtain a binary
string x' (of length N1 = poly(M)). We then encode z' using C02 to obtain a string of length
N 2 = poly(M) over the alphabet F (of size poly(1/e)). We then concatenate this code (i.e.
encode every symbol of it) with C3. Let k = log(jFI). The length N of the final code is N2
multiplied by N3 = 2k = poly(1/E) < poly(M), which is poly(M).
We now turn to the decoding properties of this code. We start by showing that the
concatenation of C2 and C3 , denoted by C', is an approximate locally list-decodable (binary)
code.
Lemma 6.4.1. C' : {0, 1}N -+ {0, 1}N is a 1/25-approximate (1/2 - E, )-locally-list-
decodable code, where t = poly(1/E). The local decoder for C' can be implemented by
constant-depth circuits of size poly(log M, 1/e), with majority gates of fan-in 0(1/E) (and
AND/OR gates of unbounded fan-in).
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Proof. By Theorem 6.4.10 (and the simplification assumption from Remark 6.2.2), there is
a locally-list-decoder D2 taking advice of size log(£2), where £2 = poly(1/E), such that for
every y E FN2 and for every m E {0, 1}N" for which Ar(C2 (m), y) < 1 - E3/2,
3a E [£2] s.t. Pr [Pr[Dy(a, i) = m[i]l > 9/10] > 24/25
ZER[N1]
Furthermore, D2 can be implemented by a constant depth circuit of size poly(log M, 1/E).
By Theorem 6.4.15, there is a locally-list-decoder D3 taking advice of size log(£3), where
£3 = O(1/E 2 ), such that for every y E {0, 1}N3 and for every m E {0,1}k for which
A(C 3 (m), y) < 1/2 - E/2,
]a E [£3] s.t. Vi E [k] Pr[D'(a, i) = m[i]] > 9/10
Furthermore, D 3 can be implemented by a constant depth circuit of size poly(log M, 1/E),
that uses majority gates of fan-in O(1/e).
The fact that the local-list-decoders for the two codes can be combined to obtain a local-
list-decoder for the concatenated code (with list size that is the product of the two list sizes)
is quite a standard argument. We refer the reader to [STV01] for the formal details. Here
we just sketch the argument.
The decoder D' for the concatenated code C' roughly works as follows: it takes advice
(a 2 , a3) E [£2] x [£3]. Given an index i, D' runs D2 (a 2, i). Whenever the latter needs a (k-bit)
symbol from its received word, D' runs D 3 (a3 , .) to retrieve the whole symbol.
To analyze the correctness we argue as follows. For a received word y E {0, 1}N and
a message x E {0, 1}N 1 for which A(C'(x), y) < 1/2 - E, there are at least e/2 symbols of
C2(x) for which their C3 encoding has 1/2 + E/2 agreement with the corresponding bits in y.
Each one of these gives rise to a list of £3 possible symbols one of which is the correct one.
By an averaging argument, there is a a3 E [£3], for which at least E/2 E2 = E3/2 fraction of
the symbols of C2(x) are such that the a 3 'th element in the list produced by D3 (with advice
as) agrees with the corresponding symbol of C2 (x). Since D2 (with an appropriate advice
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a2) can 1/25-approximately recover from agreement E3/2, we get that the combined decoder
with advice (a2, a3) recovers a string that has agreement 24/25 with x.
The size of the decoders D2, D3 is poly(log M, 1/E). Both are of constant depth where
the latter uses majority gates of fan-in E(1/e). Combining the two we get a constant-depth
(1/2 - E, poly(1/E))-locally-list-decoder for the concatenated code of size poly(log M, 1/E)
with majority gates of fan-in E(1/E). I
We now can describe the decoder D for C. On a received word y E {0, 1}N, we run the
local-decoder D1 for C1. Whenever it requires a bit from its received word (in {0, 1}N1), we
run the approximate local-decoder D' for C', with some advice string in [f] (where £ = £2 3 ),
to obtain a candidate for that symbol. If the received word has 1/2 - E agreement with C(x)
(for some x E {0, 1}M), then there exist an advice string a E [f] such that D2(a, .) decodes
correctly at least 24/25 fraction of the symbols of Ci(x). Thus, when D1 receives symbols
from D2(a, .), it gets access to a word that has 24/25 agreement with Ci(x) and hence it
correctly decodes every symbol in x.
Since the sizes of the two decoders is poly(log M, 1/E), and their depth is constant, then
so are the size and depth of the combined decoder, and it uses majority gates of fan-in E(1/E)
because so does the decoder D2. 0
As mentioned in Remark 6.4.9, we can obtain codes with quasi-polynomial rate that work
for E = 1/M'. These are obtained by replacing the code C, in the proof of Theorem 6.4.10,
which is a de-randomized direct-product code by [IJKWO8], with their (not de-randomized)
direct-product code. We state the parameters of these codes without a proof.
Theorem 6.4.16. For every 1/M E< = E(M) < 1/2 (where 6 > 0 is a constant), there
exist a (1/2 - E, poly(1/E)) -locally-list-decodable code {CM {0, 1 }M --4 {0, 1 }MOg(o(lo/))I}MN
with a local-decoder that can be implemented by a family of constant depth circuits of szze
poly(logM, 1/E) that use majority gates of fan-in E(1/E) (and AND gates of unbounded
fan-in).
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6.5 Local-List-Decoding Requires Computing Major-
ity
In this section we prove Theorem 1.4.6, showing that local list-decoding of binary error
correcting codes from relative distance 1/2 - E essentially requires computing the majority
function on E(1/e) bits. In particular, this means that there are no constant-depth decoders
for polynomial e. This negative result is essentially tight (up to polynomial factors) given
the construction of Theorem 1.4.4. We begin with a formal statement of the theorem:
Theorem 6.5.1 (Formal statement of Theorem 1.4.6). Let {CM : {0, 1}M - {0, 1}N(M)}MeN
be a (1/2 - e(M),J(M))-locally-list-decodable code, such that £(M) < 2 M", and 1/N 6 1 <
E(M) <_ 62 for universal constants , 61, 62. Let D be the local decoding machine, of size
S(M) and depth d(M).
Then, for every M E N, there exists a circuit AM of size poly(S(M), f(M)) and depth
O(d(M)), that computes majority on 0(1/E(M)) bzts. The types of gates used by the circuit
AM are identical to those used by D. E.g., if D is an ACo[q] circuit, then so zs AM.
Proof Intuition for Theorem 1.4.6. Fix a message length M and E = E(M). We will
describe a circuit B with the stated parameters that decides the promise problem H on
inputs of length roughly 1/E. By Lemma 6.2.7 this will also give a circuit for computing
majority.
We start with a simple case: assume that the (local) decoder D makes only non-adaptive
queries to the received word. In this case we proceed using ideas from the proof of Theorem
6.4 in [Vio06]. Take m to be a message that cannot be even approximately decoded s from
random noise with error rate 1/2. Such a word exists by a counting argument. Let C(m)
be the encoding of m. Let x E HIye U rIN be a H-instance of size 1/2E (we assume w.l.o.g.
throughout that 1/E is an integer). B uses x to generate a noisy version of C(m), by XORing
each one of its bits with some bit of x that is chosen at random. It then uses D to decode
sBy this we mean that no decoder can recover (w.h.p.) a string that is, say, 1/3-close to m.
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this noisy version of C(m). If x E rINo, this adds random noise (error rate 1/2), and the
decoding algorithm cannot recover most of m's bits. If xz II y,, then each bit is noisy with
probability less than 1/2 - 2E, which means that w.h.p. the fraction of errors is at most
1/2 - E, and the decoding algorithm successfully recovers every bit of m.
By comparing the answers of the decoding algorithm (or more precisely, every decoding
algorithm in the list, by trying every possible advice) and the real bits of m in a small number
of random locations, the algorithm B distinguishes w.h.p. whether x E IIes or x E IINo-
Note, however, that B as described above is not a standard algorithm for H. This is
because we gave B access to the message m as well as its encoding. Both of these are strings
that are much larger than we want B itself to be. So our next goal is to remove (or at least
minimize) B's access to m and C(m), making B a standard circuit for II. Observe that B
as described above distinguishes whether x is in IIyes or in IINo with high probability over
the choices of D's random coins, the random locations in which we compare D's answers
against m, and the random noise generated by sampling bits from z. In particular, there
exists a fixing of D's random string as well as the (small number of) testing locations of m
that maintains the advantage in distinguishing whether x comes from Hy,, or HINo, where
now the probability is only over the randomness used to sample bits from x. So now we can
hardwire the bits of m used to test whether D decodes the noisy version of C(m) correctly
(i.e. we got rid of the need to store the whole string m). Furthermore, after we fix D's
randomness, by the fact that it is non-adaptive, we get that the positions in which B queries
the noisy C(m) are now also fixed, and independent of x. So we also hardwire the values of
C(m) in these positions (and only these positions) into B. For any x, we now have all the
information to run B and conclude whether x is in Iyes or IINo-
Next we want to deal with adaptive decoders. If we proceed with the ideas described
above, we run into the following problem: suppose the circuit has two (or more) levels of
adaptivity. The queries in the second level do not only depend on the randomness of the
decoder, but also on the values read from the received word at the first level, and in particular
they also depend on the noise. The noise in our implementation depends on the specific H-
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instance x. This means that we cannot hardwire the values of C(m) that are queried at the
second level because they depend on z!
To solve this problem, we analyze the behavior of the decoder when its error rate changes
in the middle of its execution. Specifically, suppose that the decoder D queries the received
word in d levels of adaptivity. For every 0 < k < d, we consider the behavior of the decoder
when up to level k we give it access to the encoded message corrupted with error-rate 1/2-2E,
and above the k'th level we give it access to the encoded message corrupted with error-rate
1/2. By a hybrid argument, there exists some level k, in which the decoder has a significant
advantage in decoding correctly when up to the k'th level it sees error rate 1/2 - 2E (and
error-rate 1/2 above it), over the case that up to the (k - 1)'th level the error-rate is 1/2 - 2E
(and 1/2 from k and up). We now fix and hardwire randomness for the decoder, as well
as noise for the first k - 1 levels (chosen according to error-rate 1/2 - 2E), such that this
advantage is preserved. Once the randomness of D and the noise for the first k - 1 levels are
fixed, the queries at the k-th level (but not their answers) are also fixed. For this k-th level
we can proceed as in the non-adaptive case (i.e. choose noise according to x and hardwire
the fixed positions in C(m)). We now have to deal with queries above the k'th level. At
first glance it is not clear that we have gained anything, because we still have to provide
answers for these queries, and as argued above, these may now depend on the input x and
therefore the query locations as well as the restriction of C(m) to these locations cannot
be hard-wired. The key point is that for these "top" layers the error rate has changed to
1/2. So while we have no control on the query locations (as they depend on x) we do know
their answers: they are completely random bits that have nothing to do with m or C(m)!
Thus, B can continue to run the decoder, answering its queries (in the levels above the
k'th) with random values. We thus obtain a circuit that decides membership in HI correctly
with a small advantage. Since the number of adaptivity levels is only d (the circuit depth
of the decoder), the distinguishing advantage of the k-th hybrid is at least O(1/d), and in
particular this advantage can now be amplified by using only additional depth of O(log(d)).
This gives a circuit that computes H and concludes the proof. Due to space constraints we
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defer the formal proof of Theorem 1.4.6 to the full version of this paper [GR08].
Proof of Theorem 1.4.6. Fix M E N, C = CM : {0,1} { 1 }N(M), 1N(M) E = E(M),
£ = £(M), S = S(M) and d = d(M) as in the statement of the theorem. We show how to
use the decoder D to construct a circuit for computing II on instances of size 1/E (and thus
also for computing majority, by Claim 6.2.7) as promised in the theorem statement.
Let us start with some notation. For an advice string a E [f], an index i E [M], and
a received word y E {0, 1}N, we denote by DY(a, i, r) an execution of the decoder D with
advice a, randomness r, and (oracle) access to y E {0, 1}N to retrieve the i-th message
bit (recall that we are working under the simplifying assumption from Remark 6.2.2). For
m E {0, 1}M and 0 < a < 1, we use F (a, y, m) to denote the fraction of indices i in m that
DY(a, i, r) recovers with probability at least a (the probability is over D's randomness r).
Formally:
F(a, y,m) def 1
F(a, y, m) i E [M] : Pr[DY(a, i, r) = m[i]] > all
Let Eo be the uniform distribution on {0, 1}N, and E1 be the distribution over {0, 1}N in
which every bit is chosen (independently) to be 1 with probability 1/2 - 2e and 0 otherwise.
First we show that there exists a message m E {0, 1}M, such that if C(m) is corrupted
with completely random noise, then with probability 9/10 over the noise, for every advice
string a, the decoder D cannot recover more than 3/5 of m's indices with probability greater
than 3/5 (over its random coins).
Claim 6.5.2. There exists a message m E {0, 1}M such that,
Pr []a E [f] s.t. F3/5 (a, C(m) E e, m) > 3/5] < 1/10
e*--Eo
Where the e operatwon between bit strings means bt-wise XOR.
Proof. The intuition is that if e is drawn from Eo (error rate 1/2), then C(m) G e is inde-
pendent of C(m), and thus for most m's, all of the f possible outputs of the decoder are far
from m. Formally:
267
Prmc{0,1}M,eEo [3a E [C] s.t. F 3/ 5 (a, C(m) e e, m) > 3/5] =
PrME{0,1}M,e-Eo [3a E [f] s.t. r 3/ 5 (a, e, m) > 3/5] =
1
Prme{O,1}M,e_Eo [3a E [I] s.t. I{i E [M] : Pr[De(a, i, r) = m[i]] > 3/5} > 3/5]
Examining this last quantity, for any fixed error vector e and advice a, let me be the (sin-
gle) message obtained by taking m [i] to be the more probable answer (over r) of De(a, i, r).
Now, fixing e, and taking a random m, the probability that
1
3a E [C] s.t. I{i E [M] : Pr[De(a, i, r) = m[i]] > 3/5} > 3/5M
is at most the probability that for the random m, for some a E [C], the fractional distance
between m' and m is at most 2/5. Denote by Vol2/ 5 (M) the volume of the M-dimensional
sphere of radius 2M/5 (in the M-dimensional Hamming cube). Taking H to be the binary
entropy function, the probability that there exists a E £ such that m is 2/5-close to m' is
(by a union bound) at most:
S- Vol 2/5(M) £ 2 (H(2/5)+o(1))M 1M < < < 1/102" 2- 2Q(M) -
Where in the last inequality we assume £ < 2"~ for a universal constant K. We conclude
that indeed:
Pr [3a E [f] s.t. F3/ 5(a, C(m) D e, m) > 3/5] < 1/10
mE{O,1}M,e-Eo
and thus certainly there exists an m E {0, 1}M for which
Pr [3a E [C] s.t. F3/ (a, C(m) D e, m) > 3/5] < 1/10
e-Eo
|
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In contrast to the above claim, the decoding algorithm has the guarantee that for every
message m E {0, 1}M, with high probability over noise e of rate 1/2 - 2E or less, there exists
an advice string a E [f] such that when D is given this advice string and oracle access to the
codeword C(m) corrupted by e, it recovers every bit of m with probability 9/10.
Claim 6.5.3. For every message m E {0, 1}M:
Pr []a E [f] s.t. Fg/o1 (a, C(m) e e, m) = 1] > 9/10
e*-E1
Proof. Recall that the decoder D has the guarantee that if a codeword is corrupted in less
than a 1/2 - e-fraction of its coordinates, then for some a E [f], when D uses advice a it
can recover each of the original message's coordinates with probability at least 9/10 (over
its coins). It remain only to show that the probability that e drawn from El corrupts more
than a 1/2 - E-fraction of C(m)'s coordinates is at most 1/10. This follows by a Chernoff
bound, since e that is drawn from E1 corrupts independently every coordinate of C(m) with
probability 1/2 - 1/2e. Then the probability that the fraction of coordinates corrupted
is more than 1/2 - 1/e is exponentially small in 1/e (here we use that fact that 1/E is
significantly smaller than N, because E > 1/N 61 for some universal constant 61 > 0). In
particular, for E smaller than some universal constant 62 > 0, this probability is indeed
smaller than 1/10 as required. M
Fix m as in Claim 6.5.2. We define a probabilistic circuit A 1 that for b E {0, 1} gets
oracle access to a string y = C(m) e e where e is sampled from the distribution Eb. The
goal of the circuit is to guess the value of b. We begin by constructing such a circuit that
also gets oracle access to the string m. The algorithm is described in Figure 6-1.
The algorithm A1 (as described in Figure 6-1) can be implemented by a probabilistic
oracle circuit of size poly(S, f) and depth O(d), where the circuit has oracle access to the
message m and noisy codeword C(m) e e. Denote by F the randomness used by A1.
269
Oracle access to: m and y = C(m) e e where e <- Eb.
Output: b.
The algorithm:
Let q = O(log(f)). For every a E [f] do the following in parallel:
1. Choose random indices i,...,i [M].
2. Choose random strings r,..., r, for D.
3. For every j E [q] run DY(a, ia, ra) to obtain a prediction for the bit rn[i]. If for at
least 43 of the j's, the prediction is equal to m[ia], output 1 and halt.
Otherwise (no a E [[] resulted in output 1), output 0 and halt.
Figure 6-1: Algorithm A1
Claim 6.5.4.
Pr [AmC(m)ee(r) 1] - Pr [Amc(m)e(r) = 1] > 1/2
e*--E,r e--Eo,r
Proof. By Claim 6.5.3, when e is drawn from El, with probability 9/10, there exists a E [f] for
which D (with advice a) successfully recovers each of m's indices with probability 9/10 (over
its random coins). In this case, when A1 tries this a, with probability at least 1 - 1/poly(f),
in at least 3 of its q experiments it will successfully retrieve the proper bit of m (by a
Chernoff bound). Taking a Union bound, we conclude that, when e is drawn from El, the
probability that A 1 outputs 1 is at least 8/10.
By Claim 6.5.2, when e is drawn from Eo, with probability 9/10, for every a E [f], there
exist a 2/5 fraction of m's indices, such that D (with advice a) fails to recover each one of
them with probability at least 2/5 (over its coins). In this case, for any a in the execution
of A1 , the probability of successfully recovering bits of m in a 4 fraction of the experiments
is at most 1/poly(C) (because at best, the decoder can recover with high probability 3/5 of
the bits of m, and is expected, over its randomness to recover each of the remaining 2/5
bits with probability less than 3/5). Taking a Union bound, when e is drawn from E 0, the
probability that A1 outputs 1 is at most 2/10.
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In conclusion:
Pr _[A 'c(m)ee() = 1] - Pr _[A'C(m)ee(F) = 1] > 8/10 - 2/10 = 6/10 > 1/2
e+ E,r eEor
We now remove the need for oracle access to the message m. This can be done by fixing
(for each a E [f]) all of the i ,..., iq in the description of A 1, such that the difference in
the probabilities of A1 outputting 1 in Claim 6.5.4 is preserved (by averaging such a fixing
exists). The values m[ia], .... , m[i ] (for every a E [f]) can then be hard-wired into the circuit
A 1 (there are only poly(C) of them). Let us call the new circuit A 2 which now has only oracle
access to C(m). We have,
Pr [Ac(m)ee(F) 1] - Pr _[Ac(m)ee() = 1] > 1/2 (6.2)
e--E,r e<-Eo,r
The next step is to remove the oracle access to C(m) e eb (these oracle queries are made
by D). This is not straightforward since (as noted in the proof intuition) the queries of an
adaptive decoder to the noisy codeword may depend on the noise, and through it (in our
construction) on the input x itself. Since we do not know the query locations, we cannot
hardwire the proper values of C(m) into the circuit. We use a hybrid argument to overcome
this difficulty. This involves further notation.
Assume that the decoder D asks its queries in d levels of adaptivity (d is a bound on
its depth, so it is certainly a bound on the number of adaptive levels). For d distributions,
GI,...,Gd on {0, 1}N, we denote by A ((m)G)...G ) the output of A2 , with randomness
f, where queries to the noisy codeword are answered as follows: for every adaptivity level
k E [d] of the decoder D, sample ek - Gk . If in its k-th level, D queries the codeword in
position j E [N], then the answer is C(m)[j] D ek[j].
Note that if we use an oracle as described above (that generates a different noise vector
for each adaptivity level), then if the same query is asked in different levels, the answers
may be inconsistent. We want all answers to be consistent between the adaptivity levels
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and across all of A 2 's executions of D (note that consistency across executions is important
because the list-decoding guarantee is against a single fixed noise vector). To guarantee
consistency, we modify A 2 so that the answers to queries across different executions (and
within each execution) are always consistent; if k is the first execution in the minimal level in
which query j is made (across the parallel executions), then the answer to query j is always
C(m) [j] ( ek [j]. We note that this consistency guarantee can be realized with an ACo circuit,
by always answering a query with the answer given to that query in the lexicographically
first level and execution number.
Now, for every 0 < k < d, we define
k d-k
Ok de C(m) El,..., EEo, . . . , Eo
Consider running A2 with oracle O k . That is, for the first k levels we give A 2 access to C(m)
corrupted with error rate 1/2 - 2e and for the last d - k levels we give it access to C(m)
corrupted with error rate 1/2. By (6.2):
Pr [A d( )=1]- Pr [A 0 (f)= 1] > 1
,E1 ,...,E 1  r,Eo,...,Eo 2
This inequality holds because for the oracles 00 and Od , all the error vectors (in the different
levels) have the same error rate. In this case, A 2 with the above "consistency modification",
behaves identically to A1 (with the hard-wired bits of m) with that same error rate. It
follows, by triangle inequality, that there exists 1 < k < d, such that,
Pr [A k(r) = 1]- Pr [Ak (r) = 1] > 1 (6.3)
r,Eo,...,Eo,E1 ,...,El r,Eo,...,Eo,E ,...,E - 2d
Fix such a k. Consider the circuit A obtained from A 2 as follows: Fix f, as well as the noise
for the answers of the oracle on the first k - 1 levels, such that the advantage in Inequality
(6.3) is preserved. After doing this, all the queries as well as their answers for the first k - 1
levels are fixed. Hardwire all of them into the circuit (these are poly(S, £) bits). Also, the
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queries (but not their answers) in the k'th level are fixed. Hardwire these queries into the
circuit, as well as the values of C(m) in these positions.
We now use A to answer a new guessing game. It is given access to a sample e <-- Eb
(b E {0, 1}) and it has to guess the value of b. It does so by simulating A 2 with the fixed
randomness f, answering oracle queries as follows: for the first k - 1 levels it uses the fixed
queries and their answers. For level k, if A 2 queries the received word in position j (which
is now fixed), A returns as an oracle answer the value C(m)[j] G e[j] (recall that C(m)[j]
is hardwired). For the levels above k, A returns random bits (uniformly and independently
distributed) as oracle answers. Note that throughout A, just like A 2, guarantees consistency
of answers to D's oracle queries across the parallel executions and adaptivity levels.
Since A 2 is an oracle circuit of size poly(S, £) and depth O(d), then so is A. Also, it
is clear that A simulates A k when b = 1 and AOk-1 when b = 0 (with fixed values that
maximize the gap in (6.3)). Let f' be the randomness of A. We have,
1
Pr [Ae( ' ) = 1]- Pr [Ae(f ' ) = 1] >  (6.4)
e-El,' e+-Eo,' - 2d
Let
def Pr [Ae(f/) = 1] = Pr[A k = 1]
e -E 1 ,r'
We are finally ready to describe a circuit B that computes II correctly on instances of
length 1/2E with a small advantage (that will later be amplified). We assume w.l.o.g. that
1/2e is an even integer. On input x E lys U IINo of length 1/2e, B runs A while simulating
the noise e - Eb as follows: whenever A queries e in position j, B chooses uniformly
i E [1/2e] and returns the bit x[i]. At the end of the execution, B returns the same answer
as A does.
B is also a circuit of size poly(S, f) and depth O(d) (inherited from A). If x E IIyes, then
Pr, [x[i] = 1] = 1/2 - 2E, and the simulated oracle is distributed identically to a sample from
El. On the other hand, if x E IINo, then Pr,[x[i] = 1] = 1/2, and the simulated oracle is
distributed identically to a sample from E0 . We conclude from Inequality (6.4):
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Claim 6.5.5. If x E IIye, Pr[B(x) = 1] > -y. And if x E IINo, Pr[B(x) = 1] < y - 24
Finally, we amplify the success probability of B. This can be done by hard-wiring -Y in
the circuit, and running B a poly(d) number of times (in parallel) with independent random
coins. If at least y - -L of the executions return 1, then return 1, and otherwise 0. By Claim
6.5.5 and a Chernoff bound, this amplified version of B computes II correctly on instances of
size 1/2E with probability of error at most 1/10. Furthermore, it is a circuit of size poly(S, f)
and depth O(d) (note that counting the number of 1-answers in the poly(d) executions that
are run for the final amplification step only requires additional depth O(log(d))).
I
By using known lower bounds for computing the majority function by ACo [q] circuits (for
a prime q) [Raz87, Smo87], we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 6.5.6. Let {CM : {0, 1 )} {0, 1}N(M)}MrEN be a (1/2-E, f)-locally-list-decodable
code (where E is in the range specified in Theorem 1.4.6) with a decoder that can be tm-
plemented by a family of ACo[q] circuits of size s = s(M) and depth d = d(M). Then
s = 2(1/) (1/d)/poly().
6.6 Hardness Amplification
What is Hardness Amplification? Functions that are hard to compute on the average
(by a given class of algorithms or circuits) have many applications, for example in cryp-
tography or for de-randomization via the construction of pseudo-random generators (the
"hardness vs. randomness" paradigm [BM84, Yao82, NW94]). Typically, for these impor-
tant applications, one needs a function that no algorithm (or circuit) in the class can compute
it on random inputs much better than a random guess. Unfortunately, however, it is often
the case that one does not have or cannot assume access to such a "hard on the average"
function, but rather only to a function that is "somewhat hard": every algorithm in the
class fails to compute it and errs, but only on relatively few inputs (e.g. a small constant
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fraction, or sometimes even just a single input from every input length). In order to bridge
this "hardness gap", an approach that has been used (very successfully) is to find a way
to convert "somewhat hard" functions to functions that are "very hard" (on the average).
Procedures that attain this goal are called hardness amplification procedures or reductions.
Let us be more precise. We say that a Boolean function f : {0, 1}* -- {0, 1} is 6-hard on
the average for a circuit class C = {Cn}nN (where circuits in the set C, have input length
n), if for every large enough n, for every circuit C, E C,;
Pr [Cn(x)= f(x)] < 1- 6
xE Un
The task of obtaining from a function f that is 6-hard for a class C, a function f' that
is 6'-hard for the class C, where 6' > 6 is called hardness amplification from 6-hardness to
6'-hardness (against the class C). Typical values for 6 are small constants (close to 0), and
sometimes even 2-", in which case the hardness amplification is from worst-case hardness.
Typical values for 6' (e.g. for cryptographic applications) are 1/2 - n - ( 1).
The most commonly used approach to prove hardness amplification results is via reduc-
tions, showing that if there is a sequence of circuits in C that computes f' on more than a
1 - 6' fraction of the inputs, then there is a sequence of circuits in C that computes f on
more than 1 - 6 fraction of the inputs. An important family of such reductions are so-called
fully-black-box reductions which we define next.
Definition 6.6.1. A (6, 6')-fully-black-box hardness amplification from input length k to
input length n = n(k, 6,6'), is defined by an oracle Turing machine Amp that computes
a Boolean function on n bits, and an oracle Turing machine Dec that takes non-uniform
advice of length a = a(k, 6, 6'). It holds that For every f : {0, 1}k {0, 1}, for every
A: {0, 1}) _ {0, 1} for which
Pr [A(x) = Ampf(x)] > 1 - 6'
XERUn
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there is an advice string a E {0, 1}a such that
Pr [DecA(a,x)= f(x)] > 1- S
xERUk
where DecA(a, x) denotes running Dec with oracle access to A on input x and advice a.
If Dec does not take non-uniform advice (a = Ial = 0), then we say that the hardness
amplification is uniform.
The Complexity of Hardness Amplification. We now elaborate on the role that the
complexity of Dec plays in hardness amplification. Recall that hardness amplification is used
to amplify the average-case hardness of functions that are somewhat hard. In particular,
suppose we want to obtain from a function f : {0, 1}k _+ {0, 1} that is 6-hard against some
class (of algorithms or circuits) C, a function f': {0, 1} -+ {0, 1} that is 6'-hard against C,
using a hardness amplification procedure as defined in Definition 6.6.1. For this application,
we need a (6, 6')-fully-black-box hardness amplification from length k to length n (as above),
such that Dec itself (as a machine with non-uniform advice) is in the class C. To see this,
set f' = Ampf. Then by contradiction, if there is A E C that computes f' on more than
1 - 6' fraction of the instances of length n, then DecA(a, .) computes f on more than 1 - 6
fraction of the instances of length k. Furthermore, DecA(c , ) E C (here we assume that C is
informally "closed under oracle access"), which is a contradiction to the 6-hardness of f. To
summarize, the complexity of Dec determines against which class of algorithms or circuits
the hardness amplification can be used. In particular, if one wants to use such hardness
amplification to amplify hardness against uniform classes of algorithms or circuits, then the
hardness amplification must be uniform.
We note that the question of finding functions that are average-case-hard for low com-
plexity classes, such as ACo[q], is of central importance for de-randomizing these classes
[NW94]. This motivates the study of hardness amplification against such classes, especially
since these are the only classes for which (unconditional) mildly average hardness results
are known [Raz87, Smo87], and thus there is clear hope of unconditional de-randomization.
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We now elaborate: a function f that is very hard on the average (at least 1/2 + 1/polyn)
for a class can be used in the Nisan-Wigderson construction [NW94], to obtain efficient
pseudo-random generators that fool statistical tests in the class. This, in turn, can give a
de-randomization of the class. Unfortunately, for classes such as ACo[q], no such hardness
results are known: [Raz87, Smo87] only give constant hardness (smaller than 1/2) of the
mod p function for a prime p f q. Consequently, we do not know how to unconditionally de-
randomize probabilistic ACo[q] circuits, even using sub-exponential size deterministic ACo[q]
circuits.
It is well known [STV01, TV07, Tre03, Vio03] that there is a tight connection between
(2 - k, f')-fully-black-box hardness amplification (or in other words worst-case to average-case
reductions) and binary locally (list) decodable codes. We state this fact without proof.
Proposition 6.6.1. There is a (1/2 - E, t)-locally-list-decodable code Enc : {0, 1}K
{0, 1}N with a decoder D, if and only if there is a (2- k, 1/2 - e)-fully-black-box hardness
amplification from length k = log K to length n = log N defined by Amp and Dec, that
takes a = log £ bits of advice, where Amp is Enc and Dec is D.
Our results, both positive and negative, on constructing locally list-decodable binary
codes, lead to progress on the complexity of hardness amplification.
New worst-case to average-case reductions for low complexity classes. As stated
above, it is well known that explicit binary locally list-decodable codes with polynomial rate
(and even quasi-polynomial rate) imply worst-case to average-case reductions for the class
EXP' [BFNW93, IW97, STV01]. To see this, consider such a code C : {0, 1}M + {0, 1}N
that can be locally and list decoded from agreement 1/2 + e. Let f : {0, 1}* - {0, 1} be an
EXP-complete function, and let TFm be its M = 2m-bit truth-table for input length m. Now
consider the function f whose truth table for input length cm = log N (for some constant c
depending on the rate of the code) is C(T7). f E LXP because the code is explicit and Trm
can be computed in time 2md (for some constant d). Now suppose that there is an efficient
algorithm A that computes j correctly on a 1/2 + e fraction of the inputs of length cm. Then
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the truth table of A at that length has 1/2 + e agreement with C(T7). This together with
the decoder for C gives an algorithm B that solves f correctly on every input (of length m)
given some non-uniform advice: indeed, by letting A answer the queries of the decoder, we
can generate a list of circuits, one of which solves f correctly everywhere, and the advice
bits give the index of this circuit in the list. Now, since both the decoder and A are efficient,
we obtain an efficient algorithm that solves f correctly on the worst-case. Thus there is an
equivalence between the worst-case and average-case hardness of EXP-complete languages,
against efficient algorithms.
In the argument above, B runs both the algorithm A (whose efficiency we determine by
hypothesis) and the decoder (whose efficiency is a property of the code). Thus the efficiency
of the decoder determines the efficiency of the worst-case to average-case reduction, and
hence the class of efficient algorithms against which we can establish worst-case/average-
case equivalence in SXP. By using our construction from Theorem 1.4.4, we obtain a
reduction in non-uniform ACO for polylogarithmic E. However, we can do better. By using
ideas from Trevisan and Vadhan [TV07], we can obtain a reduction in uniform ACO. They
show how to remove the non-uniform advice bits (assuming that there are not too many
of them) by using the fact the EXP-complete languages have instance checkers. Roughly
speaking, an instance checker for a language L, is an efficient probabilistic oracle algorithm,
that on input x computes L(x) when given access to an oracle that computes L correctly,
and when given a faulty oracle, either detects that the oracle does not compute L correctly
or it still outputs L(x). We refer the reader to [TV07] for the formal definition. Using the
fact that there are very efficient instance checkers for EXP-complete languages, we obtain
the following theorem.
Theorem 6.6.2. Let C be a class of algorithms (or Boolean circuits) that can compute
probabilstic uniform ACO circuits. Then for every SXP function f : {0, 1}* -> {0, 1}, there
is an LXP function f : {0, 1}* -+ {0, 1} such that: for every large enough m, if there is no
algorithm (or family of circuits) in the class C that computes f at length m correctly in the
worst-case, then there is no algorithm (or family of circuits) in the class C that can compute
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f at length n = poly(m) correctly on at least a 1/2+ 1/(log m)' fraction of the inputs, where
a > 0 zs a unwversal constant.
Proof. Consider the language L = {(M, x, c) : M is a deterministic TM that accepts x within
c steps, where c is in binary representation}. It is EXP-complete under ACo reductions. So
it is enough to show a worst-case to average-case reduction with the specified parameters
from this language. We need the following easy claim.
Claim 6.6.3. L has an instance checker (with exponentially small error) that can be zmple-
mented in ACo.
Proof. One can apply our general approach presented in this paper to obtain the claim.
However there is a much simpler way. It is well known that a complete language for a given
class (of languages) has an instance checker, if it has a Probabilistic Checkable Proof in
which the problem of computing every given bit in the proof can be done within the class.
In particular EXP-complete languages have this property. The computation of the instance
checker involves running the PCP verifier as well as the reduction to the complete language.
Now take the PCP proof for an instance of L, and append to it for every possible random-
ness of the verifier, the tableau of the verifier's computation (given the input, the randomness
and the bits read from the original proof). This is still a PCP proof with the property that
every bit of it can be computed in EXP. But now the verifier simply needs to check the
correctness of the tableau and this can be done in ACo. Finally since L is complete under
ACo reductions, we obtain an instance checker for L that can be implemented in ACo. M
We now proceed as in the outline above. Let Tn be the M = 2m-bit truth-table of L
for input length m. Consider the function f whose truth-table for input length n is C(T),
where C is the code from Theorem 1.4.4. We set e to be 1/(log m)o = 1/(log log M)0 , where
a > 0 is a constant that ensures that the ACo decoder for C is of size poly log M = poly(m).
By the parameters of C, n = log IC(TL)I = O(m).
We prove the contrapositive. Suppose there is an algorithm A in the class C that computes
f correctly on 1/2+1/(log m)o fraction of the inputs of length n. Then we can run the decoder
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for C with oracle access to A and obtain poly log m algorithms (that use A as an oracle)
one of which computes L correctly (everywhere) on input length m. Since A E C and the
decoder is in ACo, we conclude that every algorithm in the list is in C. Now to solve a given
input of length m, we run the ACo instance checker for L with each one of the algorithms
in the list as an oracle (we do that in parallel and with independent random coins). Finally,
we compute the approximate majority of the answers we receive from the instance checker.
The whole procedure is in uniform ACo making oracle calls to A, and hence it is in C. M
Negative Results. Using this equivalence of fully black-box hardness amplification and
local list-decoding, together with Theorem 1.4.6, we can show (informally) that worst-case
to average-case hardness amplification with small non-uniform advice requires computing
majority. This is stated formally in the theorem below:
Theorem 6.6.4. If there zs a (2 - k, 1/2 - E(k))-fully-black-box hardness amplification from
length k to length n(k) where Dec takes a(k) bzts of advzce and can be Zmplemented by
a circuit of size s(k) and depth d(k), then for every k E N there exists a circuit of size
poly(s(k), 2 a(k)) and depth O(d(k)), that computes majority on O(1/E(k)) bzts.
It is known [Raz87, Smo87] that low complexity classes cannot compute majority. Thus,
Theorem 6.6.4 shows limits on the amount of hardness amplification that can be achieved
by fully-black-box worst-case to average-case reductions (that do not use too many bits of
advice), in which Dec can be implemented in low-level complexity classes. I.e. classes that
cannot compute majority (e.g. ACo and ACo[q]). The reason is that if there exists hardness
amplification for which Dec is in such a class, then by Theorem 6.6.4 there must be a circuit
family in the same class for majority, contradicting known circuit lower bounds [Raz87,
Smo87]. In particular, the theorem implies that there are no uniform (or even O(log 1/)-
non-uniform) (2 - k , 1/2-e)-fully-black-box worst-case to average-case reductions for E smaller
than 1/poly log k, where Dec is a AC[q] circuit (for a prime q) of size poly(k, 1/). This
should be contrasted with [GGH+07] who showed such a fully-black-box reduction (with Dec
in ACo) for e > 1/ logo k, where 3 is a universal constant.
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Finally, we note that the worst-case lower bounds (which are actually mildly average-
case lower bounds) of [Raz87, Smo87] hold against non-uniform ACo[q]. This means that it
may be possible to get the average-case hardness required for pseudo-randomness by using
a lot of non-uniformity in a fully-black-box reduction (i.e. a reduction in which Dec takes
poly(k) bits of advice). Shaltiel and Viola [SV08] rule out such non-uniform fully-black-box
reductions in the special case that Dec has only non-adaptive access to A.
Extensions. Theorem 6.6.4 can be extended in two ways: first to rule out hardness am-
plification from mildly hard functions (and not necessarily worst-case hard) to very hard
functions, and second to rule out not necessarily fully black-box hardness amplification.
Let us start with the first direction. Proposition 6.6.1 can be extended to show a similar
equivalence between 6-approximate locally (1/2 - e, £)-list-decodable codes to (6, 1/2 - E)-
fully-black-box hardness amplification (with the same translations between the parameters).
Let 0 < a < 1/2 be an arbitrary constant. Theorem 1.4.6 can be extended to show that
a 1/2 - a-approximate locally (1/2 - e, f)-list-decodable code implies circuits for majority
with the same parameters as in the statement of Theorem 6.6.4.9 Putting the two together
we obtain the following.
Theorem 6.6.5. Let 0O < a < 1/2 be an arbitrary constant. If there is a (1/2-a, 1/2- (k))-
fully-black-box hardness amplification from length k to length n(k), where Dec takes a(k) bits
of advice and can be implemented by a circuit of szze s(k) and depth d(k), then for every
k E N there exist a circuit of size poly(s(k), 2 a(k)) and depth O(d(k)), that computes majority
on 1/e(k) bits.
We conclude with an informal discussion about not necessarmly fully black-box hardness
amplification. Note that in definition 6.6.1, the hardness amplification is required to work
for every function f. A more relaxed notion is (not necessarily fully) black-box reductions:
9The proof follows the outline of the proof of Theorem 1.4.6 using the fact that from error rate 1/2 we
cannot recover more than 1/2 + a/2 of the bits of the message m, while from error rate 1/2 - E we can
recover at least 1/2 + a of the bits. So by sampling bits from m we can distinguish between the two cases.
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Definition 6.6.6. A (6, 65')-black-box hardness amplification from f : 0, 1}k -+ (0, 1} to
f' : {0, 1} -- , 1 1} is defined by an oracle Turing machine Dec that takes non-uniform
advice of length a = a(k, 6, ') and the following holds; for every A : {0, 1} - {0, 1} for
which
Pr [A(x) = f'(x)] > 1 - 6'
XE RUn
there is an advice string a E {0, I}a such that
Pr [DecA(a,x)= f(x)] > 1- 6
XE RUk
This is relaxation of fully-black-box hardness amplification. In this case, the hardness
amplification is not required to work for any function, but only for a speczfic and known
function. Suppose we have a function f that we already know is worst-case hard, or even
6-hard on the average, against a low level class such as ACo[q]. Perhaps we can use specific
properties of the function f (e.g. random self-reducability) to construct a function f', such
that there is a (6, 1/2 - 1/poly(n))-black-box hardness amplification from f to f' that can be
implemented by ACo [q] circuits. This would not be a fully-black-box hardness amplification
result, but it certainly suffices for de-randomization applications (in fact, usually for de-
randomization one uses a specific and explicit hard function).
We note that the results of Theorems 6.6.4 and 6.6.5 can be extended to show that if a
function f is 6-hard on the average for a low complexity class, and furthermore, there is a
uniform (or even somewhat non-uniform) (6 + 1/poly log(k), 1/2 - E(k))-hardness amplifica-
tion from f to any other function f', where Dec is of size s(k) and depth d(k) , then there
exists a circuit of similar size and depth that computes majority on O(E(k))-bit inputs.
The basic idea is similar to the proof of Theorem 6.6.4. The decoder cannot, given
an oracle for f' that is only correct with probably 1/2 (over the inputs), recover f with
probability greater than 1 - 6. This is because doing so would contradict the hardness
of f: computing any f' with error rate 1/2 is computationally easy, so the oracle can be
simulated by an ACo circuit, and we get a circuit for computing f. On the other hand, the
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reduction does recover from error rate 1/2 - E(k), computing f correctly with probability
1 - 6 - poly log(k). This gives a distinguisher between error rates 1/2 and 1/2 - e(k), which
in turn (as in the proof of Theorem 6.6.4) leads to an algorithm for computing majority on
O(E(k)) bits. The full details are omitted.
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